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LJ.%. A(^ nOC Ix^^ij^toa.TVcv\ey\\ci.\ Cc.rrxm\TTe'e- Tci Havy)j\e_ T% E. .ft.TWjec^ 

Study of the War and Navy Departments’ Ad Hoc Committee 


on the Treatment of the 

German Aircraft 
Industry 

from the Standpoint of 
International Security 



DELEGATED BY THE 
ENEMY BRANCH 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 


JULY 10, 1945 '— R E S T R I ft E D 

I \_. e. . \<\ 4.1, -j 

^ J *, 3 









T. I. D. C. Projects on German Industrial and Economic Disarmament 


NO. 

TITLE 

DELEGATED TO 

1 

Implements of War . 

War and Navy Departments. 

2© 

Aircraft . 

War and Navy Departments. 

7 

Scientific Research . 

OSRD—NACA. 

4 . 

Secret Weapons.. 

War and Navy Departments. 


Light Metals... 

TIDC. 

6 . 

Petroleum . 

TIDC. 

7 . 

Rubber . 

TIDC. 

8 . 

Electronics . 

TIDC. 

9 . 

Bearings .. 

TIDC. 

10 . 

Common Components . 

TIDC. 

11 . 

Machine Tools. 

TIDC. 

12 . 

Automotive . 

TIDC. 

13 . 

Shipbuilding and Shipping. 

WSA—Maritime. ' 

14. 

Machinery . 

FEA Engineering Staff. 

15a . 

Iron & Steel . 

TIDC. 

15b . 

Ferro Alloys . 

TIDC. 

16 . 

Chemicals ... 

TIDC. 

17 . 

Solid Fuels . 

TIDC. 

18 

Power. 

TIDC. 

19 . 

Nonferrous Metals & Strategic Minerals. 

TIDC. 

20/27 . 

Import and Trade Controls. 

TIDC. 

21 . 

Permanent Disarmament Commission.. 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

22 . 

Territorial Separation . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

23 . 

Agriculture . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

24 . 

Development of Safe Industries . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

25 . 

External Economic Security . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

26 . 

Cartels . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

28 . 

Governmental & Economic Institutions. 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

29 . 

Historical Background . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 

30 . 

Forest Resources . 

TIDC. 

31 . 

Scientific Equipment . 

TIDC. 

32 . 

Transportation & Communications . 

FEA Drafting Committee. 


Preface 

This preliminary TIDC report is one of a series undertaken at the request of the FEA by the War and Navy Departments 
(1, 2, & 4), the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (3), the 
War Shipping Administration and Maritime Commission (13). It has been prepared in response to a directive to Mr. Crowley 
by the late President Roosevelt (in a letter dated September 28, 1944) to “accelerate” studies of “what should be done after 
the surrender of Germany to control its power and capacity to make war in the future.” This delegation was made by FEA 
because the technical knowledge and ability in this field available to and within the American Government is concentrated in 
these sister agencies. 

This study is a report to not by the FEA. Hence, in using this document for its own information, and distributing it for 
the advice and information of U. S. officials, FEA does not necessarily endorse the views stated herein. 

The recommendations in this report are presented with but superficial regard to the recommendations which will emerge 
simultaneously from comparable studies on other industries. Hence, the cumulative impact of the total of all recommendations 
on the German economy and its war-making power could not be taken into account in the preparation of each report. 

The Committee was expressly instructed to refrain from dealing in any detail with the cartel and intercorporate relation¬ 
ships of the industry under study even if these relationships were of considerable importance. The cartel problem is being 
treated separately in a special project (Project 26, The Post-Surrender Treatment of German Participation in International 
Cartels Affecting International Security). 

In line with the Yalta Declaration and subsequent statements by the President, FEA favors a firm program for disarming 
Germany industrially to the end of international security. It is expected that this report and the other TID reports will be 
used in formulating a precise U. S. program covering the whole field of German economic and industrial disarmament for 
discussion with the Allies, which may have to be both selective and accumulative in character. 

' ’ ; Henry H. Fowler 

DIRECTOR, ENEMY BRANCH 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 

j D' 0 H 4 












































































D C PP G *JSVA • 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 


T.I.D.C. Project 2 
The Treatment of the 

German Aircraft Industry 

front the Standpoint of 
International Security 


C 


Letter of Transmittal . 

Origin, Composition and Procedure of the Committee. 

Summary of the Study. 

Graphic Analysis of the German Aircraft Industry. 

List of Products Covered. 

Chapter I: Object of the Study .*. 

Chapter II: Industrial Analysis of the Aircraft Industry. 

General Characteristics .._. 

Relationship between Civilian Military Aeronautics. 

Conditioning of the C. S. Industry for War. 

Research and Development. 

Manpower. 

Materials. 

Machinery and Equipment. 

Plants. 

Management . 

German and l\ S. Industries Broadly Compared . 

Summary of German Developments 1918-1039. 

Chapter III: Technical and Statistical Analysis of the C. S. Aircraft 

Industry . 

Airframe Industry. 

Aircraft Engine Industry. 

Aircraft Propeller Industry. 

Aircraft Turbo-Supercharger Industry. 

Aircraft Landing Gear Industry. 

Aircraft Instrument Industry . 

Aircraft Electrical Equipment Industry . 

Aircraft Gun Turret Industry . 

Aircraft Gunsight and Computer Industry . 

Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Industry. 

Aircraft Modification Centers. 

Aeronautical Research and Development . 

Appendix A—Table 1—200 Major Aircraft Products. 

Table 2—Major Categories of Machine Tools Found in a Typical 

Airframe Plant . 

Charts 1. 2. and 3—-Aircraft Production 1940-45: Airframes. Engines 

and Propellers . 

Charts 4 and 5—Aircraft Industry Average Progress Curve. Em¬ 
ployees’ Output and Efficiency. 

'Tables 3 and -I—Material Breakdown. P-47 and B-29. 

( hart 6—Kev Aircraft Workers, Direct and Indirect. 

Charts 7a to g—Aircraft Material Procurement and Time Cycle 
Charts . 


l’age 

III 

1 

2 

4 
7 
7 

5 

s 

9 

10 

10 

11 

11 

12 

12 

12 

12 

13 

14 
14 
22 
27 
31 
34 
36 
39 
41 
45 
47 
51 

53 
57 

59 

54 

62 

61 

64 

65 


i 










































TABLE OF CONTENTS 


Page 

Table 5—Horsepower, weight and construction of various engine 

types . 72 

Table 6—Machine Tools and Equipment Required for R-1850-75 

Engine at 2,000 Monthly Rate. 72 

Tables 7 and 8—Materials Used in R-1830-90C and R-3350 Engines 73 

Charts 8 to 12—Development of 400 Cycle Lightweight Electric 

Motors and Progress of AAF Electrical Development since 1940. 74 

Chapter IV: Basic Policy Recommendations. 79 

Chapter V: Application of the Basic Policies. 79 

Basic Control Considerations . 79 

Fundamental Essentials . 79 

Major Prohibitions . 80 

Specific Actions for the Initial Period of Occupation. 80 

Initial Actions . 81 

Action During the Intermediate Occupation. 81 

General Observation . 81 

Complete Elimination Recommended . 82 

Complete Elimination Desirable . 84 

Reduction to a Predetermined Level . 85 

Plant Buildings and Services. 85 

Conditions to be Achieved by tbe End of Occupation. 85 

Post-Occupation Period . 86 

Chapter VI : Administrative Devices for Applying tbe Policies. 87 

Period of Occupation in General . 87 

Agencies Necessary . 87 

Post-Occupation Period . 88 

German Government Reports. 88 

Indication of Violations . 88 

Agencies for Collecting Data in Germany. 89 

Action Necessary in the Event of Violation. 89 

Appendix B : Bibliography. 89 


ii 





























AD HOC INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE 
TO HANDLE FEA PROJECTS 
5C-637—Pentagon Building 
Washington 25, D. C. 


10 July 1945. 


Mr. Leo T. Crowley, Administrator 
Foreign Economic Administration 
Washington 25. D. C. 

Dear Mr. Crowley: 

subject: Report on FEA Project Xo. 2. 

Submitted herewith is the Committee’s report on the subject project. 

The data presented, conclusions reached, and recommendations made represent the consensus of the 
Committee and do not. until formally approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, or their 
authorized representatives, constitute the official views of those Departments. 

Very truly yours, 

T. D. Ruddock 

REAR ADMIRAL, USX 

K. B. Wolfe 

MAJOR GENERAL, USA 

If. C. Minton 

BRIGADIER GENERAL, CSC 

B. G. Leighton 

CAPTAIN, USNR (RET.) 


Ill 



























































ORIGIN, COMPOSITION AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMMITTEE 


References: 

(a) Identical letters of Administrator, FEA. 

dated 0 February 1945. addressed sepa¬ 
rately to the Secretary of War and Sec¬ 
retary of the Navy. 

(b) FEA Interim Report on Study Projects re¬ 

lating to Gentian Economic and Industrial 
Disarmament dated 10 January 1945. 

A. Origin of the Committee 

By reference (a) the Administrator forwarded to 
the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy copies 
of reference (b) outlining twenty-seven Technical 
Industrial Disarmament Committees (TIDC) Study 
Projects relating to German Economic and Indus¬ 
trial Disarmament. The introduction to reference 
(b) quoted a passage from the President’s letter of 
29 September 1944 which established the broad 
purpose of the studies to be the determination 
“. . . what should be done after the surrender of 
Germany to control its power and capacity to make 
war in the future. " Reference (a) requested the 
military services to study and make recommenda¬ 
tions on the Post-Surrender Treatment of: 

Project 1. German Industry Involved in the 
Production of Armament. Munitions, and Im¬ 
plements of War. 

Project 2. The German Aircraft Industry. 

Project 4. German Engineering and Research 
in the “Secret Weapon” Field. 

After preliminary consideration bv various tech¬ 
nical agencies of two departments, it appeared that 
the three projects are so closely interrelated as to 
require correlation under one directing committee. 
Accordingly, a special Ad Hoc Interdepartmental 
Committee of the War and Navy Departments was 
formed to coordinate the pertinent subsidiary studies 
and to compile reports. 

B. Composition of the Committee 

The committee is composed of two representatives 
from the War Department and two from the Navy 
Department, namely: 


Rear Admiral T. D. Ruddock, USX 

(formerly Director of Production and Procure¬ 
ment Bureau of Ordnance, and later Assistant 
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy De¬ 
partment.) 

Major General K. B. Wolfe, AC, USA 

(Chief, Engineering and Procurement, A I SC. 1 
Brigadier General H. C. Minton. GSC, P SA 
( formerly Executive Officer to the Chief of 
Ordnance. Director, Production Division. ASF, 
1942 to date.) 

Captain Bruce G. Leighton, USXR (Ret.) 

(formerly Asst. Deputy Director, Aircraft Pro¬ 
duction Division. WPB. 1942. Later Produc¬ 
tion Executive, Office of BuAer. General Rep¬ 
resentative. Western District, 1943-1945.) 

A working staff of officers of the Army and Navy, 
with the necessary clerical assistance, was assembled 
and work started 1 May 1945. The staff consists of - 

Colonel X. Knowles, ASF 
Lt. Colonel T. F. Bowes, AAF 
Lt. Colonel H. G. Spillinger, AAF 
Lt. Comdr. L. S. Rockefeller, USNR 
Major A. M. Hartman, ASF 
Lt. R. W. Yosper, USXR 
Lt. F. D. McAlister, USXR 
Lt. R. S. McKnight, Tr., USXR 

C. Committee Procedure 

Because aircraft is an implement of war, and be¬ 
cause the general considerations which govern the 
production, operation, and control of aircraft are 
similar to, and many detailed elements identical to. 
those governing other implements of war. the com¬ 
mittee decided to treat Project 2 as complementary 
to Project 1. and to exclude from Project 2 consid¬ 
eration of matters not peculiar to the development, 
production, operation, and control of aircraft. Rock¬ 
ets. explosives and propellant powders, airborne 
ordnance, and related operational equipment are 
treated together with related items of surface 
forces and included in Project 1. 

Available information regarding the German air¬ 
craft industry is still fragmentary, hut enough is 


1 



known to establish that its pattern is fundamentally 
the same as that of the U. S. aircraft industry, even 
to the extent of manufacturing processes. 

The committee, therefore, decided that conclusions 
and recommendations based on an analysis of the 
U. S. industry should be generally applicable to the 
German industry. The Air Technical Service Com¬ 
mand was requested to prepare a detailed analysis 
of the U. S. industry for inclusion in the report. This 
appears as Part L of Chapter II of this report. 

D. Acknowledgments 

Assistance rendered in the preparation of this re¬ 
port by the following agencies is appreciatively 
acknowledged: 


(a) War Department. 

(1) Civil Affairs Division, WDSS 

(2) Operations Division. WDGS 

(3) Army Air Forces 

(4) Army Service Forces 

(b) Navy Department. 

(1) Bureau of Ordnance 

(2) Bureau of Aeronautics 

(3) Bureau of Ships 

(4) Office of Procurement and Material 

(c) European Advisory Commission 

(d) SHAEF 

(e) United States Group, Control Council 


SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 


This report—FEA Study Project 2 is a study by 
a special Ad Floe Interdepartmental (War and 
Navy) Committee on the Post-Surrender Treatment 
of the German Aircraft Industry. It is complemen¬ 
tary to two other FEA Project Studies simultane¬ 
ously conducted by this same committee —“German 
Industry Involved in the Production of Armament, 
Munitions, and Implements of War” (Project 1), 
and “German Engineering and Research in the 
‘Secret Weapons' Field” (Project 4). 

All three project studies (undertaken at the request 
of the Administrator of the FEA to the Secretaries 
of War and Navy) are incidental to a Presidential 
directive to the Administrator of the FEA to make 
studies “. . . from the economic standpoint of what 
should he done after the surrender of Germany to 
control its power and capacity to make war in the 
future." Coincident studies on individual industries 
and other aspects of the FEA studies above men¬ 
tioned are in course by other special Project Com¬ 
mittees appointed by FEA. 

FEA has stated the basic premise for Project 2 to 
be “that the German aircraft industry, military and 
civilian, should he wiped out.” 

General considerations applicable to all implements 
of war, including aircraft, are discussed in Project 1, 
and incorporated in Project 2 bv reference. The 
conclusions reached and controls recommended in 
Project 2 report are based on the assumption that 
the actions recommended by the Committee in Proj¬ 


ect 1 are made effective. A summary of Project 1 
is appended to this summary of Project 2 for ready 
reference. 

The report on Project 2 analyzes the facilities, 
processes, materials, manpower, and broad organic 
zational structure involved in an aircraft industry, 
and discusses the factors involved in the elimination 
of the German aircraft industry and preventive con¬ 
trol of its subsequent redevelopment. 

The Characteristics of an Aircraft Industry 

To a degree not equalled in any other major im¬ 
plement of war, the means for the development, pro¬ 
duction, and operation of military aircraft are 
common to those required for civilian aircraft. For 
control purposes civilian and military aeronautics 
must, therefore, be treated as one. 

An aircraft industry is a complex organism com¬ 
bining the activities and products of a wide variety 
of producers, most of whom have markets for similar 
services or products in other than aeronautical pur¬ 
suits. An aircraft industry is peculiarly dependent 
upon the existence of a central planning and directing 
authority in government to provide: 

A coordinated, comprehensive and continuous pro¬ 
gram of research and experimentation; 

Broad coordinating direction for the activities of 
its wide variety of component, producers and 
suppliers; 



Ground facilities and controlling direction for the 
assembly, proof testing and operation of its end 
products; and 

Money for its development, and markets for its 
products and services. 

It is therefore necessary to: 

(a) Eliminate during the occupation period not 

only the German General Staff and German 
air force but also all other government 
agencies devoted to the development or ex¬ 
ecution of plans for the design, manufac¬ 
ture, procurement, or operation of aircraft 
or any component thereof, and to prohibit 
their reestablishment thereafter. 

(b) Prohibit the manufacture, ownership, storage, 

or operation by the German Government, 
or by any public or private agency under 
German Government control or jurisdiction 
within Germany or outside of Germany, of 
any aircraft or aeronautical training devices, 
or the components thereof (except only 
such operation of civilian aircraft and facili¬ 
ties therefor as are provided for in (i) 
below). 

(c) Prohibit at any time the appropriation or dis¬ 

bursement of any funds by the German 
Government, or by any public or private 
agency in Germany, or by any agency out¬ 
side Germany under German Government 
control for the purposes or practices in (a'l 
and (b). 

Laboratory, Manufacturing, and Operating 

Facilities 

Most of the components of aircraft can he individu¬ 
ally manufactured in small plants with general pur¬ 
pose tools and equipment. Undercover manufacture 
of individual components in limited quantities will be 
practicallv impossible to prevent. The effective de¬ 
velopment of aircraft, however, requires model testing 
in wind tunnels whose form and equipment are dis¬ 
tinctive and which have no useful application to other 
purposes. Aircraft power plants also require exten¬ 
sive and quite distinctive proof test installations 
which have no useful application to other purposes. 
The assembly, storage and operation of aircraft re¬ 
quires special plants characterized by distinctive tool¬ 
ing in distinctive wide high-bay buildings and by 
adjacent airport facilities. 

It is therefore necessary to: 


(d) Destroy or remove for reparations, during the 

occupation period, and prohibit the recon¬ 
struction of: 

(1) All wind tunnels and aerodynamic 

laboratory equipment. 

(2) All aircraft engine test buildings 

and installations. 

(3) All propeller test installations. 

(4) All buildings and special purpose 

tools and equipment designed 
for the manufacture, assembly, 
storage, and maintenance of air¬ 
craft. 1 

(5) All airports and their equipment. 1 

(e) Search out and destroy all underground 

installations except those required for 
authorized mining and quarry operations. 

Major Control Considerations 

Because aircraft in the generic sense is the most 
powerful single implement of war, the general con¬ 
siderations and broad recommendations contained in 
Project 1 report are applicable to the aircraft indus¬ 
try. The unusually wide variety of essential services 
and components involved; the special and distinctive 
characteristics of development laboratories, proof test¬ 
ing facilities, and assembly plants; and especially the 
very nature of aircraft and their sphere of operation, 
all are such that the secret development of any suc¬ 
cessful aircraft is extremely difficult, and their secret 
production in any considerable quantities practically 
impossible, in any nation which does not exclude 
foreign visitors from its borders or set aside large 
restricted areas and prohibit entry thereto. Aircraft 
assembly and test installations are peculiarlv suscep¬ 
tible to discovery from the air. 

It is therefore necessary to require as a condition 
of withdrawal of occupation forces: 

(f) Freedom of entry to and travel in Germany 

by nationals of other nations who bear duly 
authenticated credentials. 

(g) Freedom for flight of aircraft of United Na¬ 

tions over German territory, subject to reg¬ 
ulation by international control agency. 

1 Except sucli buildings, airports and facilities as are re¬ 
quired by the occupation authorities for their own operations 
during the occupation period and except those thereafter re¬ 
quired for civilian aeronautic activities that are operated by 
non-German agencies specifically authorized by the United 
Nations. 


3 



GRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 


AIRCRAFT CONTROL DATA 


Central Control, 


Finance, and Related Industries: War Industries Aggregate. 


Component Parts 
and Equipment 



Airframes 
Engines 
Propellers 
Landing gear 
Control devices 
Instruments 
Turto-superchargers 
Electrical equipment 
Turrets 

Oxygen equipment 


Basic Materials 

Alumun 

ttagnesum 
Aloy Steels 
Forestry Products 
Systhetr Petroleum Products 


Project 2: Aircraft 




























Control Points 


RECOMMENDATIONS 


Identification 

Facilities 


of 



Destroy or remove tor reparations 
and prohibrt reconstruction: 


All wrd tunnels and aerodynamc 
laboratory equipment 


# Wnd tunnels for model testing 



All arcraft-engne test buildings 
and retaliations 

All propeller test nstallations 


# Proof test installations tor aircraft 
power plants 



All building and special purpose tools 
and equipment tor manufacture, assembly, 
storage, and maintenance of arcraft 
except those required for authorized 
civilian aeronautic activities 


• Wide hrgh-hay buildings 



All arports and other activities 

All underground installations except 
those repred tor authorized operations 
such as mining and quarrying 


# Airport facilities for assembly, 
storage, and operations 


# Easy to identity 


Control Policies-General 


[Innate the German General Staff. German Ar Force, all other Government 
^ agencies devoted to development or execution of plans tor design, manufacture, 
prucuement or operatnn of arcraft or any component part. 




Prohibrt manufacture, ownership, storage, or operation by any pubic or private 
agency of any arcraft or aeronautical tramng devces or components (except 
facilities requred for authorized crvi aeronautic activities by non-German 
agencies). 


Prohiut the appropriation or dishisement of any funds by the German Government 
^ or by any pubic or private agency under German control for the purposes 
or practices outlined above. 


Control Procedures (to be uniformly applied throughout all Germany) 


Base Materials: 



[Innate akrmum. magnesium, synthetic od, and gasoline production. 
Control alloy steel and forest products productcn. 

Components Marutactire: 



Reduction of general industrial capacity to and mantenance at. a level wheh leaves no 
excess tor military production. 


Arcraft Armament: 



Prohibrt manufactire. acquisition, storage, or operation of any arms, ammunition, 
or implements of war. 


[ngmeemg and Research: (Arcraft Design) 



[Innate courses n aeronautical engmeemg and related specialties, and prohibit 
ther reestablishment. 


Register and keep under surveillance individuals quaified to conduct such courses. 
Civil Aeronautics: 



Aerial surveys for effective control of redevelopment of German industrial establishments 
or ar operatng facte. 

Prohibrt German possession, operatnn. or martenance ot any arcraft. 

Estabksfi an ntemataial agency: 

To manage and operate all "civilian" ftyng over German temtory; 

To control all ground services for arcraft: 

To control all ar traffic over Germany. civSan and military, by any nation. 

Post-Occupation Surveillance: (under organization created by United Nations). 

Freedom ot entry and travel in Germany by accredted nationals of other natens. 

freedom of light for arcraft of United Natcns over German territory subject to 
regulation by ntematoial control agency. 

Control through ntemational agreements: 

Imports and exports of strategic raw or hast materials: development ot 
ndustry for manufacture ot war materials n adjacent territory: commercial 
or industnal activities of other nationals n Germany: commercial, industrial, 
experimental activities ot Germans abroad: cartel arrangements ot all krds, 
patents and patent rights. 


^2 QUAHTITATIVE , QUALITATIVE COMPLETE 

LIMITATIONS V* ' LIMITATIONS ELIMINATION 

















Civil Aeronautics 

The nature of civil aeronautics is such that, at least 
during the occupation period, a considerable amount 
of “civil” air transport in and through Germany will 
be necessary to the functions of the occupation forces. 
Civil aeronautics in German hands is an ideal cloak 
and springboard for redevelopment of military aero¬ 
nautics, but the continuation of some “civil” air 
transport into the post-occupation period will doubt¬ 
less be a necessary part of international air transport, 
and probably necessary to the internal civilian econ¬ 
omy. Aerial surveys will be very useful to effective 
control of redevelopment of German industrial estab¬ 
lishments. Such aircraft and appurtenances as are 
necessary for these operations should be of non- 
German design and manufacture. 

It is therefore necessary to: 

(h) Deny to Germany the possession, opera¬ 

tion, or maintenance of any aircraft. 

(i) Establish an international agency for the 

control, management and operation of all 
“civilian” flying in and over German ter¬ 
ritory and for the control of all ground 
services for aircraft, and make all flights 
both “civilian and military” by any nation 
in that territory subject to a traffic con¬ 
trol organization operating under the 
direct control and regulation of the inter¬ 
national agency. 

Component Manufacture 

Aircraft component manufacture is largely derived 
from general industry. This committee’s report on 
Project 1 discusses the control of general industry 
and recommends reduction of general industrial 
capacity to, and maintenance at, a level which leaves 
no significant excess for military production. Such 
action would effectively control redevelopment of air¬ 
craft component manufacture. No special additional 
action appears necessary for aircraft components. 

Basic Materials 

The materials of aircraft manufacture and opera¬ 
tion are applicable to general civilian requirements. 
Especially important to aircraft are aluminum, mag¬ 
nesium, alloy steels, forestry products, and synthetic 
petroleum products. Production of all these prod¬ 
ucts should be closely controlled, and facilities for the 
production of alumina and aluminum ingot, magne¬ 
sium ingot, and synthetic oil and gasoline should be 

6 


completely eliminated. Discussion and recommenda¬ 
tions for controls of basic materials are contained in 
this committee’s report on Project 1. 

Aircraft Armament 

Because armament for aircraft is generally similar 
in nature and derived from the sources common to 
all other implements of war, the discussions and rec¬ 
ommendations regarding armament items, contained 
in this committee’s report on Project 1, are applicable 
to aircraft, and are not included in this report. 

Engineering and Research 

Although the manufacture of aircraft in limited 
quantities is practicable with general purpose facili¬ 
ties, the design of aircraft, even in single units, is a 
highly specialized art requiring a unique combination 
of (1) highly specialized training in theoretical aero¬ 
dynamics, (2) highly specialized training in high 
capacity internal combustion prime movers and (31 
practical experience in specialized light weight struc¬ 
tures. 1 These elements are individually so highly 
specialized, and yet so closely interdependent, that 
the successful design of modern aircraft necessarily 
requires the organized and concerted efforts of a con¬ 
siderable number of individual specialists, each of 
whom must have a general acquaintance with the 
problems of the others. 

The training of such specialists involves the prac¬ 
tical necessity for organized Aeronautical Engineer¬ 
ing Schools. In all countries these schools work in 
close collaboration with the major elements of indus¬ 
try that specialize on aircraft manufacture and opera¬ 
tion. The very nature of the qualifications, training, 
and experience required to organize and direct such 
educational and training courses is such that appro¬ 
priately qualified individuals are very few in number 
and usually widely known. Because of the peculiarly 
significant relationship of Aeronautical Engineering 
Schools to the aircraft industry it is necessary during 
the occupation period to: 

(j) Eliminate organized courses in Aeronautical 

Engineering and related specialties, and 
prohibit their reestablishment. 

(k) Register and keep under surveillance the in¬ 
dividuals who are qualified to conduct such 

courses. 

1 The large number of more detailed specialities involved 
in miscellaneous minor components and equipment items, 
although important, is here omitted from consideration for 
reasons indicated under “Component Manufacture” above. 



PRODUCTS AND INDUSTRY COVERED 


A. Products 

1. Aircraft —The term “Aircraft” as used herein 
includes all weight-carrying devices designed to be 
supported in the air by action of an airfoil or by 
self-contained buoyancy, such as airplanes, gliders, 
helicopters, airships, balloons and all their component 
parts and equipment such as: 

a. Airframes. 

b. Engines. 

c. Propellers. 

d. Landing gears. 

e. Control devices. 

f. Instruments. 

g. Turbo-supercharges. 

h. Electrical Equipment. 

i. Turrets. 

Aircraft armament is not included in this report 
but is covered in Project Xo. I. 

B. Industries 

1. Specific —Following is a list of industries which 
produce the items listed in A above: 

Airframe Industry. 

Aircraft Engine Industry. 

Aircraft Propeller Industry. 


Aircraft Turbo-Supercharger Industry. 

Aircraft Landing Gear Industry. 

Aircraft Instrument Industry. 

Aircraft Electrical Equipment Industry. 

Aircraft Gun Turret Industry. 

Aircraft Gunsight and Computer Industry. 
Aircraft Oxygen Equipment Industry. 

2. General —Following is a list of industries which 
have directly to do with the production of the end 
items listed in A above: 

Light Metals and other non-ferrous Metals. 

Oil and Petroleum. 

Rubber and Rubber Products. 

Radio and Radar (Electronics). 

Bearings. 

Machine Tools. 

Automotive. 

Machinery. 

Steel and Ferro-alloys. 

Chemicals. 

Electric Power. 

Strategic Minerals. 

Forest Products. 

Optical Glass and Technical and Scientific Equip¬ 
ment. 

Jewelry and Watch making. 


chapter i : 

OBJECT OF THE STUDY 


To recommend action and administrative pro¬ 
cedures, in relation to aircraft, conforming to the 
major U. S. Policy “to eliminate or control all Ger¬ 
man Industry that could be used for military 
production.” This involves corollary policies to 
insure that: 

A. “The German Aircraft Industry, military and 

civilian, should be wiped out.” 

B. “Germans are prohibited and prevented from 

producing, maintaining, or operating all types 
of aircraft.” 


It is assumed at the outset that the achievement 
of these objectives will require: 

C. Immediate confiscation in Germany of all air¬ 

craft, and prohibition of their manufacture 
in the future. 

D. Immediate closing and eventual destruction or 

removal of all facilities and establishments 
employed exclusively in the design, develop¬ 
ment, manufacture, operation, and storage 
of aircraft, except such as are required for 
the uses of, and directly controlled by the 
occupation forces. 


/ 













E. The destruction prior to the withdrawal of the 
occupation forces of all facilities for the 
design, development, and manufacture of air¬ 
craft of all types, in Germany. 

E. The direct ownership, control, and operation 
by agencies specified by the United Nations, 
of all civil aeronautic activities required for 
the civilian economy of Germany in the 
post-occupation period, and the exclusion 
of German participation therein. 


G. The destruction of all facilities for the mainte¬ 

nance and operation of aircraft in excess of 
the minimum requirements of activities in F. 

H. The elimination or control of the production 

of basic materials used in the manufacture 
of aircraft. 

I. The elimination of state support of industries. 

establishments, or institutions devoted to 
the development or production of aircraft. 


c ii a r t e r t i : 

THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY, AN INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS 


K O R E W O R t) 

An analysis of the U. S. aircraft industry indi¬ 
cates that, because of its relationship to and its 
dependence upon other industries, only a limited 
number of special controls will be necessary to effect 
the policy of this government with respect to the 
German aircraft industry, if the other German in¬ 
dustries are adequately controlled. Controls peculiar 
to the aircraft industry will be elaborated herein. 
Since controls of other industries are treated in 
complementary studies by this committee (Projects 
1 and 4) and in other FEA studies, only the nature 
and importance of such controls from the viewpoint 
of controlling German aircraft industry will be re¬ 
ferred to herein. 

The volume production of aircraft and related 
equipment requires extensive research and develop¬ 
ment, manpower, materials, production equipment, 
plants and related facilities and managerial organiza¬ 
tions; all of these must be planned, directed and 
financed by a central government authority. The 
control of the German aircraft industry, therefore, 
must be directed at these factors. 

Sections A through K of this chapter discuss the 
broad organizational characteristics of an aircraft 
industries aggregate. In section L appears a de¬ 
tailed technical and statistical analysis of the United 
States Aircraft Industry in individual elements as 
prepared by the ATSC at Wright Field. 

A. The General Characteristics of an Aircraft 
Industry 

An analysis of the German war-time aircraft in¬ 


dustry would obviously furnish the best guide for 
this study, but the type and volume of data required 
are not yet available in this country. From what is 
alreadv known of the German war-time aircraft in¬ 
dustry, however, it appears that, although there are 
certain differences in details of organization and 
administration, the pattern of the German aircraft 
industry is fundamentally the same as that of the 
l . .S', aircraft industry even to the extent of most 
of the manufacturing processes. Conclusions and 
recommendations drawn from an analysis of the 
U. S. industry therefore should be generally ap¬ 
plicable to the German aircraft industry. 1 

T he term “aircraft” as used in this report includes 
all weight-carrying devices designed to be supported 
in the air by action of an air foil or by self-contained 
buoyancy, such as airplanes, gliders, helicopters, air¬ 
ships, and balloons and all of their component parts 
and equipment, such as engines, propellers, landing 
gears, control devices etc. Although specific analy¬ 
sis of lighter-than-aircraft and carrier equipment, 
peculiar to Naval aeronautics are not included as 
separate subjects in this report, the materials and 
processes involved in their manufacture are similar 
and the controls recommended are applicable. 

As will appear from the discussion, in later sec¬ 
tions, an aircraft industry is a complex organism 
combining the activities and products of a wide 

1 A summary of presently known significant differences in 
organization and administration in the U. S. and German Air¬ 
craft industries appears as part J of this chapter. 


8 



variety of producers, most of whom have markets 
for similar services or products iu other than aero¬ 
nautical pursuits. It is peculiarly dependent upon 
the existence of a central planning and directing 
authority in government to provide: 

A coordinated comprehensive and continuous pro¬ 
gram of research and experimentation: 

Broad coordinating direction for the activities of 
its wide variety of component producers and 
suppliers; 

Ground facilities and controlling direction for the 
assembly, proof testing and operation of its end 
products: and 

Money for its development and markets for its 
products and services. 

B. The Relationship between Civil and Military 

Aeronautics 

Because civil aeronautics in Nazi Germany has 
been wholly absorbed into and integregated with the 
military, it must he considered and treated as one 
with the military during the occupation period, and 
will doubtless he so treated by the occupation forces. 
As a guide to what may he expected in Germany in 
the post occupation period, here considered is the 
general innate relationship of civil to military aero¬ 
nautics. not onlv in Germany but as indicated In¬ 
experience in other countries where the two are (at 
least nominally) operated independently in peace. 

With the existing disruption of ground transport 
in Germany, extensive air transport is a vital neces¬ 
sity to the effectiveness of the occupation forces in 
Germany. It will doubtless continue so throughout 
the occupation period. Thereafter in Germany, as 
elsewhere in the world, the continued operation of 
at least a limited number of “civil" aircraft will cer¬ 
tainly he necessary to the civilian economv as well as 
to the needs of international communications. Cer¬ 
tainly the people of Germany will argue (and with 
growing justification as the general world-wide use 
; of civil aeronautics expands) that such activities as 
air mail and express, insect control, aerial surveys for 
municipal, agricultural, and forestry development: 
emergency medical service, and the like, are non- 
military in character and that they should be per¬ 
mitted to develop along with other civil needs to the 
extent that the purely civilian economy needs them 
and can support them. 

During the occupation period these activities will 
presumably be carried on by the occupation forces 


not by Germans. Upon the withdrawal of the occu¬ 
pation forces what should then be done? 

It is significant to note that, historically, civil aero¬ 
nautics even where has stemmed largely from the 
militarv. Government appropriations (either through 
direct purchase of military types or largely influenced 
by national defense considerations > have carried the 
preponderance of the overhead expense of basic re¬ 
search, experimentation, and plant development, and 
the standardization of material and process specifica¬ 
tions. Nowhere but in the United States has civil 
aeronautics even approached a state of self-support 
and independence, and even in the U. S. A. consider¬ 
able measure of the support is derived, at hast in¬ 
directly, from international transport. In present 
conditions the independence of civil air transport is 
more nominal than real. 

Economical civil air transport is predominantly 
long range transport of international scope by Euro¬ 
pean distance standards. It does not appear likely 
that in a countrv of so limited distances as Germany 
the market for internal air transport for purely 
civilian needs will be large enough to make it self- 
supporting. other than as a complement to a more 
extended international system. 

Economical aircraft production is dependent on 
large volume. The volume required for Germany's 
internal civilian needs certainly would not support a 
German aircraft industry. The cost of its products 
would certainly preclude sales in competitive civil 
markets abroad, unless heavily subsidized. Such an 
industry, once established, would be under the power¬ 
ful temptation—even the compulsion—to turn to the 
military field for the preservation of its verv exist¬ 
ence. This temptation—or compulsion—is not pecu¬ 
liar to the atmosphere of Germany. It is inherent in 
the very nature of the relationship between civil and 
military aeronautics as it has long existed, still exists, 
and will probably continue to exist until the (as yet 
unpredictable) day when civil air transport as such 
has reached proportions enabling it to stand unsup¬ 
ported on its own feet. 

America’s own national defense needs during the 
earlier phases of the current world war forced her to 
impress directly into military service practicallv everv 
privately owned airplane in America. Her civil aero¬ 
nautic schools at once became the primary training 
ground for military pilots and mechanics, her soaring 
plane enthusiasts (essentially a "sporting fraternity" i 
became a serious nucleus in the development of a 
military glider force, her air transport lines have been 


9 






filled to capacity with military personnel or civilians 
travelling on the business of war. and a large number 
of her “civil aeronautics” personnel were called im¬ 
mediately to military service to become executives, 
pilots and mechanics in the military services. On 
release from military service a large number of pilots 
and mechanics immediately turn to civil aeronautics, 
retaining their understanding of military operations 
and the fraternal ties that are a universal accompani¬ 
ment of flight operations. 

No formula has anywhere yet been found for a 
clear distinction between civil and military aeronau¬ 
tics, nor does it now appear likely to be found in 
this generation. This is especially true in Germany 
where military and civil aeronautics have always been 
blood brothers, and where there has been not even 
the semblance of separation for at least seven years. 

The conclusion is inescapable that in any nation 
civil and military aeronautics arc closely complemen¬ 
tary, and that in any nation suspect of intent to 
develop a military air force, the manufacture or oper¬ 
ation of civil aircraft by its nationals offers at once 
a ready made cloak and springboard for the inception 
of a military air force, and a powerful temptation to 
use it. 

For the foregoing reasons the development, manu¬ 
facture. ownership and operation of civil aircraft in 
Germany, or by Germany or German nationals anv- 
where, should be treated alike with military activities. 
Such “civil” air activities as are necessary to Ger¬ 
many’s internal civilian economv, or to international 
communication, should continue, after the with¬ 
drawal of occupation forces, to be operated under 
international control and by other than German 
nationals. 

While this may at first sight appear harsh or 
impracticable, it is pointed out that Germany’s own 
extended “civil" air operations in other nations in 
the “pre war” period were with rare, if any, signifi¬ 
cant exceptions conducted with German built air¬ 
craft, and operated by German nationals under Ger¬ 
man management. Moreover it should be noted 
that these operations were frequently accompanied 
by the establishment in “other nations” of factories 
or ground facilities for the manufacture, develop¬ 
ment, or operation of military aircraft which were 
nominally owned or controlled by local interests, 
but in which German nationals almost invariable 
occupied strongly influential positions, either as 
direct employees or as “technical advisors.” These 
activities constituted the most important sustaining 


element in the development of Germany’s airpower 
and contributed in important measure to the growth 
and spread of German economic influence. 1 

C. The Conditioning of the U. S. Industry for War 

The present United States aircraft industry repre¬ 
sents a 160-fold expansion of the pre-war industry. 
From an annual sales volume of less than $100 million 
in the typical pre-war years of 1936 and 1937, the 
industry expanded to a sales volume of $16 billion 
in 1944, or four times the best pre-war volume of 
the automobile industry. Whereas only about 3,000 
airplanes aggregating less than 12 million pounds 
airframe weight were produced in the average pre¬ 
war year, over 100.000 airplanes, or more than 1200 
million pounds of airframe weight were turned out 
in 1944. This huge expansion program presented 
a number of special problems. To plan, coordinate 
and direct the mobilization of resources required for 
this program, a central authority had to be estab¬ 
lished in the Government, workers had to be re¬ 
cruited and trained on a national scale, production 
capacity had to be increased many fold not only in 
the aircraft industry but also in the basic supply and 
machine tool industries, the resources of other in¬ 
dustries had to be converted to aircraft production, 
and funds had to be made available to defray the cost 
of the program. The United States war time air¬ 
craft industry, high-lighted below, is the product of 
these special measures. 

D. Research and Development 

Because of the very rapid progress in the field of 
aeronautics, research and development plays a highly 
critical role in aircraft production. The task of 
maintaining the nation’s leadership in aircraft design 
and performance is shared by the Government, in¬ 
dustry, and the technical schools. The overall plan¬ 
ning, direction and financing of the nation’s aircraft 
research and development program is the responsi¬ 
bility of the Government. The actual research and 
development, for the most part, is carried on by the 
industry and the technical schools fto a great ex¬ 
tent in facilities provided by the Government) 
although the Government through the Armed Serv¬ 
ices also maintains and operates extensive develop¬ 
ment and testing facilities. 

l A summary of German Developments in the Period 
1918-1939 appears as part Iv of this chapter. 


10 



E. Manpower 

Over 2 million persons were directly employed in 
the aircraft industry in 1944. Almost 50 percent 
were employed in airframe prime contractor plants, 
about 15 percent in engine prime contractor plants, 
another 15 percent in prime contracting plants of 
the other segments of the industry, and the remain¬ 
ing 20 percent in plants of aircraft subcontractors of 
all types. Less than 5 percent of these persons mav 
he considered key workers such as engineers, tool 
designers, tool makers, mechanics, machinists, drafts¬ 
men, foremen, etc., and no more than 10 percent 
of the total labor force in the industry may he con¬ 
sidered skilled. The great mass of workers have 
been recruited and trained during the war years and 
number among them many who were never previously 
employed in manufacturing industry. Approxi¬ 
mately one-third of this labor force is composed of 
women, a somewhat higher percentage in airframes 
and a lower percentage in the other segments of 
the industry. 

The success with which unskilled labor was util¬ 
ized was not only due to the large scale training pro¬ 
grams provided by industry and the Government, 
but also to the application of proven manufacturing 
methods developed by the mass production industries 
which provided a high degree of worker specializa¬ 
tion. Productivity per worker increased many 
times during the war years, not onlv bv the extension 

T A P. L E A : 


of the work week but also by the continued improve¬ 
ment in worker efficiency and the development of 
more efficient manufacturing methods and manage¬ 
ment organization. 

Among the major labor problems encountered by 
the aircraft industry during the present war were 
high turn-over and absenteeism rates, caused princi¬ 
pally by inadecjuate community services such as 
transportation and housing. These were solved by 
large scale Government housing programs and Gov¬ 
ernment aid to transportation companies. 

F. Materials 

Aluminum, magnesium and alloy steels are the 
three principal raw materials used in the manufacture 
of aircraft. Although this country has not been very 
successful in the production of all-wood powered 
airplanes (small numbers of several types have been 
manufactured), wood and adhesives as well as 
textiles and dopes are used in large quantities for 
the manufacture of gliders, control surfaces for metal 
airplanes, and in the case of some light non-combat 
airplanes, certain other structural parts. Copper is 
required in large amounts for the production of the 
many types of electrical equipment used in modern 
aircraft. Beryllium copper and phosphorus bronze, 
although not as important in terms of quantity, are 
essential for the manufacture of aircraft instruments. 
The following is a list of the more important raw 
materials used in aircraft manufacture: 


Third Quarter 1944 Total U. S. Material Allotment and Aircraft Requirement 


Material 

Total allotments 

U. S. 1 

Aircraft production 
requirements 

Percent 
aircraft to total 

Copper . 


71.292.000 pounds . 


Alloy Steel 1 . 

2.342,505 net tons . 

322,000 net tons . 

14.0 

Aluminum 1 . 

778,000,000 pounds . 

504.000,000 pounds . 

65 0 

Carbon Steel . 

16,095,772 net tons . 

125,000 net tons . 

0.8 

Beryllium . 


123,000 pounds . 


Cobalt (Ore and concentrated 
crude) . 

1,514,000 pounds . 

368,000 pounds . 

24.0 

Cordage Hihers. 


1,069,000 pounds . 


Magnesium . 

74,423,000 pounds . 

21,363,000 pounds . 

29.0 

. 


152,000 pounds . 


Monel . 

9,940.000 pounds . 

820,000 pounds . 

0.8 

Nickel . 

48,101,000 pounds . 

242,000 pounds . 

.5 

Nylon . 

7.900,000 pounds . 

3,572,000 pounds . 

45.0 

Ravon (High tenacity) . 

32.100,000 pounds . 

1,982,000 pounds . 

6.0 

Rubber . 

257,655 long tons . 

10.560 long tons . 

4.0 

Tungsten (Ore and concentrates) 

4,795,667 pounds . 

26,455 pounds . 

0.6 

Plywood . 

378,650,000 sq. ft. 

7,600,000 sq. ft. 

2.0 


1 Allotment to all Claimant Agencies. 

11 

































































Among the so-called purchased parts, jewel and 
anti-friction hearings stand out because of their 
critical position in this war. I he former are in¬ 
dispensable to the manufacture of high precision 
aircraft instruments and the latter to the manufacture 
of aircraft items such as engines, propellers, landing 
gear, generators, electric motors and practically every 
other moving part of an airplane. 

G. Machinery and Equipment 

Approximately one-quarter ol a million machine 
tools and major items of production equipment were 
employed in the aircraft industry at peak production. 
About SO percent of these were general purpose and 
similar to those used in other industries. I he re¬ 
maining 20 percent were special purpose tools or 
production equipment designed around some particu¬ 
lar aircraft part or manufacturing operation. These 
were the high production tools indispensable to vol¬ 
ume production of aircraft. In dollar cost they 
greatly exceeded 20 percent of the total value ol 
machine tools and production equipment in the air¬ 
craft industry. It should be noted, however, that 
anv aircraft item can be produced, although much 
less efficiently, with general purpose machine tools 
only. 

Machine work is much more important in the 
manufacture of engines, propellers, landing gear and 
similar items, than in the production of airframes. 
Only about 20 percent of the manhours involved in 
the fabrication and assembly of a typical metal air¬ 
frame are expended in machine operations, compared 
to about 50 percent in the case of engines. The 
line between hand labor and machine work cannot be 
too finely drawn since many operations performed 
by machines can lie accomplished by hand labor, 
especially in airframe manufacture. The volume 
production of aircraft, however, is dependent not 
only on the availability of large numbers of machine 
tools and other production equipment, but especially 
on the availability of high production special pur¬ 
pose machine tools and equipment. 

H. Plants 

Plant area devoted to the fabrication and assembly 
of airframes, engines, and propellers (the three major 
components of the aircraft industry) amounted to 
over 150 million square feet in 1944, or 14 to 15 
times the plant area available in 1939. Additions 
to pre-war plants and the construction of new plants 


(financed principally by the Government) accounted 
for the major portion of this expansion. C onverled 
plants represented less than 10 percent of the total. 
The possibilities of converting peace time plants to 
airframe assembly were very limited because of the 
requirements for wide high-bay areas and adjacent 
airport facilities. Thus, only four plants have been 
converted for this purpose during the war. They 
represent onlv 4 percent of the present total floor 
area devoted to the fabrication and assembly of 
airplanes. 

Plant conversion played a much more important 
role in engine and propeller production. Seventeen 
percent of the 1944 floor area devoted to engine fab¬ 
rication and assembly and 38 percent of the floor area 
devoted to propeller fabrication and assembly was 
provided bv conversion. The major portion of plant 
conversion to aircraft production has come about in 
connection with subcontractors and suppliers, where 
thousands of peace time plants have been adapted to 
production of aircraft parts and sub-assemblies 
While there is little statistical information available 
on this subject, it is safe to say that most subcontract¬ 
ing is performed in converted facilities. Except for 
the assembly of larger airframes, aircraft and air¬ 
craft parts and equipment can be manufactured in 
practically every type of peace time plant. 

I. Management 

The management organization of a typical aircraft 
company is not unlike that found in any manufactur¬ 
ing company, except for the greater prominence of 
the design and engineering department. Because of 
the rapid advancement in aeronautics, design and 
development is the life's blood of the typical aircraft 
company, and the personnel responsible for this func¬ 
tion are usually closely associated with top manage¬ 
ment. It was this nucleus of top management and 
engineering “know how” in the pre-war aircraft in¬ 
dustry, supplemented by the management resources 
of the nation’s mass production industries, which 
made possible the rapid expansion of aircraft produc¬ 
tion in this country. 

J. German and U. S. Industries Broadly Compared 

Extensive studies of the German aircraft industry 
arc being made in Europe by CIOS, bv T1TC, by 
teams of (i-2 SHAEF, and by other agencies. Avail¬ 
able information is still fragmentary, but enough is 
known to establish that in its major essentials, the 


12 


German aircraft industry generally parallels the 
broad pattern of the U. S. industry, although within 
ibis broad pattern there are highly significant differ¬ 
ences in organization and administrative policies and 
technical details. Among these differences probably 
the most highly significant from a control viewpoint 
are: 

(a) The complete integration of all German air¬ 
craft, experimental engineering, production and oper¬ 
ation, under one central directing organization. For 
example, a number of final assembly plants were 
operated directly hv the Luftwaffe, the “civilian fac¬ 
tories” acting as sub-assembly plants. (This should 
make the disintegration of the aircraft industries 
aggregate less difficult). 

(b) The complete regimentation of all German 
labor, and the retention in the industry of engineer- 
ing, supervisory, and mechanical skills under a policy 
which made them ineligible for combat service until 
proved otherwise, as opposed to the U. S. Policy 
which excused them from military induction only in 
exceptional cases, which placed the burden of proof 
of indispensability upon the individual employer, and 
left the decision primarily to local civilian draft 
boards. The German policy, plus the use of slave 
labor, plus the rigid military control over migration 
of all labor, left to all German establishments stable 
seasoned staffs of management, engineering, tooling, 
supervisory, and mechanical skills which permitted a 
rapidity of evolution in experimental engineering and 
productive efficiency not equalled in the United 
States. 

(c) The lavish variety of German experimentation 
on all manner of highly speculative devices in a 
large number of highly specialized and elaborately 
equipped individual laboratories. This provided an 
integrated but highly diversified program of special¬ 
ized experimentation, which, in combination with (a) 
and (b), gave to the German aircraft industry a 
rapidity of technical evolution, and a degree of flexi¬ 
bility and adaptability to rapidly changing tactical sit¬ 
uations, quite beyond the capacity of the U. S. 
Industry. 

(d) The marked emphasis on internal combustion 
turbines and jet and rocket propulsion, and on devel¬ 
opment and application of self-directing (“robot”) 
control devices, which in Germany at war’s end were 
distinctly in advance of U. S. developments in similar 
lines. 

(e) The elaborate underground laboratory and 
factor}- installations in Germany which, aside from 


their bomb proof characteristics, greatly facilitated 
preservation of secrecy. (The Y-2 project appears 
to have been initiated underground as early as 1928.) 

(f) The much longer period of continuous Ger¬ 
man concentration on war production under compul¬ 
sory government control has conditioned the individ¬ 
ual German establishment to far greater dependence 
on centralized government planning, and makes it 
far more amenable to government control than the 
individual U. S. establishment. (This factor is of es¬ 
pecial significance in considering control procedures.) 

Despite the important differences in administrative 
policies, present information indicates that the U. S. 
and German aircraft industries conform closely 
enough to a common broad pattern to warrant the 
assumption as a first approximation that the known 
requirements and broad essential requirements of 
the U. S. industry are applicable as a reference guide 
to an estimate of the requirements and the means of 
controlling the aircraft industry of Germany or any 
other nation which has or aspires to have an effective 
military air force. 

K. Summary of German Developments 1 91 8-1939 

From 1918 onwards there was, under German 
government encouragement, continuous development 
and manufacture of commercial types in Germany by 
Junkers and Dornier, with branches established in 
Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia 
where military types were constructed for export sale. 
Lufthansa established and extended commercial lines 
on an international scale. These activities were all 
conducted openly, and widely advertised to govern¬ 
ments abroad by German or German-connected sales¬ 
men seeking markets and demonstrating their wares 
to both commercial and military air officials from at 
least as early as 1924. This continued progressively 
and without formal protest by any of the Allied Na¬ 
tions until March 1935 when the German Govern¬ 
ment formally proclaimed the reconstitution of the 
German Airforces. Since 1918, there had probably 
been continuous secret broad military planning 
within Germany, and since 1933 certainly a consider¬ 
able amount of secret design and development activity 
in military types. The fact of its existence was 
known to many alert observers, and duly reported, 
even though the details and extent were somewhat 
obscure. 

Intensive development really started with the 
Airforce proclamation of March 1935. By that time 
there were some militarv aircraft in Germanv, but 


678184—46—2 


13 



they were few in number and of inferior design. 
Thereafter, the Germans made no attempt to conceal 
the fact of the existence and activity of their aircraft 
industry. On the contrary they boasted about it 
and offered inducements to professionally competent 
foreign visitors to come and see for themselves. 
American military engines were bought by Germany 
and delivered under approved U. S. State Depart¬ 
ment export licenses. German engineers in the 
meantime were given freedom to visit certain 
American factories by U. S. military authorities, to 
study American military designs. 

For three years thereafter expert foreign observers, 
including civilian engineers and military and air at¬ 
taches from major powers, had a considerable meas¬ 
ure of freedom in German factories and in aero¬ 
nautical laboratories—enough to give them fairly ac¬ 


curate knowledge of Germany’s industry organization 
and enough to establish independent but fairly con¬ 
sistent estimates that placed Germany’s capacity in 
1938 at about 1,000 aircraft per month—an estimate 
that was generally thought of as “fabulous” at the 
time, and widely discredited or ignored, not only by 
the public but by the governments of the foreign 
powers most vitally concerned. 

What happened in 1939 was not that the world 
was taken by surprise with an unheralded weapon 
developed in secret, but that the “Allied Nations” 
of 1918 lacked the foresight or the political courage 
(or had lost the will) to keep in force and to enforce 
the long flouted rules which they themselves had set 
up in 1919 as a means of preventing the develop¬ 
ment in Germany of a military air force under civil 
guise. 


CHAPTER III: 

A TECHNICAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 


AIRFRAME INDUSTRY 


General 

By the end of 1944, there were approximately 
fifty plants engaged in fabrication and assembly of 
airplanes under prime contract to the United States. 
These plants represented over 100 million square 
feet of floor space and an investment in plant and 
equipment greater than a billion dollars. 

Production from these plants reached a monthly 
peak of 9,000 planes or 100 million pounds of air¬ 
frame weight. More than a million persons were 
employed in the assembly plants and some 300,000 
additional in subcontracting plants. (See appendix 
A, charts 1-3, showing production programs, 1940 
to 1945, in airframes, engines, and propellers.) 

The airframe assembly industry started a rapid 
expansion in June 1940 from some 8 million square 
feet of floor area and 30,000 employees producing 
3 million pounds a month. The expansion was 
virtually completed and peak production reached in 
early 1944. The growth of production is more ac¬ 
curately reflected in the poundage output than in 
the units because of the greater emphasis on heavier 
planes in the later period. 


Product 

The principal types of planes assembled in an 
airframe plant include bombers, fighters, transports, 
trainers, gliders, liaison, observation, and targets. 

'The several types of planes vary considerably 
in size, weight, complexity and construction. Table 
B page 15, gives a general indication of these 
characteristics. 

The difficulty of production of an airplane is not 
only measured by its size but also by its design 
complexity. The installation of more and more 
equipment and controls to improve the combat ef¬ 
fectiveness of the plane adds considerably to its 
production problems. Higher rated engines, turbo 
superchargers, remote fire control systems, radio and 
radar equipment, pressurized cabins, additional arma¬ 
ment, leak proof fuel cells all complicate the manu¬ 
facturing process. In a typical fighter there are 
10,000 parts, 3,417 feet of wiring, 10,000 feet of 
hydraulic tubing, 36,700 rivets. A bomber has 
16,000 parts, 24,746 feet of wiring, 3,725 feet of 
hydraulic tubing, 334,250 rivets. (See Appendix A, . 
Table 1.) 


14 




TABLE B : 


Size, Weight, and Construction of Major Airplane Types 


Airplane type 

Weight 

empty 

(pounds) 

Wing 

span 

(feet) 

Rudder 

height 

(feet) 

Construction 

Heavv bombers . 

35,000-130,000 

100-230 

18-47 

Aluminum, stressed skin. 

Medium and light bombers 

17.000- 24.000 

60- 70 

16-20 

Aluminum, stressed skin. 

Fighters . 

2.700- 31.000 

27- 70 

7-15 

Aluminum, stressed skin. 

4-F transports. 

37.000-130.000 

117-230 

27-17 

Aluminum, stressed skin. 

2-E transports. 

4.800- 33.000 

52-108 

7-22 

Aluminum, stressed skin. 

2-E trainers. 

6,000- 8,000 

40- 50 

11-15) 

Tubular or wood frame, metal or fabric 

1-E trainers. 

4.000- 5.000 

40- 50 

6- 8) 

covered surfaces. 

filiders . 

3.000- 12.000 

83-105 

~ 1 

CV| 

1 

Wood or metal structure, fabric covered 
surfaces. 


The design and development process on new 
models required a considerable length of time. After 
development contracts are let. designs must he drawn, 
mock-up built, lofting templates made, an experi¬ 
mental airplane produced, and finally a production 
article. Studies indicate that it takes on an average 
of three years to get a production airplane after the 
experimental project is initiated. The time is some¬ 
what longer for larger airplanes and shorter for 
smaller types. Experience tends to show that, when 
that time is reduced appreciably, the time saved is 
generally lost in a slower production acceleration. 

For production purposes, the airplane is usuallv 
broken down into major components such as fuselage, 
wings, and empennage. Further breakdown of each 
of these components is made. The primary job of 
the airframe plant is to fabricate structural parts 
for the wing, empennage, and fuselage, and assemble 
them into an airframe, and install the engines, land¬ 
ing gear, and other equipment items. 

Plants and Layout 

The prime airplane plants range in size from 
100.000 square feet to over 7.000.000 square feet. 
More than half of the plants are over 2.000.000 
square feet and produce slightly over 95 percent of 
the total poundage output. In general, these plants 
are of permanent construction of structural steel and 
concrete, although some are solely of concrete blocks 
or wood or a combination of both. 

The special features of the airframe plant are its 
high hay and wide column spacing assembly areas, 
ramps, hangars, and airport facilities. The final 
assembly lines must provide adequate space for 
mounting the wings and empennage sections. Air¬ 


port runways must be long enough to enable take¬ 
off of the airframe and able to carry the landing 
weight of the plane. Runway loads may be as high 
as 300.000 pounds gross in the case of very heavy 
bombers now under construction, or. what is more 
to the point, upwards of 100,000 pounds per wheel. 
Xo runway in the United States currently will bear 
such a load. 

The general pattern of plant layout provides for 
ready receipt of raw materials, and a flow through 
sheet metal preparation, machine shop, bench, sub-, 
major, and final assembly. The production area 
generally amounts to about 45 percent of the total 
floor space, the remainder being represented in ware¬ 
houses, tool rooms, service departments, engineering, 
and administration. 

Plants located in the northern portion of the 
country require considerable heating facilities in 
order to maintain satisfactory working temperatures 
in the high bay areas. The plants throughout the 
south are generally equipped with air conditioning. 

The average airframe plant constructed since 1940 
required about 18 months to construct and get out 
the first production airplane. Some of the smaller 
plants were in production in 9 to 10 months, while 
some of the larger bomber plants required 24 to 30 
months. 

The production capacities of the airplane plants 
has not been fully demonstrated in many cases due 
to schedule changes and cutbacks. One plant of 
4.700.000 square feet produced 460 heavy bombers 
a month with 35 percent subcontracting. Under 
maximum capacity conditions the same plant could 
have probably produced over 800 bombers a month. 
Experience indicated that the capacity of plants pro- 


15 




































ducing bombers and transports is about 1.5 to 2.0 
airframe pounds per square foot and for fighters 1.0 
to 1.5 pounds per square foot. 

Machinery and Equipment 

Due to the large amount of subcontracting em¬ 
ployed, not all plants have a well balanced machine 
shop for integrated airframe production. Integrated 
manufacturing in a plant requires a balanced distribu¬ 
tion of standard tools such as lathes, milling machines, 
grinders, drill presses, boring, honing, and swaging 
machines, shears, saws, roll formers, brakes, and 
hammers. For high production, other machines are 
required, such as cylindrical, centerless, surface and 
thread grinders, automatic screw and milling ma¬ 
chines, turret lathes, multidrillers; forming, punch, 
and hydraulic presses. Supplementing these standard 
tools are special machines, such as tappers, duplicators, 
spar cap milling machines, extrusion and high speed 
millers, radial arm routers and drills, stretch presses, 
shrinking machines, extrusion benders, and leading 
edge rollers. The tool room requires its complement 
of tool room tools. In an average integrated air¬ 
frame plant, approximately 80 to 90 percent of the 
machines are standard and the remainder special. 

Large quantities of production equipment are re¬ 
quired, such as heat treat, anodic baths, paint, 
material moving, cloth cutting, sewing, doping, con¬ 
veyors, etc. See Appendix A, Table 2. 

The high tolerances required of the airfoils and 
structural sections involve the production of large 


quantities of bench, sub- and major assembly jigs 
in addition to those dies and fixtures needed in the 
machine and sheet metal shops. Every major struc¬ 
tural part is assembled or mated in such a jig, and 
the production of these in the quantities needed de¬ 
mands a large and able staff of tool design and fabri¬ 
cating personnel. With the use of large numbers 
of unskilled workers including women, tooling had 
to be redesigned and adapted to such skills as were 
available. 

Materials Used 

Metal Airframes. 

The basic raw materials used in the production 
of metal airframes include: 

Percent 


Aluminum alloy . 70 

Steel alloy. 15 

Magnesium . 5 

Other. 10 


Total . 100 


In the miscellaneous category are bronze, brass, 
wood, plexiglass, rubber, copper, nylon, linen, paint, 
and other chemicals. 

Aluminum is used in the form of sheet, forgings, 
castings, extrusions, tubings, and bar stock. Gen¬ 
erally, it is alloyed with copper, manganese, and 
magnesium to increase its tensile strength and “clad” 
with a thin coat of pure aluminum to protect it from 
corrosion. Some of the more common aluminum 
alloys currently used are shown below: 


table c : 



24 S 

14S 

195 

356 

75 S 

Copper . 

4.5% 

4.4% 

4.5% 


1.5% 

Magnesium . 

1.5 

0.4 


0.4 

2.5 

Manganese . 

0.6 

0.8 




Silicon . 


0.8 

1.2 

7.0 


Iron, maximum . 



1.0 



Zinc . 





5.5 

Chromium . 





0.2 

Tensile (clad) strength . 

64000 

70000 

35000 

35000 

76000 

Lbs./sq. ft. (bare). 

68000 




88000 

Major use. 

sheet 

forgings 

cast- 

cast- 




extrusions 

ings 

ings 



Although most airframe manufacturers depend on 
the aluminum companies for their raw stock, they 
also need heat treating equipment with a range of 


800° to 1000° F. and a control accuracy of +5°. 
Such equipment is used in effecting the changes in 
temperature required in forming aluminum shapes. 


16 





































As an indication of the quantity of aluminum re¬ 
quired in airframe production, including spares, it 
is pointed out that a B-29 uses: 

23,662 pounds sheet. 

1,418 pounds forgings. 

618 pounds castings. 

11,308 pounds extrusions. 

(See appendix A, tables 3 and 4, for detailed 
material breakdown of a P-47 and a B-29 by pounds.) 

Wood airplanes. 

The wood airframe industry calls for two other 
basic raw materials—wood and glue. Since the 
mass production of wood airplanes is not accom¬ 
plished as easily as metal, wood for the military air¬ 
plane is a substitute and all wood airplanes contain a 
certain percent of metal. (See Table D below.) 


table d : 


Types of wood Airplanes used 

By the AAF in World War II 

Percent 

wood 

AT-10 . 

. 95 

AT-21 . 

95 

C-76 . 

95 

PT-19 . 

50 

PT-12 . 

20 

C-78 . 

20 


Wood is selected for aircraft according to its 
density—a measure of strength. For structural 
parts, the Army Air Forces set Spruce as the prime 
wood, but permitted the following substitutes: Xoble 

I Fir, Douglas Fir. Western Hemlock, Yellow Poplar, 
and Port Orford Cedar. For plywood the following 
combinations were allowed: Mahogany on Mahog¬ 
any, Mahogany on Poplar, Birch on Birch, and as a 
substitute for Mahogany, Sweetgum, Black Walnut, 
and Douglas Fir were approved. Yellow Birch was 
specified for propellers. 

The AAF specified the types of wood because of 
their prevalence in the United States Forest Stands. 
They are in no way to be considered the only wood to 
be used in the manufacture of airplanes. For ex¬ 
ample, the highly successful all-wood British Mos¬ 
quito was made entirely of Birch. Many other types 
of wood can be used and scientists can find ways and 
means of improving the strength of almost any wood. 
A study of a nation’s forest stands will indicate its 
potential wood aircraft production. Large stands 
of pure stock facilitate economical mass production. 
Glue, the second major raw material of the wood 


airframe industry, has improved tremendously in 
this war through the introduction of the following 
synthetic resin adhesives: (1) phenol formaldehyde, 
(2) resourcinal formaldehyde, and (3) eurea formal¬ 
dehyde. Casein (curd of sour milk), the glue of 
World War I, was used for both plywood and struc¬ 
tural gluing, but was not water and mold resistant 
over a prolonged period. Today’s wood airplanes 
have a glue line durability equal to the life of the 
wood itself. 

Labor 

Employment in the airframe industry rose from 
59,000 in January 1940 to more than 900,000 in 
November 1943, a fifteen-fold expansion. This 
rapid expansion brought with it numerous problems 
of recruitment, training, supervision, up-grading, 
morale, labor relations, and working conditions, as 
well as community problems of housing, child care, 
transportation, and other facilities. The number of 
workers at individual plants varied considerably, 
ranging from 700 to 80,000. The following table 
shows a distribution of airframe plants in the U. S. 
by size of the labor force during April 1945. 


table e : 


Range of 
employment 

Number 
of plants 

Total 

employment 

0-10,000 . 

33 

110,000 

10,001-20,000 . 

14 

273,000 

20,001-30,000 . 

8 

183,000 

over 30,000 . 

5 

188,000 


The number of manhours required to build an 
airplane tends to follow a fairly consistent reduction 
curve determined by the cumulative number of planes 
produced. Chart 4, Appendix A, shows the man¬ 
hour per pound average curves for various types of 
planes. As more planes are produced and as the 
workers and management obtain more experience, 
the man-hours are reduced. For example, in the 
early stages of production, a B-29 required 336,000 
direct man-hours; however, by the time 1,000 B-29’s 
had been built at that plant, man-hours were re¬ 
duced to 33,065. The lowest recorded figure was 
0.35 man-hours per pound on a heavy bomber. 
Appendix A, chart 5, shows employee output and 
efficiency curves for the airframe industry, as a whole. 
Direct workers usually average about 40 percent of 
total employment depending upon the amount of re¬ 
search and development work being performed at 


17 


























tlie plant and the degree of tooling, planning, and 
mechanization of assembly methods. See Appendix 
A, Chart 6. The following table shows a sample of the 
employment and production rates of airframe plants: 


t a i; l e f : 


Model 

Monthly 

rate 

Percent of 
subcontracting 

Employment 

B-29 . 

105 

36 

18,500 

13-24 . 

324 

36 

23,400 

C-54 . 

59 

30 

17,000 

017 . 

312 

18 

20,000 

P-47 . 

310 

65 

5,300 


Turnover of workers in the airframe industry in¬ 
creased considerably during tbe war years. In 1941, 
about 30 workers out of every 100 quit. By 1943, 
this bad risen to 50 workers out of every 100 on 
the payroll. The work week has ranged from 37 
to 69 hours, averaging 45 hours in 1944. A fuller 
utilization of plant facilities was achieved by working- 
two ten-hour shifts, two nine-hour shifts, or three 
eight-hour shifts. By June 1944, personnel employed 
on the second and third shifts were averaging 44.8 
percent of total employment and represented 81.4 
percent of employees on tbe first shift. 

As demand for workers by war industries in¬ 
creased, the airframe plants found it necessary to 
draw on many new sources of workers, including 
housewives, farmers, and people from the service 
trades. Minority groups, such as negroes, handi¬ 
caps, and part-time workers, were called upon. For 
these groups of relatively unskilled workers, intensive 
training programs were necessary. Out-of-plant 
training schools ranging from two to six weeks were 
used to supplement on-the-job training. 

All-round highly skilled machinists comprised 
some five percent of the labor force in airframe fac¬ 
tories. Most of the workers have special skills of 
varying difficulty. The trend has continued rapidly 
toward greater job simplification and specialization 
to permit rapid absorption of unskilled workers. 
“The turret-lathe operator needs only to know how 
to set his work in a fixture, the sequence in which 
to use the tools in the turret, and the count of work 
that determines whether or not bis tools are sharp. 
He can be left alone in about eight weeks. Routers 
follow a jig and a smart fellow can become proficient 
in a couple of days. Drop-hammer operating is a 


difficult forming task, but nothing to compare with 
power-hammer operating—a skill near tbe top ot 
sheet-metal working. It is a knack few men can 
acquire. Part forming over flat dies needs care, can 
be called skilled only in tbe sense that such workers 
become - extremely efficient in forming particular 
shapes. Welders, on tbe other hand, are highly 
skilled but also highly specialized because aircraft 
requires a weld of maximum strength with minimum 
weight. Platers usually get paid more than riveters, 
as much because of unpleasant working conditions 
as because their work requires more skill. Multiple 
guns make more perfect rivets, but they do not re¬ 
quire so much skill as single guns, which depend on 
steadiness of hand and eye (tbe rivet must fill the 
hole and the boles must be in line). So tbe single 
gun riveters in subassemblies get a slightly higher 
hourly rate. Supervision and teamwork are the key 
to good inspection. Final assembly requires skilled 
installation mechanics, but again it is specialized; 
men work only on electrical, hydraulic, engine, or 
instrument installation, quickly become experts . . .” 
(Extract from Fortune, page 97, March 1941.) 

Subcontracting 

In order to utilize existing facilities, equipment, 
skills, and managerial “know-how.” the airframe in- 
dustrv was forced to increase its subcontracting from 
5 percent in 1940 to 37 percent in 1944. The amount 
of subcontracting varied from plant to plant, some 
continuing at a low rate and others ranging up to 
80-85 percent, performing only tbe final assembly 
operations. 

Experience has indicated that almost every major 
airframe manufacturing operation can be subcon¬ 
tracted, although most manufacturers preferred to 
retain tbe more difficult operations such as fuselage, 
center wing section, cockpit, and instrument as¬ 
sembly, and, of course, final assembly. The items 
most frequently subcontracted were: wing tips, 
ailerons, leading edges, trailing edges, flaps, outer 
wings, nacelles, wing panels, elevators, tabs, actu¬ 
ators, rudders, fins, complete empennage assembly, 
tail cones, landing gear, fuselage panels, bomb bay 
doors, bomb racks, cowling, cowl flaps, engine 
mounts, complete engine and cowling assembly, nose 
sections, oil and fuel tanks, piping, ducts, shrouds, 
and fittings. 

Plants were converted from peacetime production 
to airframe subcontracting. In general, tbe attempt 


18 

















was made to locate plants in the vicinity of the prime 
contractor but this was not always feasible. Con¬ 
siderable cross-hauling' resulted. The increased 
amount of subcontracting placed a tremendous pro¬ 
curement burden on the prime airframe plants neces¬ 
sitating their development of large staffs for ordering, 
locating vendors, follow-up, engineering liaison, and 
production planning, and scheduling. 

Xot only was subcontracting effective in utilizing 
existing facilities and labor force and in reducing the 
burden on housing and other community problems, 
it also enabled the establishment of duplicate sources 
for similar items and achieved an extensive dispersal 
and decentralization of production. 

Management 

Administratively, an airframe plant is organized 
just as any other production company with its effort 
directed by one head—its president. Most company 
organization charts distinguish between five major 
functions: 

1. Finance and accounting. 

2. Manufacturing. 

3. Industrial relations. 

4. Engineering. 

5. Procurement. 

The manufacturing organization is the largest, and 
in addition to shop operations includes the service 
departments of production control, tooling, plants 
maintenance, inspection, and industrial engineering. 
Most large aircraft companies operate two or more 
divisions under varying degrees of central control. 

Actual production depends on sound aeronautical 
engineering and the assistance of process engineers, 
tool design engineers, tool and die makers, test pilot 
engineers, and skilled machinists. With these men 
as a nucleus, directed by a management skilled in 
coordinated “know-how” effort, unskilled labor can 
lie taught semi-skilled operations and rapid produc¬ 
tion can be effected. During tbe expansion period 
of the aircraft industry (1940—14) most airframe 
companies were able to set up division factories that 
depended almost entirely on the parent organization 
for all engineering. Small liaison engineering staffs 
solved the problems for the division plants by get¬ 
ting the answer from the original organization at 
company headquarters. Tooling and production lay¬ 
out were established by the parent engineering and 
planning unit. 


A well engineered airplane is designed for produc¬ 
tion as well as performance. The airframe must 
move rapidly and smoothly down the production line 
with every consideration given to the types of tools 
available for production. The engineering depart¬ 
ment prepares blueprints and design data from which 
the tool design department, the production depart¬ 
ment, and the process engineers, in cooperation with 
shop superintendents, establish exact production ar¬ 
rangement of machinery and equipment. An engi¬ 
neering department is usually broken down into 
groups specializing on a particular part of the air¬ 
frame, i.e., wing, empennage, control surface, and 
fuselage. These groups are under the supervision 
of the project engineers responsible for a particular 
plane type. 

In order to keep production rolling smoothly, in¬ 
ventories of supplies must be constantly maintained 
und anticipated. This calls for material control de¬ 
partments that establish requirements for the pur¬ 
chasing organization. Requirements are based upon 
production schedules established by planning and 
scheduling units. (App. A, Ch. 7a-g). 

Manufacturing Methods (Metal) 

Despite the quantities of airplanes that were pro¬ 
duced in 1944 and 1945, the airframe industry never 
rose to a truly mass production basis, such as the 
manufacture of automobiles. The production of 
planes resembles the making of automobiles in that 
it involves a complex industrial process—a period of 
“tooling up." and coordinated flow of thousands of 
accessories and materials. But there are many im¬ 
portant points of difference. An average bomber 
lias some 20.000 parts as against 1,750 in a typical 
automobile. The automobile line is tooled up once 
a year for a production run of several hundred thou¬ 
sand. The airplane is a dynamic tactical weapon 
subject to frequent change, and seldom are more 
than 300 to 5.000 of the same basic model produced. 
Experience of World M ar II taught that basic de¬ 
sign changes had to be incorporated with each 
monthly quota. Often the tactical urgency of the 
change would require immediate incorporation. This 
resulted in expensive and time-consuming modifica¬ 
tion work on the completed airplane which was ac¬ 
complished in the early stages of the war in special 
modification centers. Machining work on an air¬ 
plane represents some 5 percent of the total hours, 
while the largest portion is comprised of the labori- 

19 








ous hand labor of riveting, welding, assembly, and 
installation. 

The flow time involved in this process varies with 
the size of plane and is usually reduced as production 
experience accumulates. The following table gives 
examples of this flow time or time cycle from first 
machine hours to acceptance: 


table c. : 


Model 

Time cycle in days 

B-29, Bell-Atlanta . 

183 

B-24, Consolidated-Vultee, San Diego 

90 

C—46, Curtiss-Buffalo. 

120 

P-47, Farmingdale. 

44 


Sheet metal preparation .—The raw stock of alu¬ 
minum sheets must be cut, routed, and formed into 
the sizes and shapes required by the assembly de¬ 
partments. 

The sheets usually start with the shearing oper¬ 
ation on standard metal shears, ranging from 3 to 
sixteen feet. They are then routed or profiled to 
special sizes by radial arm routers. Other sheets 
will he formed into various convex and concave 
surface-skin parts by drop hammers ranging from 
5 to 600 tons, or into wing ribs, cowl sheets, etc. by 
large hydraulic presses up to 5.000-ton capacity. In 
this connection, it is pointed out that the drop ham¬ 
mer dies are usually made of a soft metal such as 
Kirksite, rather than of steel, as would be required 
for true mass production, and the hydro presses use 
only one metal die with rubber in a heavy casting to 
force the desired shape. Leading edges are formed 
into the required curvatures by a special rolling mill 
(Farnham) with capacity for handling sheet metal 
in lengths from 1 to 16 feet. Stretch presses are 
used to obtain contour forming of the skins and other 
sections. 

Heat treating equipment is essential to obtain the 
highest strength-to-weight ratio for all metal struc¬ 
tures. Critical inspection at this point must be main¬ 
tained to insure performance of parts to specifica¬ 
tions—magnaflux and hardness tests. 

Small parts are bent into angles by power brakes 
and .blanked out of sheets by punch presses. Power 
brakes must handle sheets up to 12 feet and punch 
presses blank sheets from less than 1 inch in area 
per blank to approximately 6 by 12 feet, depending 


on size of press and required size of blank. A good 
third of all the metal used is aluminum sheet. It 
goes through at least sixteen basic operations in the 
sheet metal shop before it is ready at the first bench 
assembly station. 

Machine Shop .—There are two essential functions 
performed in the machine shop: Surface finishing 
and drilling. These operations are performed on 
bar stock, extrusions, forgings, castings, and tubing. 
Fully 60 percent of 11 machined parts that go into 
an airplane pass across the table of a milling ma¬ 
chine. Special milling machines are required for 
forming spar cap extrusions. Other parts pass to 
the engine lathes, turret lathes, and screw machines 
for such operations as drilling, reaming, boring, 
facing, threading, etc. These include parts such as 
central shafts and pulleys, collars, bushings, cyl¬ 
inders, tube fittings, and brackets. Still other oper¬ 
ations require grinding, broaching, honing, swaging, 
and drilling. 

Assembly .—The parts from the machine and sheet 
metal shops meet at the primary assembly benches 
where they are riveted and welded together. In 
subassembly, the bench assemblies are mated together 
to form sections such as spars, ribs, skin sections, 
etc. The next operation, major assembly, requires 
large fixtures to insure that proper tolerances and 
alignments are maintained. It is here they take the 
shape of empennage, fuselage, and wing panels. The 
principle usually followed in sub- and major as¬ 
sembly is that of breaking down the operation as 
small as possible and performing as much work as 
possible before the assembly hits the major jigs. The 
subassembly and major assembly fixtures may be 
on a moving line or stationary. If they are stationary, 
the workers usually move from fixture to fixture 
performing the same operation in each fixture. For 
a production of 400 B-24’s a month, one company 
used 35 center wing jigs, each one being over 15 feet 
high and 25 feet long. In small ships, the fuselage 
is assembled in half shells so that installation of wir¬ 
ing and plumbing is made easily. From the major 
assembly jigs come the wings, center section, fuse¬ 
lage, empennage, and are mated together. Final 
assembly makes further installations, including en¬ 
gines, superchargers, propellers, and landing gear. 
In some plants, long final assembly lines are used 
with an airplane at each of 50 to 60 stations. Other 
plants perform more work in major assembly and 
accomplish the final assembly operations in 3 to 10 
stations. 


20 










Manufacturing Methods (Wood) 

The manufacture and assembly of wood airplanes 
is accomplished in buildings of the same general con¬ 
struction as the metal airframe plant, i.e., wide as¬ 
sembly lines and high, wide bay areas. But the 
machinery and/or equipment is altogether different, 
being designed, of course, for working with wood. 
The tools and equipment for the most part are char¬ 
acteristic of any large furniture or piano factory. In 
order to produce safe airplanes, a factory, with its 
accompanying storage houses and wood bins, must 
be temperature controlled. All wood airframe fac¬ 
tories possess large brick drying kilns for preserving 
and seasoning wood. They may be placed inside or 
outside the plant. The assembly process follows the 
same procedure as the metal airframe plant with the 
exception of tools and materials used; however, the 
wood airframe factory possesses many more painting 
and drying stations. Large batteries of infra-red 
lights or baking ovens are adjacent to assembly areas, 
and glue stations are dotted strategically throughout 
the plant. A glue station is a glassed-in cage where 
one man continually mixes adhesives in order to keep 
workers supplied with glue that is not over one to 
two hours old. 

The tools are peculiar to all other wood-working 
industry and consist of circular saws, routers, electric 
planers, sanders, hammers, draw shaves, chisels, etc. 
The aircraft industry has made wide use of autoclaves 
—large molds for baking plywood wing covers and 
fuselage sections. These are male and female items 
which may be constructed entirely of metal or the 
male mold may be of wood or some other substitute. 
In some plants huge ovens are built which can hold 
a number of autoclaves, and in others heat is applied 
directly through electricity or steam to the autoclaves 
themselves. These molds are designed purely for 
aircraft work but they can be modified to make boat 
hulls, automobile bodies, etc. 


The wood airframe factory production layout is 
very similar to the metal airframe plant. All that 
varies is the machinery and equipment belonging to 
the wood-working industry. Wood and glue come 
into the factory where the wood is cut up and sent 
to the subassembly unit which uses that particular 
type. Plywood and phenol resin glue go to the molds 
where they are molded into fuselage wings and tail 
cover sections. In the sub-, major, and final assem¬ 
bly, the mating and installation of parts calls for a 
great deal of hand carpentry, sawing, shaving, nail¬ 
ing, tacking, gluing, etc. Conveyors, overhead cranes, 
and handling equipment are similar to that of a metal 
aircraft plant. 

The wood airframe plant administratively is or¬ 
ganized along the same lines as that of the metal. 
Production depends on the same key personnel- 
aeronautical engineers (production and experimen¬ 
tal), flight test engineers, design tool engineers, 
process engineers, and tool and die makers. The 
expansion of the wood airframe industry got oft" to 
a late start in January 1942 because of its substitute 
nature. Production of raw metal could not keep up 
with the production of frames; consequently, wood 
was substituted. Although the entire wood produc¬ 
tion was small in comparison to metal during the 
peak production period, that it was accomplished at 
all is a very strong indication that small key staffs 
with the “know-how'’ can effect mass production 
rapidly, given the machinery and the labor. This is 
especially true in light of the fact that there were 
only ten aeronautical engineers in the entire country 
with enough training in wood to produce a combat 
airplane. These men organized and trained young 
engineers just out of school and educated only for 
the metal aircraft industry to apply their knowledge 
to wood. Ten men and twelve companies by 1943 
effected mass production through furnishing designs 
and engineering assistance to the country’s furniture 
and piano industry. See Table H below: 


21 




T A 15 L E II : 


Production of the Wood Airframe Industry, 1941 through 1944 



Total 

number 

produced 

First 

production 

Peak production 

Rate 

Month and year 


Advanced trainers—2E. 






AT-10 Globe, Ft. Worth . 

600 

Feb. 1943 

60 

May 1944 


AT-10 Beech, Wichita . 

1771 

Nov. 1941 

150 

Dec. 1942 


AT-21 Fairchild, Burlington . 

98 

Sept. 1943 

24 

Aug. 1944 


AT-21 McDonnell, Memphis . 

26 

Feb. 1944 

6 

Sept. 1944 


AT-21 Bellanca, New Castle . 

27 

Mar. 1944 

12 

Oct. 1944 


Primary trainers. 






PT-19 Fairchild, Hagerstown . 

3954 

Apr. 1940 

151 

Nov. 1942 


PT-19A Aeronca, Middletown . 

620 

May 1943 

76 

Nov. 1943 


PT-19A St. Louis, St. Louis. 

44 

Nov. 1943 

22 

Tan. 1944 


PT-17 Boeing, Wichita . 

4812 

May 1940 

191 

Sept. 1941 


Medium transports—2E. 






C-76 Curtiss, Louisville. 

20 

Sept. 1943 

5 

Sept. 1943 


C-76 Curtiss, St. Louis . 

5 

Feb. 1943 

4 

Sept. 1943 


C-78 Cessna, Wichita. 

3206 

Jul. 1942 

197 

Jul. 1943 


Total wood plane production . 

15,183 


| 





AIRCRAFT ENGINE INDUSTRY 


General 

Nineteen plants under prime contract to the Army 
Air Forces were engaged in the fabrication and as¬ 
sembly of airplane engines at the close of 1944. 
These plants, employing 300.000 persons, occupied 
more than 75,000,000 square feet of door space. 
About 40 percent additional personnel was employed 
in subcontracting factories. 

Monthly production reached a peak of 24,219 en¬ 
gines, or 42.000.000 horsepower by August 1944. 

The engine industry rapidly expanded after Janu¬ 
ary 1941, when it employed about 36.000 persons 
and produced 3,407 engines, or 2,500,000 horse¬ 
power, each month on 10.000.000 square feet of floor 
space. 

Product 

Aircraft engines as produced in the United States 
fall into two broad classifications: Trainer and com¬ 
bat. These classifications may be reduced to three 
general types: Reciprocating, turbine and turbo-jet. 

A. Reciprocating engines — engines translating 
power by the reciprocating action of pistons 


—may be classified further as radial, in-line, 
opposed and H-type or double-opposed. 

13. Turbine engines—translating power through 
action of a turbine wheel—have, as yet, no 
further classification break-down. 

C. Turbo-jet engines—providing power by the 
thrust of violently expelled gases—comprise 
ram, intermittent and athydid types. 

(1) Ram jets are those giving a constant. 

continuous thrust, as in the XP-80 
jet-propelled lighter airplane. 

(2) Intermittent jets are those giving in¬ 

termittent bursts of thrust, as in 
the engines used to propel buzz 
bombs. 

(3) Athydid-type jet engines are very 

high speed types, consisting of a 
hollow tube and using the same 
general mechanics as the intermit¬ 
tent jet, but without the front-end 
valve which controls the thrust 
burst timing on the intermittent 
types. 


9? 












































Trainer engines, in general, are those engines 
within the 50 to 800 horsepower range. Combat 
engines, range from 1.000 to 3.000 horsepower up¬ 
wards. All jet engines, the power output of which 
is measured in thrust rather than horsepower, fall 
into the latter category. Total number of engine 
parts for various types ranges from 1.000 to 11.000. 
( See Table Appendix A for horsepower, weight 
and construction of various engine types.) 

Design and development of new engines generallv 
require from one to five years. After development 
contracts, come design studies, mock-ups and experi¬ 
mental engines. Then follow exhaustive test-stand 
study and actual flight tests. Production often is 
begun before final test acceptance is made in order 
to meet war time demands. 

For production purposes the reciprocating engine 
usually is broken down into major component assem¬ 
blies—cylinder head assembly, crank-case assembly, 
crankshaft assembly, piston assembly and accessories. 
The last includes carburetors, magnetos and ignition 
harnesses. 'Turbo- jet engines are production-divided 
into body cases, compressor wheels, turbine wheels 
and gears. Many prime contractors fabricate main 
assemblies in their own plants. Accessories, and some 
main assemblies, however, are fabricated by sub-con¬ 
tractors and assembled by the prime contractor. 

Design trends lean towards emphasis on jet 
engines. 

Plants and Layout 

Prime engine plants range from 14.000 to more 
than 5.000,000 square feet and generally are perma¬ 
nently constructed of structural steel and reinforced 
concrete. 

Engine test cells attached to the main building are 
a construction feature peculiar to the industry. The 
number of test cells per plant reflects quite accurately 
the production capacity. 

General pattern of engine plant layout follows a 
llow through machine shop, bench, and sub, green 
and final assembly. Approximately 45 r c of the total 
floor space of an engine plant is used for production. 
An engine plant has two assembly lines—one known 
as the green line, from which engines are sent to 
testimr cells, returned, torn down and reassembled. 
The second line, or final line, takes the reassembled 
engines back to the testing cells for final testing. 

Air conditioning and temperature control is par¬ 
ticularly important in the manufacture of engines as 
a safeguard against corrosion. Average construction 


time of a new engine plant requires 12 to 13 months 
from the time the project was approved until 
production began. 

Machinery and Equipment 

Few engine plants had layouts for integrated manu- 
lacture, which requires balanced distribution of such 
standard tools as forging hammers, mechanical 
presses, hydraulic presses, planers, turning machines, 
grinders, gear cutters, finishing machines, drilling 
machines, broachers and borers. 

As a supplement for high production, a modern 
plant had many special machines: Hobbing machines, 
polishers, borers, grinder, torque machines, reamers, 
lathes, spindle drills, counter sinking and index 
tapping machines. 

Special machines constituted approximately 30 per 
cent of all engine production machinery. (See Table 
6, Appendix A for machine tools and production 
equipment required for the major components of a 
Pratt and Whitney R-1830-75 engine at 2000 month¬ 
ly rate.) 

Close tolerance together with a skilled worker 
shortage early in the war-time engine program 
necessitated a large scale use of automatic machinery 
for mass production. Skills were built into the ma¬ 
chines. leaving operators little to do other than press 
the appropriate buttons. More than any other single 
factor, these machines were responsible for the tre¬ 
mendous war-time engine production. 

In the manufacture of cylinder heads, for instance, 
a Greenlee automatic transfer machine replaced 42 
standard machines, requiring 107 skilled and semi¬ 
skilled workers. Only eight operators, working one 
shift, were needed with the Greenlee for a comparable 
output. Since the work consisted principally of load¬ 
ing and unloading, the eight usually were women with 
a few days training. One set-up man was the only 
skilled laborer needed, effecting a labor saving of 99 
persons. 

Conveyors effected enormous savings in floor space 
by eliminating the usual temporary storage at each 
machine. 

About 80 per cent of total man-hours were devoted 
to fabrication and machining, while 20 per cent was 
taken up by sub and green assemblies, tear-downs 
and final assembly. 

Materials 

Principal metals from which reciprocating aircraft 
engines are fabricated include: carbon steel and steel 




TABLE 1 : 

Savings Effected by the Use of Specialized Greenlee Automatic Transfer Machine (Drilling, Reaming, 
Counter-Sinking and Tapping of All Holes in an Aircraft Engine Cylinder Head). 


Machine 

Area 

square feet 

Number 

machine 

Total 

cost 

Number 

Hand 

Operations 

Men 

required 

Production 

hours 

Standard . 

6,658 

42 

$319,500 

17 

107 

795.5 

Greenlee . 

2,890 

1 

313,266 

2 

8 

7.8 

Savings . 

3,768 

41 

6,234 

15 

99 

787.7 


alloys, aluminum brass, magnesium, copper and 
bronze. 

1. Because of the special strengths required 

throughout much of the engine, high-grade 
alloy steels form the largest portion of the 
metal used. In the R—1830-90C engine, 
there are 2800 pounds of various alloy 
steels, as compared to 940 pounds of alum¬ 
inum. the next largest material component. 

2. Carbon steel is used for bolts, nuts, springs 

and other small sections. In general, carbon 
steel is composed of iron plus carbon .05 to 
1.05% and manganese .3 to .9%. In some 
free machining carbon steels, sulphur is 
added. 

3. Alloy steels used in engines are of several 

kinds. Alloy agents give steel special prop¬ 
erties needed in various engine functions. 
In gears, where strength is needed through¬ 
out the section, a nickel or nickel-chromium 
steel alloy may be used. Nickel steels have, 
in general, iron, carbon .1 to .5%, manga¬ 
nese .3 to .9%, and nickel .4 to 5.25%. In 
nickel-chromium steel, the nickel is dropped 
to 1 to 1.5% and .45 to .75% chromium is 
added. 

4. Where similar depth in strength is necessary 

in extremely large sections, such as a crank¬ 
shaft, a molybdenum steel alloy is used. Such 
steel contains approximately .15 to .40% 
molybdenum, less than 1% of chromium 
and lB+%) nickel, iron and manganese. 

5. Steels containing \y 2 to 2% tungsten resist 

heat. 

6. An extremely important steel alloy is No. 

8640, which contains .6 to 1 % of chromium, 
nickel and manganese. 


7. Aluminum bar-rod, forgings and wire stock 

in engine making will contain 4 to 4%j% 
copper .5% magnesium, .5% manganese 
and aluminum. 

8. Aluminum castings for cylinder heads are 

composed of 4% copper, 2% nickel and 
1.5% magnesium, while the other alum¬ 
inum castings contain about 4% copper. 

9. Aluminum die castings are aluminum-silicon, 

with about 10 to 12% of the latter included. 
Sheet aluminum used in engine making has 
an aluminum-copper-magnesium formula, 
while the aluminum tubing is composed of 
aluminum, magnesium and silicon. 

10. Engine brass is composed of copper and about 

20 to 40% zinc, while engine bronze is cop¬ 
per and about 10% tin. 

11. Monel tubing is essentially a stainless steel, 

containing a nickel base material with cop¬ 
per added. 

(See Tables 7 and 8, Appendix A for prin¬ 
cipal materials in R-1830-90C and R-3350 
engines.) 

Principal metals used in the construction of gas 
turbines and turbo-jet engines are aluminum, mag¬ 
nesium and high temperature alloy agents. Because 
the operating temperatures of turbine and turbo-jet 
engines are extremely high, manufacturers found the 
only satisfactory metals were those employing such 
high-temperature alloy agents as cobalt, nickel, mo¬ 
lybdenum, columbium, tungsten and chromium. 

1. The cost of these metals is high. Vitallium 
used in the cast buckets of the turbo-super- 
charger is 60% cobalt. Timken alloy for 
turbo-jet engine discs is composed of 16% 
chromium, 25% nickel, 6% molybdenum, 


24 







































and the remainder iron. Hastalloy used for 
forged buckets contains 30% molybdenum, 
65% nickel and only 5% of cheaper iron. 

2. A metal alloy coming into increasing prom¬ 
inence in the jet picture is 19-9DL, virtu¬ 
ally a stainless steel composed of 19% 
chromium, 9% nickel and other special 
alloy agents, including columbium, tung¬ 
sten, molybdenum, not more than 1 per cent 
each. It is hoped by design to be able to use 
19—9DL in practically all turbo-jet and gas 
turbine parts, thus reducing costs. 

Labor 

Employment in aircraft engine plants increased 
from 16,000 in June 1940 to 340,000 by June 1944. 

By efficiency, man-hours required for building 
engines were reduced continuously throughout the 
war. By 1945 man-hours per horse-power ranged 
from 5.82 to 0.86 for large air-cooled engines, and 
from 3.14 to 0.80 for large liquid-cooled engines. 

The following table shows the comparative em¬ 
ployment for various rates of engine output in 
typical plants: 


TABLE J : 



Prime 

contractor 

employment 

Type 

Number of 
engines 
shipped 

November 1943. .. . 

35,000 

R-1830 

3,300 

December 1943.... 

17,000 

R-1820 

2,300 

May 1945.... 

28,824 

R-3350 

1,600 


Turnover increased appreciably during the war. 
In 1941, 17 workers out of every 100 quit. By 1943, 
this had risen to 30 out of every 100. The work 
week ranged from 34 to 56 hours, averaging 46 hours 
for the industry in 1944. Comparatively large sec¬ 
ond and third shifts increased utilization of plants 
and equipment. By January 1944, there was an 
average of 74 workers on the second shift and 33 
on the third shift for every 100 workers on the first 
shift. The percentage of women in total hires reached 
64.8 percent in August 1944. 

Prewar production techniques required many high 
skilled workers, for machining, and assembly opera¬ 
tions called for extremely close tolerances. Mass 
production methods and special machines, however, 
permitted greater use of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. 


Subcontracting 

Most engine plants subcontracted from 20 to 60% 
of their work, although some converted automobile 
companies subcontracted as high as 70 percent. 

Most commonly subcontracted engine items were 
superchargers, carburetors, magnetos and ignition 
systems, pumps, gears and crank shafts. 

Management 

Techniques of aircraft engine production require 
emphasis on precision engineering and quality con¬ 
trol. Management placed focal emphasis on the key 
functions of engineering, tooling, manufacturing, 
quality control and procurement. The tooling “know 
how” in the aircraft engine factory is considerably 
different from that in the airframe plant because 
of the greater emphasis on machining operations. 
This “know-how” requires an understanding of 
standard machine tools, special machine tools, special 
tooled standard tools, as well as the assembling 
process. 

Manufacturing Methods 

The principal features of aircraft engine produc¬ 
tion are: 

a. Heavy metal removal on a precision basis. 

b. Numerous heat treating operations designed to 

relieve pent up strains thus imposed. 

c. Close quality control. 

d. Double production lines leading from assembly 

through ‘‘green” testing, tear-down, re¬ 
assembly and final testing. 

A partial sequence of the individual machining 
operations leading to the assembly of aircraft engines 
is listed below: 

Propeller shafts possess a complex three-plane 
surface which must be accurately formed on the out¬ 
side rim. Such operations are handled on lathes 
fitted with automatic tracer attachments. High-speed 
gear shapers form the contour of master link rod 
ends. Crankshaft and propeller shaft splines are 
cut. Threaded sections are precision ground from 
the solid diameter on thread grinders. Abrasive cut¬ 
off saws are used on the crankshaft and on the pro¬ 
peller shaft lines. In each case, cut-off saws are 
employed to remove a heavy coupon and thin disc 
from the forging end. 

Carboloy is used principally in precision boring 
on automatic boring machines. In drilling oil holes 


25 



















in the hardened crankshaft, drills which penetrate 
the surface with a countersink are used. Honing 
machines fitted with micromatic hones are used for 
finishing con rod bores. Large batteries of heavy 
duty drills are used in other operations. Grinders 
of every variety are supplied, as are automatic and 
turret lathes. Horizontal two-spindle machines arc 
used for core-drilling the long bore in the propeller 
shaft. In the propeller shaft department are chuck¬ 
ing grinders, which also find use in master and link 
rod departments. Heat-treating equipment and sol¬ 
vent degreasers, which finds a variety of uses in 
metal cleaning operations, are among other items 
of machinery. 

The crankshaft, received as a rough, 196-pound 
forging, is reduced to about 90 pounds in finished 
form, representing nearly 55 per cent metal removal. 
Despite, this reduction, and the multiplicity of cutting 
and heat-treating operations, no straightening of the 
shaft is permitted. 

Crankshaft forgings are presented to the machine 
shop after being heat treated, inspected and centered. 

I he machine shop routine involves hundreds of 
steps. Two major operations are routing and initial 
rough machining. This prepares the shaft for case 
carburizing, leaving enough stock for subsequent 
work. 'I he next step is the semi-finish machining, 
in which the shafts are prepared for hardening and 
final grinding, 'flic metal removal is continued 
further, preparing for final grinding, as well as opera¬ 
tions following the assembly of counterweights. 
Finishing steps are extensive, including finished 
grinding. 

Basic work is milling two locating spots. The end 
main bearing and shoulder arc rough turned. A 
special test coupon and slug now arc cut off, suitably 
stamped, and sent on each operation with the shaft 
from which it is cut. I his leaves a permanent 
metallurgical record of each shaft. 

I hen comes such steps as recentering of the front 
end, the grinding of the front and rear main hear¬ 
ing, and the rough turning and grinding of pins. 
This completes the rough machining cycle. Heat 
treating to produce a depth case of 0.070 inches 
minimum follows. 

The ends are faced and recentered on a turret 
lathe, leaving stock lor subsequent turning and grind¬ 
ing. Phis is followed by turning the main bearing 
on lathes, grinding, rough-milling of counterweight 
ends. Counterweight contours are milled and the 
pin tops and pin ends are form-milled. 


I he shafts move through semi-finish machining 
and are prepared for hardening. Special fixtures 
aid in minimizing fire distortion as they are heated 
to 1475 degrees Fahrenheit for four hours in hatch- 
type draw furnaces. Then the shafts are sand¬ 
blasted in rotary table cabinets, and are subjected to 
metallurgical inspections. 

Once again ends are recentered and the shafts 
go through a series of turning, grinding, drilling and 
other types of operations. Manholes in the front 
and rear ends are bored on turret lathes. 

In the final grinding, pin diameters are held to 
plus or minus 0.0005 inch and hearings are held 
to plus or minus 0.0004 inch. The center bearing 
is held to a tolerance of 0.00075 inch in grinding 
between the center walls. Finish is subjected to 
rigid examinations. The shafts then are burred and 
polished. 

Front and rear centers are ground, as are main 
hearings, before the shafts are washed in kerosene 
and given a magnaflux inspection. 

Following a trip through the degreaser, the shafts 
go through a series of grinding operations, the mill¬ 
ing of splines, grinding of the fly weight hole on an 
internal grinder, the grinding of the front end threads 
in a precision thread grinder. Polishing, filing and 
burring are performed on all surfaces, using heavy 
duty machines. 

After leaving the polishing room, the shafts are 
washed in kerosene, degreased, inspected and sent 
through a series of reaming and counter-boring 
operations. Bearings and pins are lapped to a fine 
surface finish and degreased. Final operation is 
a complete inspection, including the use of a universal 
internal gage. 

The engine begins to take shape when the crank¬ 
case is mounted in a cradle which will be the en¬ 
gine’s support. To the crankshaft is joined the 
crankcase and connecting rod sub-assembly. The 
propeller shaft sub-assembly then is bolted on. This 
unit has been moved along toward the main line on 
roller conveyors with each cylinder bank mounted 
on a solid metal block. 

The process continues, with sub-assemblies cutting 
into the main assembly line, until the engine is com¬ 
pleted and ready for its run at full throttle on the 
lest stand. Phis is called the “green” run. 

Afterwards, the engine is completely disassembled, 
cleaned, inspected and reassembled. In the tear- 
down, a crew first removes the electrical shielding 
harness and cover plate, hanging them on an over- 


26 



head conveyor, which travels across the floor. On 
them are tags bearing the engine number. Thus, 
they are reassembled to the proper engine on the 
other side of the floor. The engine moves along 
to successive stations. The camshaft assembly is 
withdrawn and placed on roller conveyor. Suc¬ 
cessive parts are removed in reverse of the assembly 
order. 

At this point nothing is left in the cradle except 
the upper crankcase and studs. The process of re¬ 
assembly begins. The crankshaft, which comes oft 
last, is the first to go hack. Bv this time, it has 
been cleaned and inspected, as have all parts and 
assemblies. The cradle continues to move on the 
conveyor line, receiving one sub-assembly after an¬ 
other. until finally the harness and cover plate go 
back on and the engine once more is complete. The 
engine then is wheeled off the conveyor and sent to 


AIRCRAFT PROPELLER INDUSTRY 


the test stand for its final run. The final step is 
boxing. 

A peculiarity of the general flow of aviation en¬ 
gines is double production lines. The engine is first 
run on the “green” line to testing cells. After 
“green” test, the assembled engine is returned, torn 
down and put on the final assembly line leading to 
final tests. 

Before the war, aviation engines were practically 
custom-built by highly skilled workers able to ac¬ 
complish several precision jobs on manually-operated 
machines. Because of a lack of skilled workers, this 
technique was of necessity changed. Giant auto¬ 
matic machines on a push-button level were principal 
means of transferring the industry from the custom 
to mass production basis. One firm formerly needed 
57 man-minutes for machining its cylinders. Auto¬ 
matic machines reduced that time to eight minutes, 
without impairing finish or accuracy. 


General 

Three prime design contractors, plus a number of 
licensees, were producing combat propellers for the 
Armv Air Forces at the end of 1945. In addition, 
eight manufacturers were building small wooden 
blades and test clubs, five more constructing small 
fixed pitch and adjustable hub-propellers, and five 
others fabricating small controllables and automatics 
now being built for liaison airplanes requiring maxi¬ 
mum performance. 

The prime plants had a total floor space of ap¬ 
proximately 10 million square feet, with an equal 
amount required by subcontractors and builders of 
purchased parts. 

Employment reached a peak of 60 thousand in 
earlv 1944. when 22,500 combat propellers a month 
were being produced. This represented a sixfold 
expansion in three years, from a 1941 total of 39,102 
propellers to a 1944 total of 243.740. In 1940, the 
propeller industry constructed about 4.500 pro¬ 
pellers. 

Product 

Power to drive an airplane through the air con¬ 
ventionally is furnished by the engine, the brake 
horsepower of which is transformed into thrust by 


the propeller. The propeller is a twisted airfoil of 
irregular plan form. 

There are three general types of propellers: Fixed 
pitch, adjustable pitch, and controllable pitch. 

a. The fixed pitch type is manufactured in one 

piece and no adjustment of the pitch can 
he made. It may he of wood or metal, and 
its use at this time is limited to engines of 
relatively low horsepower. 

b. The adjustable pitch type has a split hub which 

permits the adjustment of the blades on the 
ground. The propeller is removed from 
the engine when this adjustment is made. 
Two or more blades may be used and they 
usually are of metal, but may also be of other 
materials. 

c. The controllable pitch type permits adjustment 

of the blade angle during operation of the 
engine in the air or on the ground. Two 
or more blades may be used. Combat air¬ 
planes demand engines of high horsepower 
and, thus, controllable pitch propellers, since 
a one degree change in blade angle will affect 
engine RPM between 70 and 100 RPM. or 
in the case of geared engines an effect vary¬ 
ing with the gear ratio. 


27 








The mechanism for controlling the blade angle 
may he mechanical, hydraulic or electrical. Two 
of the three prime design AAF contractors pro¬ 
duced hydraulic versions; the third, electric. 
Mechanical propellers are not used in the United 
States. 

Of the three basic designs for propellers used 
on American military aircraft, two are hydraulic, 
but with this basic difference: 

Type 1 uses the engine oil system for its hydraulic 
mechanism and the constant speed governor for 
the propellers is not contained within the propeller 
unit itself. 

Type 2 is a self-contained unit, including the con¬ 
stant speed governor. 

Propellers as constituted for modern military air¬ 
craft are extremely complex and heavy. They 
contain 25 to 1500 parts and vary in weight from 
30 pounds for the six-foot liaison airplane installa¬ 
tions to 1,083 pounds for the 19-foot very heavy 
bomber installations. 

Development and delivery of experimental designs 
usually require a year. Tests consume another six 
months and production can begin a year later, reach¬ 
ing peak production in 60 days to nine months 
later. 

Design of propellers depends on the design of 
the airplane and its engine, consequently, the first 
is handicapped until the latter two are stabilized. 
To overcome this handicap, some firms develop alter¬ 
nate designs in the hope that one will be satisfactory. 
An example is the B-36, where experimental 
propellers are on order with all three prime design 
contractors, together with an additional blade 
development by a fourth concern. 

Yet, through combinations of interchangeable blades 
and hubs, hundreds of models of propellers have 
been devised in the last six years. Design trends 
are variable as in engine and aircraft experimenta¬ 
tion. If the rather startling propeller-turbine theory 
achieves the proper results, a decided change to 
lighter weights and more complete control may be 
expected. 

Already well launched are reversible-pitch pro¬ 
pellers, through which more complete control in 
taxiing is achieved and by which braking power may 
be exerted in shortening landing runs, and contra¬ 
rotating propellers, which are designed to overcome 
torque and allow cleaner aerodynamics. 


Plants and Layouts 

Prime propeller plants range in size from 19 
thousand square feet to 1,020,000 square feet. Most 
are of permanent construction, but many buildings 
merely are adapted to propeller construction as a 
war-time measure. Five Minnesota State Fair build¬ 
ings were remodeled and equipped, for example, and 
bars, stainless steel tubing and sheet steel were 
effectively processed into component blade parts. 
The addition of several other buildings with equip¬ 
ment and conveyors resulted in completed propeller 
blades being fabricated inside the fairgrounds. 

In the case of some converted buildings, and even 
with new installations, difficulty was experienced 
with a lack of ceiling height to handle larger blade 
sizes than originally contemplated. Propeller plants 
specifically designed for the production of propellers 
usually consist of one or more relatively high ramps 
with crane equipment sufficient to handle the machin¬ 
ing dies used in heavy operations, as well as the 
height for large blade handling operations. Smaller 
parts may be made in standard factory buildings of 
lesser clearance. 

Fairly heavy power, gas and water needs must be 
met. Transportation of the larger propellers presents 
problems. Relatively large areas must be available 
for finished parts storage, either for sub-assemblies 
or for final assemblies. Clear, well-lighted assembly 
and inspection areas must be draft-free. Balancing 
pits, or equivalent scales, must be provided. Pack¬ 
ing and shipping space also must be large. 

Machinery and Equipment 

The degree of machinery integration within pro¬ 
peller plants varies considerably, but the prime 
design plants have a comparatively high percentage. 

Standard heavy purpose machine tools in pro¬ 
peller production include lathes, turret lathes, mill¬ 
ing machines, grinders, thread mills, presses, screw 
machines and drill presses. 

There are many special purpose machines—dupli¬ 
cators of all kinds, bending and twisting machines, 
quenching machines, and various special polishing 
and grinding equipment. 

Welding equipment consists of hand and machine- 
controlled submerged arc, gas and resistance or flash 
types. Magnaflux and X-ray requirements are large, 
since both are used for quality control in production 
as well as for inspection. 

Furnace equipment for forging, annealing, braz¬ 
ing, hardening and drawing also is required—and 


28 


has, in some cases, been the limiting factor in get¬ 
ting into production. For small production, batch- 
type furnaces are used; for large production, 
conveyor-type continuous furnaces are utilized. 

Atmosphere control, either by reduction or lithium, 
is universal in propeller plants to prevent decarbur¬ 
ization. scaling or surface imperfections. Metallurg¬ 
ical and chemical laboratories are mandatory for 
satisfactory quality control and for experiments, 
while cleaning, shot-blast and degreasing machines 
are also required. 

Some parts are plated. When production war¬ 
rants. continuous automatic equipment is used. 
()therwise, horizontal tanks with special racks and 
handling devices are common. 

\ ibration. bench testing and engine testing labora¬ 
tories are used by the three major companies. 

Conveyor equipment, usually the closed storage 
type, is utilized to keep down floor space, reduce 
transportation problems, and particularly, where 
female labor is involved, ease the load handling 
problem. 

Machine time is 80 percent of total manhours. 

Materials 

Principal basic materials of American propellers 
for combat are aluminum and steel—although pro¬ 
pellers for military combat aircraft can be made of 
wood, plastics and magnesium, or even of beryllium 
copper and stainless steel. 

Two aluminum alloys now are used in propeller 
blades—Dural and HSP 25. The latter has higher 
strength and hardness than dural. The composition 
of each is listed below: 


table k : 



Dural 

HSP 25 


Percent 

Percent 

Copper . 

4.5 

4.5 

Magnesium . 

1.5 


Manganese . 

.6 

.8 

Aluminum . 

93.4 

92.9 

Silicon . 


.8 


The steel alloy used in blades and in hub manu¬ 
facture is SAE 4340. a chrome-molybdenum steel, 
containing: 

Molybdenum. 0.15-0.25% 

Chromium . 1.25% 

Nickel . 2.75% 

Manganese . less than 1% 

Iron . Remainder 


Hollow steel blades, in the larger diameters, repre¬ 
sent a weight saving over aluminum. Xo other 
country in the world has developed production 
methods to obtain such blades. Our allies are show¬ 
ing increasing interest in this type blade but, it must 
he emphasized materials are not of prime considera¬ 
tion in the over all propeller picture, for many lower 
strength materials may he used. 

Steel anti-friction bearings may be replaced by 
heavier materials, and satisfactory operation can 
he obtained when the pilot uses correct control 
techniques. 

Because of the complexity of hubs and blades, 
the weight of raw materials will run from four to 
six times the finished weight. A 90-pound Ameri¬ 
can propeller blade requires 450 pounds of seamless 
steel tubing: 360 pounds are removed during pro¬ 
duction. The weight of aluminum alloy blade forg¬ 
ings runs 20 percent to 25 percent greater than the 
finished blade weight. 

Labor 

Total employment in the propeller industry reached 
a peak of 57.164 persons in January 1944, represent¬ 
ing a 28-fold expansion over January 1940 when 
only 2,500 persons were employed. 

As of January 1940 only two propeller facilities 
were at work on propellers. By the end of the year, 
they had doubled their employment. Three more 
facilities entered the industry and employment 
reached 13 thousand by December 1941. By the 
close of the following year, nine propeller plants 
were in operation employing 36,000. 

In 1940, all propeller employees were in two East¬ 
ern States, Connecticut and Xew Jersey. Assistance 
of outside industry, however, had the effect of mov¬ 
ing part of the production inland. By June 1944. 
Ohio had more propeller employment than any other 
State, 14.000 employees, with Michigan and Xew 
Jersey next with 9.000 each and Connecticut ap¬ 
proximately 8.000. The West Coast had no propeller 
production. 

In 1941, propeller plants hired 1.500 persons to 
gain a thousand increase in employment. Two years 
later the ratio had risen to 2,100 to 1,000. 

Work week for the propeller industry ranged 
from 40 to 52 hours, but the average was somewhat 
higher than airframe and engine industry. 

Skilled machinists and bench hands, originally re¬ 
quired by the propeller industry, have been reduced 
to a minimum through automatic tooling and opera- 


678184 — 46—3 


29 























tion simplification. Blade grinding and finishing, 
however, still cannot he handled by machines; con¬ 
sequently, a large number of skilled persons are still 
required—and must be trained before production can 
be obtained. 

Subcontracting 

Subcontracting in the propeller industry varies 
from 35 percent to 65 percent. 

Electrical parts—such as switches, relays, boosters, 
feathering pumps, synchronizers, etc.,—are a design 
responsibility of the propeller contractor, who thus 
plays an intimate role in the detail design of the 
parts. Many electrical manufacturers were not 
cognizant of the peculiar loads, temperatures and 
vibrations imposed on propellers. Propeller de¬ 
signers had to extend considerable assistance to the 
ultimate design solutions. 

Subcontractors occupied at least 10,000,000 square 
feet—a total equal to the space used by prime 
contractors. 

Among the commonly subcontracted parts are 
seals, nuts, bolts, gears, bearings, electric motors, 
slip rings, cams. 

Management 

Management of a propeller plant is similar to 
that of other mass production of components in the 
aircraft industry, except for the preponderance of 
persons charged with experimental and development 
items. 

In one plant, 350 engineers, technicians, experi¬ 
mental mechanics and machinists, consist of 300 ex¬ 
perimental personnel and only 50 production workers. 
In another, 700 such workers are broken down into 
500 experimental and 200 production. 

Because of differences in detail design and process¬ 
ing, each contractor maintains and hires the tool 
design needed for his own special propellers. Further¬ 
more, the prime contractors of propellers carry a 
higher design responsibility for all parts—includ¬ 
ing subcontracted assemblies—than most aircraft 
components. 

Manufacturing Methods 

Production of propellers is based principally on 
the ability of experienced engineers, who—having 
been furnished the airplane engine characteristics— 
can devise the proper combination of airfoil sections, 
structural sizes, strengths, properly rated bearings, 
gears and other power transmission devices. 


Such production is handled either on a job-lot 
basis, for relatively small quantities of certain de¬ 
signs, or on a production line basis, where quantities 
warrant continuous production lines. The 23E50 
propeller, for instance, was tooled in four factories 
for a total production of 20,000 a month. 

Aluminum Propellers 

Blade forgings are made approximately 1/32 inch 
over finished dimensions. In making hydromatic 
blades, for instance, a bearing race is placed on the 
blade before the butt end is upset. The forgings 
are cold straightened, the shank is turned, airfoil 
surfaces are profiled—a milling cutter operating off 
a master blade which acts as a cam—and final finish¬ 
ing is done by hand grinding and polishing. The 
blade profiles, angles and other dimensions are ac¬ 
curately checked during and after final finishing 
operations. 

Hollow Steel Propellers 

There are four principal methods of manufactur¬ 
ing hollow steel propeller blades. Major differences 
lie in the welding or brazing operations. The one 
common denominator is the die-quenching operation. 
An air-hardening steel in the chrome-molybdenum 
range is used in all these blades, and a fast mechan¬ 
ism is needed during die quenching to get the hot 
blade from the furnaces to the blow-up dies. 
Nitrogen, 200 to 600 pounds per square inch, is blown 
into the blades as soon as the dies have closed on 
the hot blade. The time from the furnaces to the 
closed die is from 6 to 15 seconds. 

There are four types of such blades manufactured 
by as many methods. 

Type A 

The type A hollow steel blade starts with two 
taper rolled plates—tapered in thickness from 
approximately Y& inch to ]/& inch. One of the 
plates, the face side, is milled over a formed base 
to obtain desired metal thickness distribution or 
thicker edges. The other is used as received, ex¬ 
cept for forming. The face sheet is then formed 
into a shell, which contains the blade shank. The 
camber sheet also is formed. Both are cold form¬ 
ing operations. The camber sheet subsequently is 
welded to the face shell. Atomic hydrogen weld¬ 
ing is used for the edge welds. Automatic “union- 
melt” weld is used for the shank weld out to the 


30 


intersection with the camber sheet. Copper fillet¬ 
ing is used in the fillets formed by the edge welds, 
in order to lower stress concentrations. 

Type B 

The type B blade differs from type A in that 
it starts with a seamless tube, which is swaged, 
upset, turned, flattened, seamwelded, trimmed and 
filleted and then die quenched. This process re¬ 
quired large mandrils—10 inches diameter by 10 
feet long—hOOO ton swaging press and numerous 
large dies. 

Type C 

The type C process is intended to elude difficulties 
encountered with copper filleting and carrying the 
large blade as a unit through complete processing. 
This blade begins with some bar stock, platestock 
and short seamless tubing. The bars and plates 
receive approximately five forging operations each. 
The tubing is formed into proper shape to make 
the blade shank, and another piece of tubing is 
spun to form the blade tip. The parts number 
seven or more, depending upon blade design and 
are flash welded into the subassemblies and finally 
into the blade assembly. Quenching and shank¬ 
machining methods are similar to that of other 
manufacturers. 

This process requires a large number of die in¬ 
serts, special dies and fixtures for the flash weld¬ 


ing work. The forging of the components requires 
a fast. 4.000-ton mechanical press. 

Type D 

The type D blade is a new design, made from 
a tubular spar with a steel sheet wrapped around 
and brazed to the spar. 

Propeller hubs, electric or hydraulic, are manu¬ 
factured from a one-piece steel forging and each blade 
socket is fitted with a torque unit, consisting of a 
helically splined piston and other parts. The torque 
units provide the necessary blade angle changes when 
operating pressure is applied. The regulator fastened 
to the rear of the propeller hub contains electrical 
or hydraulic pitch-changing action. 

Hub manufacturers process a hub from subcon¬ 
tracted parts, including heat treated forgings for 
barrels, spiders, dome nuts and cams, aluminum 
castings for pistons and barrel blocks, gear blanks 
for blade and gears, and bearings and finished micarta 
parts. Individual parts are machined to drawings 
and assembled. Such hubs consist primarily of two 
major assemblies—the blade assembly, which con¬ 
tains the blades, spiders which transmit torque from 
the engine, and the barrel, which retains the blades 
when centrifugal load is built up, and the dome 
assembly. The latter contains the distributor valve 
assembly (the valves which allow unfeathering), and 
the outer dome assembly, containing the cam rotat¬ 
ing cam and piston. Hub tolerances are kept close— 
0.002 to 0.001 of an inch. 


AIRCRAFT TURBOSUPERCHARGER INDUSTRY 


General 

Five plants, occupying 2,812,000 square feet of 
floor space, were engaged in the fabrication, assembly 
and testing of turbosuperchargers, under prime con¬ 
tract to the United States Army Air Forces by the 
end of 1944. 

Production from these plants hit a monthly peak 
of 13,800 units in September 1944 when maximum 
employment totaled 12.700. 

The turbosupercharger, thus far. has been built 
exclusively for military use and prior to 1940 was 
considered experimental. From 1936 to 1940 only 
one plant produced the item. In 1936 floor space 
totaled 60,000 square feet, employment, 38. 


At the outbreak of the war the need for high alti¬ 
tude combat planes necessitated wholesale expansion, 
aimed at 12,000 units per month. 

Product 

An exhaust gas driven turbosupercharger permits 
reciprocating engine operation at high altitudes by 
compressing the thinly dispersed oxygen of that at¬ 
mosphere to sea level consistency. 

Turbosuperchargers weigh from 140 to 260 pounds 
for engines of 1,000 to 2.800 horsepower and have 
about 150 parts. 

For production purposes, the turbosupercharger is 
broken down into ten major assemblies—compressor 


31 










casing, impeller, diffuser, oil pump, pump and bear¬ 
ing housing, nozzlebox, turbine wheel shaft, cooling 
cap and cooling shroud. 

The present trend in turbosupercharger develop¬ 
ment is aimed at the elimination of critical high 
temperature alloy metals, wherever possible, by 
mechanical design changes. 

Plants and Layout 

Floor space of turbosupercharger plants varies 
from 300,000 to 812,000 square feet. Turbosuper¬ 
chargers are relatively small and light (140 to 260 
pounds) ; consequently, high ceiling and wide as¬ 
sembly lines are not necessary. A construction 
feature, however, is found in special steam and hot 
gas cells for testing superchargers. Government 
plants are single-story buildings of blackout con¬ 
struction. 

Time to build a new plant, tool, and get into pro¬ 
duction, during the expansion, averaged ten months. 

Supercharger plant layout generally includes a 
forge shop, metal stamping shop, casting department, 
welding department, heat treating department, metal¬ 
lurgical laboratory, X-ray laboratory, and assembly 
area. 

Machinery and Equipment 

Many special machines are employed in the fabri¬ 
cation of turbosuperchargers, particularly in the 
manufacture of impellers. With the exception of 
two or three such machines, however, all machinery 
used in this type plant could be utilized for other 
major manufacturing processes. 

Medium heavy forging equipment is required for 
forging turbine wheels. X-ray equipment for exam¬ 
ining all turbine wheels and buckets is mandatory, 
as is magnaflux and Zyglo inspection equipment. 
Spot, seam, arc and torch welders, including some 
hand equipment, are widely used. Other equipment 
consists of standard lathes, millers, boring machines 
with special tools. 

In addition, 12.000 lb. hammers are required to 
manufacture turbine wheels, discs and impellers. At 
present, buckets are cast eliminating the need for 
small 400 lb. hammers used in the early production 
stages. 

Manufacture of turbosuperchargers is predicated 
upon precision workmanship. Some tolerances are 
held to .0001 of an inch. 

The machine time in the manufacture of super¬ 
chargers is 50% of the total operation. On an 
average, it requires 150 man-hours to fabricate, sub¬ 


assemble and final assemble a supercharger when 
production is 4,000 a month. 

Materials 

Efficient operation of American-built turbosuper¬ 
chargers rests principally upon the extremely high 
percentages of critical high temperature alloy agents 
used in the basic metals. These agents tend to raise 
the cost of materials in superchargers so high as 
to make reprocessing of rejected parts and scraps 
economical in some instances. Supercharger buckets 
are made of vitallium—an alloy containing 649ft 
cobalt, 5.5/4 molybdenum, and 30(4 chromium. Re¬ 
jected buckets are returned to the caster. 

TABLE L : 


Strategic High Temperature Alloy Agents 


Alloy agent 

Gross weight 
per unit (pounds) 

Gross weight 
(pounds) 
per 12,000 units* 

Molybdenum . .. 

3.79 

45,495.6 

Nickel . 

16.80 

201,621.0 

Chromium . 

19.00 

228,010.0 

Cobalt . 

3.055 

36,660.0 

Total .... 

42.645 

511,786.6 


* The turbosupercharger industry was tooled for 12,000 
units a month, but the peak production hit 13,800 units a 
month. 


In addition to the buckets, the turbine wheels also 
operate in critical temperature ranges. Timken alloy 
—25% nickel, 16% chromium, 6% molybdenum, 
2% manganese, and the remainder iron—is employed 
in the fabrication of these wheels. 

For nozzle box shells and baffle ring, K2SMO 
alloy steel, containing 13% nickel, 18% chromium, 
2.5% molybdenum, 2% manganese and the re¬ 
mainder iron, is used. 

Other alloy steels include a nickel steel for the 
nozzle diaphragm containing iron, carbon, manga¬ 
nese and nickel, and a molybdenum steel composed 
of molybdenum, chromium, nickel and iron for the 
shaft. 

Aluminum alloys used for compressor casings and 
the impeller are fabricated from 14S and 24S alumi¬ 
num, as described under Paragraph 5, Airframe 
Industry. 

Principal high-temperature alloy agents in super¬ 
charger manufacture in this country, in the order 
of their relative importance, are cobalt, nickel, 
molybdenum, columbium, tungsten and chromium. 


32 


















1 he following table shows the basic metals and 
their amounts in a turbosupercharger: 


TABLE M : 


Specification 

Net weight 
pounds 

Number 

of 

parts 

Gross 

weight, 

pounds 

SAE 4140 . 

7.34911 

11 

15.41918 

AAF 57-108 . 

.00214 

2 

.0024 

KA2SMO . 

29.121061 

34 

61.7108 

Music wire. 

.2572 

1 

.274 

Stainless steel, 
free machining .. 

.60312 

2 

2.0585 

Stainless steel .... 

.0125 

3 

.0198 

SAE 2512. 

.917 

1 

4.411 

SAE 1035 . 

1.116 

2 

3.668 

Timken . 

23.0 

1 

33.0 

Vitallium. 

.0227 (per bucket) 1 

1 

.03249 

Allegheny 66 type, 
No. 430 . 

.0625 

1 

.500 

20% nickel, 20% 
chromium . 

14.50 

1 

25.75 

Total . 

76.96331 

60 

146.84617 


These figures are for the B-2 turbosupercharger as manu¬ 
factured by the Ford Motor Company, and are the most 
economical of material of any of the five manufacturers. 

1 Total vitallium weight per unit may be obtained by multi¬ 
plying by 144. 

Labor 

With the turning of the supercharger industry 
from an experimental to production position in 1939, 
great expansion of personnel was necessary. This 
was particularly true immediately after Pearl Harbor, 
when a production goal of 12,000 units a month was 
set. And, since tolerances in manufacture are close, 
skilled labor was needed in five-fold quantity over 
unskilled labor. Skilled labor was scarce. 

The following table shows roughly the expansion 
of personnel between 1936 and 194-1—the great bulk 
of which came after Pearl Harbor: 

table x : 


Employment Expansion Turbosupercharger Indus¬ 
try, Key Personnel and Unskilled 


Type 

1936 

1944 

Experimental engineers . 

4 

100 

Production engineers . 

0 

200 

Tool designers . 

4 

100 

Process engineers . 

25 

10.000 

Unskilled labor. 

5 

2,000 

Total . 

38 

12,400 


Women were employed at 70% of the jobs, 
although one plant ran as high as 84%. W ith the 
exception of tool making, they operated every type 
of machine including 400 pound hammers. 

Pilot-line schools were maintained, even prior to 
setting up production lines, teaching fabrication 
technique and providing incentive for students to 
reach the perfection required in the construction of 
an exhaust gas turbine-driven supercharger. 

Skilled supercharger labor includes welders, ma¬ 
chine operators and test operators. 

Subcontracting 

Subcontracting within the supercharger industry 
amounted to about 10% with the work going to about 
150 to 200 subcontractors who produced such items 
as oil pumps, nozzleboxes and miscellaneous sheet 
metal pieces. 

Management 

The management set-up in the supercharger in¬ 
dustry is similar to that in the engine industry, 
particularly in the manufacturing of turbine and 
turbo-jet engines. Key personnel is also the same. 

Manufacturing Methods 

From receipt of material until delivery of the 
finished product, the average flow time is two months, 
based on the maintenance of a continuous flow of 
production. 

The fabrication and processing of a nozzlebox 
offers a prime example of the work done on sub- 
assemblies prior to the main assembly work. Sheet 
steel is given a metallurgical examination and pressed 
into form, trimmed and annealed. The pieces are 
welded together and annealed and then the nozzle 
box diaphragm, which has been received as a rough 
casting and rough machine, is welded to the nozzle- 
box. The combination is finished, machined, sand¬ 
blasted, and given a final inspection. The nozzlebox 
assembly then is ready for final assembly. 

Early production utilized forged buckets, which 
necessitated the use of 4.000 pound hammers. 
Finally, buckets were precision cast at a peak rate 
of 2.000.000 buckets a month. The turbine disc 
technique has been changed from cheese forgings 
to contour forgings, with a marked improvement in 
production. The contour forging of the disc and 
the use of a cast bucket resulted in the welding of 
the buckets to the discs. Some plants employed 
hand welding, others, the union melt continuous arc 


33 













































welding process. The latter method permitted 144 
buckets to be welded to turbine discs at the rate 
of two minutes, 10 seconds a side. This move was 
one of the prime factors in obtaining mass pro¬ 
duction, which was accomplished in less than 12 
months after the plants first had been conceived. 
Compressor casings, bearing housings and diffusers 
are cast and then finished machined. Impellers are 
forged and finished machined. 

Final assembly of a turbosupercharger was broken 
down into 18 steps: mounting of turbine wheel and 
shaft assembly on assembly stand, installation of 


nozzlebox, baffle ring, front bearing cap over shaft, 
front oil deflector on shaft, roller bearing on shaft, 
oil pump drive sleeves, pump and bearing housing, 
ball bearings, rear oil deflector, rear bearing cap, 
front half of compressor casing, diffuser, impeller, 
rear half of compressor casing and waste gate, run¬ 
ning of acceptance test, placing of protective covers 
over openings and packing for shipment. 

Conveyor lines were used in all cases possible. In¬ 
spection procedures were set up for intensive, 100- 
percent scrutiny, particularly in the fabrication of 
turbine wheels and impellers. 


AIRCRAFT LANDING GEAR INDUSTRY 


General 

By January 1944, 104 companies were producing 
landing gear components for the aircraft industry. 
Breakdown of these companies according to manu¬ 
factured items is as follows: 

table o : 


Item 

Number 

companies 

Struts . 

15 

Wheels and brakes . 

3 

Tires . 

6 

Retracting gear . 

80 

Total . 

104 


Production always was sufficient to meet require¬ 
ments of airframe factories during the industry's ex¬ 
pansion. Peak output arrived in January 1944, when 
landing gear production was well in excess of 8,700,* 
the total airplane production for that month. Struts 
alone for the same period totaled 35,300—enough 
for 10,000 airplanes. 

Key landing gear component is the strut, which 
absorbs shock by means of springs or oleos. Spring 
struts are simple to make and are used only on light 
plane fixed landing gear. Oleo struts present a 
complex manufacturing problem and are a part of 
the retractable landing gear system of all fighter, 
bomber and cargo airplanes. 

Oleo struts are a major military airplane item, 
manufactured with exacting precision and certain 

* Total Army and Navy production, excluding gliders and 
special purpose aircraft. 


methods peculiar only to aircraft. They are the only 
components in the landing gear system not having 
a counterpart in general industry. Wheels, brakes, 
tires and retracting gear, consequently, will not be 
discussed in this analysis, except where they require 
special manufacturing techniques for aircraft use. 

Prior to Pearl Harbor, only two companies with 
capacity of 4,000 units a month produced struts. 
War-time expansion to 15 companies increased pro¬ 
duction to more than 35,000 units a month, enough 
to meet the peak yearly airplane production (1944) 
of 96,318 airplanes. Precision manufacturers of 
heavy equipment easily converted. Most adaptable 
were pneumatic drilling and oil well equipment com¬ 
panies, since they possessed necessary milling, grind¬ 
ing and boring machines and turret lathes. 

The two companies engaged in aircraft wheel and 
brake production before the war were augmented by 
converting one automobile concern. Conversion of 
six tire manufacturers from automobile to aircraft 
production handled the expansion of aircraft tire 
production. 

Product 

An oleo strut is an adaptation of the hydraulic 
shock absorber used on doors, large guns, bulldozers, 
trucks and automobiles. Shock is absorbed by hy¬ 
draulic resistance when a piston forces oil upward 
from one cylinder to another. Principal components 
of an oleo strut are the piston, cylinder, recoil and 
oil relief valves, metering pin, orifice plate, filler 
inlet, air pressure valve, bronze bearings, locating 
cams (for the nose strut), packing rings, upper and 


34 



















lower torque arms, locking pins, axle, axle housing, 
trunion and scissors links. 

1 wo types of strut arrangements are used. The 
first has a nosewheel oleo strut in front of the main 
landing gear and the second a tail-wheel strut, which 
may, or may not, have an oleo. in back of the main 
landing gear and under the empennage. Three 
wheels are used in both arrangements. 

Retracting gear systems either are mechanical, 
electric, or hydraulic. For emergencies, all electric 
and hydraulic systems are designed to operate 
mechanically. The most common type is run bv 
an hydraulic actuating cylinder. This cylinder and its 
components are similar to. and produced in the same 
manner, as actuating cylinders produced in industry 
generally. 

Oleo struts vary from one to fifteen inches in 
diameter and from six inches to eight feet in length: 
weigh from 75 to 700 pounds. 

The trend in landing gear as a whole is toward 
its elimination entirely and the substitution of skids 
built into the fuselage. The propellerless jet air¬ 
plane has given rise to this thought. 

Plants and Layouts 

Floor space of strut plants ranges from 4.000 to 
640.000 square feet, including main assembly and 
out buildings. Construction is of brick or stone, 
and most buildings are comparatively old, dating 
from the 1920’s. 

There are no construction characteristics peculiar 
to the industry. Most plants accomplish heat treat¬ 
ing. machine shop operation, and testing in buildings 
adjacent to the main assembly shop. Layout in¬ 
corporates the usual machine shop, sheet metal shop 
and assembly line with emphasis on special heavy 
drop-testing equipment. 

Construction and tooling of a strut plant require 
15 months. A large strut factory can produce 500 
sets (3 struts to a set) for heavy bombers, more 
for trainers and fighters. One company reached a 
high of 7,000 oleo units a month. 

Machinery and Equipment 

Strut factories by the nature of their production 
have to have a well-balanced integrated machinery 
set up. Approximately SO'T of the equipment con¬ 
sists of machine tools, and machine shops are rela¬ 
tively large. Machines are unusually heavy and 
massive to provide power and rigidity' for the opera¬ 


tion of tungsten carbide cutting tools. Specialized 
equipment includes reaming, boring, honing, grind¬ 
ing, drilling and very heavy drop-testing machines. 
Production equipment includes heat treating furnaces, 
anodic baths, paint shops, magnaflux testing equip¬ 
ment. overhead monorails and gravity conveyor belts. 

Precision requirements are unusually high—neces¬ 
sary for satisfactory operation with hydraulic fluids. 
Engineering changes during expansion were few and 
did not impair production. Machine time consumed 
85% of total manhours. 

Materials 

Struts and strut parts are made of high grade 
chromium — molybdenum — nickel steel, although 
carbon type steel can be used. In addition, struts 
require leather and synthetic rubber for packing 
rings ; mineral oil—of varying specifications—for 
hydraulic fluid. 

Labor 

Factories of the strut industry did not face difficult 
training problems since conversion from other pre¬ 
cision work made highly skilled machinists and 
workers available. Women were used to operate 
light automatic machinery and their employment at 
the peak amounted to 50%. 

Subcontracting 

50% of the work is subcontracted, including manu¬ 
facture of such items as steel forgings, forks, main 
cylinders, torque elbows, axles, connecting rods, nuts, 
bolts, bushings, cotters, gaskets, screws and packing 
ring. These parts usually are furnished to the prime 
contractor unfinished. 

Management 

Management as in the aircraft engine industry 
depends upon a nucleus of design and tool engineers, 
process engineers, tool and die makers, and highly 
skilled machinists. Of prime importance are engi¬ 
neers responsible for testing. 

Manufacturing Methods 

Flow time set back in the strut industry requires 
30 to 90 days. Final assembly is accomplished when 
the outer cylinder and the piston assembly are mated 
on a conveyed assembly line. 


35 




Before going to the final assembly line the outer 
cylinder is turned on an automatic lathe for outside 
dimensions. Then the upper end is drilled for loca¬ 
tion of oil and filler plugs. Inside dimensions are 
turned on a turret lathe. A threading machine 
grinds the internal threads. The dimensions are 
then checked and the cylinder is heat treated. The 
latter process is accomplished in large electric 
furnaces and provides a tensile strength of 175,000 
to 200,000 pounds per square inch. The cylinder 
is then quenched, cleaned and magnafluxed. Final 
machining includes honing the piston recesses and 
packing glands, threading the air chamber seal and 
orifice plates and grinding the external surfaces to 
the specified wall thickness. The part is then burred 
and a serial number is stamped on it preparing it 
for final inspection. 

The inner cylinder or piston assembly goes through 
much the same process except all parts are chromium 
plated. 

During the entire production of both major sub- 
assemblies, careful inspection is accomplished with 
the use of semi-automatic special gages and fixtures. 
All welds are magnafluxed. 

Aircraft Wheels, Brakes and Tires 

Aircraft wheels, brakes and tires are made 
by the same type manufacturers that make the 
ground equivalent—automobile, truck, motorcycle, 
scooters, etc. 

In the case of the wheels and brakes, lighter 


l 

materials are substituted for steel and iron. I he 
wheel drum is made of aluminum and magnesium 
alloys, while steel goes into the flanges, keys, lock¬ 
nuts, and bolts. Aircraft wheels vary in weight 
from 1 lb. to over 150 lbs. 

Aircraft brakes are of three types; (1) shoe, 

(2) expanding tube, and (3) disc. 1 he first two 
are used on small planes and are similar to the types 
found on trucks and automobiles. The disc type, in¬ 
stalled on medium and large airplanes, is composed 
of alternate bronze and steel discs. 1 lie bronze disc 
is keyed to the wheel and rotates with it, while the 
steel disc is keyed to the fixed axle and remains sta¬ 
tionary. Braking friction is obtained by forcing these 
discs together with either mechanical or hydraulic 
control. 

In the manufacture of wheels and brakes for air¬ 
craft, testing apparatus differs from that used to test 
the automotive product. Very large drop test equip¬ 
ment and special devices for testing braking power at 
high speeds are used. 

Aircraft tires and tubes are constructed to with¬ 
stand much greater weights and shock loads than 
those for the automotive industry. This necessitates 
different size drums and vulcanizing equipment. 
Testing equipment has to be provided which will 
permit simulation of aircraft landings. 

In some instances, aircraft tires are interchange¬ 
able between trucks and medium size airplanes. Air¬ 
craft tires range in diameter from 8 in. to 9 ft. and 
weigh from 6 to 600 lbs. 


AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY 


General 

Prior to 1940 approximately fifteen companies 
were producing AAF aircraft instruments. These 
concerns, like the closely related watch and com¬ 
mercial instrument companies, in their peace-time 
production order, depend to a large degree on sub¬ 
contracting (approximately 50%) for such things as 
plastic cases, ball bearings, screws, standard gears, 
cover glasses, gaskets. By increasing their subcon¬ 
tractors from approximately 1200 to more than 4000, 
the fifteen major companies avoided unnecessary con¬ 
struction of new buildings during the expansion. Of 
prime importance to the nation’s instrument industry 


are four companies which produce the majority of 
the total phosphorescent and radium paint supply. 
Floor space varied according to the size of the con¬ 
cern and ranged from one room shops to air-condi¬ 
tioned plants employing 5,000. The instrument 
industry’s production was sufficient to meet the de¬ 
mand for aircraft instruments at the peak of aircraft 
production. The number of instruments per plane 
varies according to the type of plane, ranging from 
five in a primary trainer to more than sixty in a 4- 
engine bomber. War production was attained in an 
orderly manner by absorbing watch and other preci¬ 
sion instrument production, for example, a musical 


36 



instrument company, experienced in producing pre¬ 
cision metal musical instruments, was switched to 
making aircraft instruments. 


located outside the instrument panel in the plane and 
electric or pressure signals from this mechanism 
motivate an indicator in the instrument panel. 


Product 










Aircraft instruments are devices which indicate 
visually to the aircrew member the altitude and per¬ 
formance of the plane in flight, the functions of the 
power plant, and provide means for automatic flight 
control. 1 ypical visual instruments are : altimeters, 
artificial horizons, directional gages, bank and turn 
indicators, airspeed indicators, tachometers, manifold 
pressure gages, fuel level gages, and fuel flow meters, 
bearing temperature indicators, cylinder head tem¬ 
perature gages, tail pipe temperature gages (for jet 
engines), compasses, air position indicators, rate of 
climb indicators, oxygen pressure gages, oxygen 
regulators and oxygen flow indicators. 

Many instruments have the complexity of a fine 
jeweled watch. They possess delicate hair springs, 
jeweled bearings, fine steel alloy ball bearings, pivots, 
cases, cover glasses, engraved dials, aluminum 
pointers, and magnesium or aluminum frames. One 
of the more complex instruments is the automatic 
pilot which is either electrically or hydraulically 
operated. It is a well balanced system of gyros and 
servos (hydraulic or electric). If electric, it will 
possess a system of amplifiers. In some cases, the 
auto-pilot is harnessed to a system of visual indicating 
instruments. Bombsights and navigating devices can 
be even more complex, incorporating the use of 
calculating machinery, radar, and electronics. 

The design and development of new models takes 
from one to two years and an additional six to nine 
months to get the instrument into production. Mod¬ 
ifying or improving a production model calls for three 
to six months and experience shows that six months 
more will he required before the improved item rolls 
oft the production line. 

For production purposes, the visual instrument 
may he broken down into its basic elements, such as 
cases, dials, pointers, diaphragms, gears, pointer 
shafts and pointers, rotors, etc. Final assembly calls 
for 10 to 15 sub- and major sub-assembly operations. 
Like the airframe plant the major aircraft instrument 
concern primarily functions as an assembly plant with 
the emphasis placed on precision calibration and rigid 
test requirements for accuracy. Trend of design is 
toward small remote indicating instruments. A 
remote indicating instrument differs from a direct in 
that the mechanism for transmitting functions is 


Plants and Layout 

Instrument plants vary in size from one room 
shops to over a million square feet. In general, the 
plants are of permanent construction and their as¬ 
sembly areas are dust free and air conditioned. 

The efficient instrument plant usually has a special 
shop called “the model shop”. In reality, it is a 
laboratory for producing, calibrating and testing ex¬ 
perimental models. At the end of the final assembly 
line is another laboratory for calibrating and testing 
the production item that is equipped similarly to the 
model shop. A paint room with special apparatus for 
painting dials with luminous paint is also a typical 
component of an instrument plant although some 
manufacturers buy painted dials direct from the lumi¬ 
nous paint manufacturer. 

Plant layout generally provides for receipt of semi¬ 
finished material which goes through sheet metal 
shops, machine shops, heat treating shops, etc., in 
the usual minor and major sub-assembly, final as¬ 
sembly production plan. The calibrating and test¬ 
ing shop at the end of the final assembly line is 
the one variation from the production routine 
that is peculiar to aircraft instrument produc¬ 
tion. Production area amounts to 60 percent of 
the total floor space. An average size plant can be 
built in 90 to 100 days and can be tooled for produc¬ 
tion in six to nine months, depending on the tvpe and 
complexity of the contemplated production instru¬ 
ment. Production again depends on the type of in¬ 
strument, the size of the plant and the requirement. 
For example, the total requirements for the second 
quarter 1945 of C-l automatic pilots amount to 
2,803, whereas the total voltammeters which are 
much less complex and for which the need is greater 
amounted to 13,444 for the same period. 

Machinery and Equipment 

Due to the permanent nature of the instrument 
manufacturers’ business the major plants have a well 
balanced machinery set-up for integrated production 
of aircraft instruments. Besides the standard layout 
for sheet metal and machine shop production, there 
is the presence of many jewelers’ tools including lathes 
and gear cutting machines, heat treating cabinets for 
seasoning diaphragms, and bourdon tube elements, 
engraving machines, coil winding machines, tach- 


37 






ometer test stands, altitude chambers, and calibrating 
equipment. Ninety percent of the special tools are 
standard equipment of the watch and jewel trades. 
Machine man hours for the machine shop amount to 
20%, the remainder going to sub- and final assembly, 
calibration and testing. 

The high tolerance and degree of precision for the 
average aircraft instrument calls for large quantities 
of precision production with the use of jewelers’ 
equipment. Through the introduction of dies and 
fixtures large numbers of unskilled workers, for the 
most part women, were utilized in the mass produc¬ 
tion of instruments using the tray job-shop assembly 
method. 

Material 

Key materials for the production of satisfactory 
aircraft instruments are jewels (usually sapphires), 
luminous and radium paint, precision steel alloy ball 
bearings, beryllium copper for diaphragms and hair 
springs. Other materials used, but for which there 
are substitutes, are: Bakelite, and aluminum or 
magnesium alloy for cases; glass for covers; zinc, 
bronze, copper, phosphorous-bronze and grey iron, 
steel springs; rubber, neoprene, cord for seals; lava 
cores for heating elements, and lacquer. 

Labor 

Labor, before the expansion program, belonged to 
the artisan class. Highly skilled instrument manu¬ 
facturers turned out items practically by hand and 
the custom-built shop method prevailed. Mass pro¬ 
duction was effected not by training more highly 
skilled labor of this class but by utilizing the skilled 
personnel at hand in the most efficient manner. As¬ 
sembly lines were introduced. The jewelers were 
placed in the calibration and inspection shops. Semi¬ 
skilled and unskilled labor was placed on the assembly 
line to relieve the jewelers from routine work easily 
learned by the uninitiated. Women were the pre¬ 
dominant labor source chosen for their natural repeti¬ 
tive dexterity. Because the artisan group did not 
materially increase and since production depends en¬ 
tirely upon them, the instrument industry worked two 
ten-hour shifts. Work week varied from 48 hours to 
60 hours. 

Subcontracting 

It has already been pointed out that subcontracting 
is peculiar to the production order of the instrument 


industry in peacetime as well as war. Many manu¬ 
facturers specialize in the production of one material 
item, for example, a plastic concern. It is easier for 
an instrument company to buy dies for a plastic case 
and let a plastic manufacturer turn out cases than to 
go into the plastic business. Hence, screws, cases, 
nuts and bolts, standard gears, seals, nipples, glass 
covers, etc., are usually bought from an outside 
source. Doubling the subcontracting situation for 
war was easily accomplished by the industry because 
peace-time watch, clock and instrument companies 
bridged the gap from peace to war-time production 
with a ‘know how’ that was applicable to both. The 
instrument industry with its inherent subcontracting 
policy fits naturally into a dispersal program. Since 
production lends itself in most cases to small floor 
areas, the manufacture of aircraft instruments can 
be easily hidden. 

Management 

Besides the usual directive personnel, the manage¬ 
ment of an instrument factory depends largely on its 
engineers,—design, tool, and process—and on its 
artisan labor (jewelry trade) for production. The 
artisan is absolutely essential. No production can be 
effected without him. Instrument manufacturers 
with plenty of skilled labor can effect production on 
engineering data provided from an outside source. 

Manufacturing Methods 

In general, any type of instrument, including an 
automatic pilot, is manufactured by going through the 
following process : semi-finished material is received 
and sent through sheet metal or the machine shop to 
the sub-assembly and final assembly line and tbence 
to the calibrating and testing laboratory. Fixtures 
are stationary. Tools used by the semi- and unskilled 
labor on the assembly line are hand tools of the 
jewelry and watch trade—small screw driver, pliers, 
cutters. Although there are exceptions, the assembly 
line has no conveyors or moving equipment. The 
tray system is used and trays are moved from bench 
to bench as the worker completes a tray-load. A 
gyroscopic instrument, bank and turn, for example, 
usually requires two major sub-assemblies; (1) the 
gyro-section, and (2) the pointer and dampening 
section. On the assembly line the bank and turn in¬ 
dicator gyro-section starts to take shape when the 
first worker presses ball bearing races into a gyro 
rotor, presses pivots into the bearing, and balances 


38 




the assembly in a special balancing fixture. Then the 
balanced gyro is moved to another tray where the 

S next operator fits it into a gimbol frame and installs 
the frame complete with gyro into the mounting sec¬ 
tion case. The pointer and dampening section is as¬ 
sembled by installing the dampening mechanism in 

AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 


General 

In 1939 three major companies produced the 
nation's supply of aircraft electrical equipment on a 
full time basis assisted by 50 part-time subcontrac¬ 
tors. Total employment did not exceed 1.000. By 
January 1945 more than fifty concerns had entered 
the field on a major basis with more than 1000 sub¬ 
contractors. Total employment soared to over 
1,000,000. Output increased enormously. For ex¬ 
ample, in 1939 two companies produced the Army 
Air Forces’ entire supply of aircraft generators—500 
—whereas, for the third quarter of 1944 seven com¬ 
panies turned out a total of 116.501. 

Production, in most instances, easily met the de¬ 
mand of airframe schedules with the exception of 
auxiliary power plants. Priorities set by \YPB at the 
demands of the services seriously hampered the B-29 
program when no major engine producers were made 
available to make auxiliary power plants for pre¬ 
flight testing of the huge plane's electrical system. 

Some major plants were forced to increase their 
floor space while others used to mass producing of 
automobile generators at the rate of 10.000 a day 
found no need for additional space. In general, floor 
space increased tenfold. One company built seven 
large plants; others leased automobile factories or 
opened up unused sections of their own plants. Pro¬ 
duction was facilitated because the nation switched 
an enormous household and commercial electrical in¬ 
dustry with millions of skilled workers to produce 
aircraft electrical items. 

Product 

The principal types of electrical items for aircraft 
include: generators, motors, starters, invertors, 
lights, switches, solenoids, batteries, auxiliary power 
plants, cable, ignition coils, circuit breakers, relays, 
voltage regulators, electrical controls, test stands, 
electric turbo-supercharger regulators. 


the front section case along with the sensitivity ad¬ 
justing springs and the pointer assembly. Although 
these operations are extremely simple, they greatly 
increase production. For example, from 1 January 
1942 to 1 May 1945. 234.500 bank and turn indicators 
were produced as against not more than 500 in 1938. 

INDUSTRY 


The fact that this equipment is made especially for 
aircraft increases the complexity of the item. For 
example, lightness is a design characteristic essential 
to flight. Automobile generators, starters and house¬ 
hold electric motors are made in the same general 
design but aircraft items for reduction in weight 
operate at high speeds and frequencies using less cop¬ 
per and iron. Tolerances and materials must be 
greatly improved. For example, in an aircraft gen¬ 
erator precision steel ball bearings are used where 
bronze bearings are good enough for an automobile. 
A starter for an automobile has a motor which turns 
up 600 revolutions per minute. An aircraft starter's 
motor requires a minimum of 24.000 rpm. The out¬ 
put of an automobile generator is 300 watts, the gen¬ 
erator for a B-29 turns out 9,000—a 30 to one 
increase in power output. 

At the start of the war very little accessory elec¬ 
trical items were installed in our airplanes but as the 
war demanded more and better fighting gadgets, 
electricity was called in to do the job. Output of 
generators was increased by 1600 r c with no increase 
in size and only 50^ increase in weight. Electric 
motors went from zero to 11 in fighters and more 
than 140 in the B-29. By switching from 30 volt 
direct current to 200 and 400 cycle alternating cur¬ 
rent more than a ton of copper wire was saved in the 
B-36 and the weight of aircraft electric motors was 
reduced by 1/5. 

The trend is toward more use of light weight, 
high frequency alternating current electric motors. 
Designs indicate that a 1000 horsepower electric 
motor 18 inches in diameter and not more than 3 feet 
long, weighing 300 pounds, can be made using 400 
cycle alternating current. A 2000 horsepower motor 
of the same design can be made weighing not more 
than 500 pounds—less than half the weight of an in¬ 
ternal combustion gasoline engine of the same horse¬ 
power. With an efficient light weight gas turbine 
such motors can be made to whirl airplane propellers. 









Engineers indicate that electrically driven propellers 
offer an answer to efficient operation of extremely 
large airplanes—aerial battleships. 

Plants and Layout 

The fifty major plants and most of their subcon¬ 
tracting plants are of a permanent construction. 
Structural steel, stone and brick prevail. The lay¬ 
out is normal to any type of electrical production but 
this layout varies according to five types of manu¬ 
facture: (1) electrical machinery plants—motors, 

generators, starters, alternators; (2) electrical ac¬ 
cessory plants—switches, relays, connectors; (3) 
wire and cable plants; (4) battery plants; and (5) 
electric light bulb plants. The bench assembly sys¬ 
tem is used for the most part with the three large 
companies making use of conveyor systems where 
possible. In the industry, electrical machinery man¬ 
ufacturers were the only ones forced to construct 
new buildings during the war. Time to build and 
tool required three to six months. 

Machinery and Equipment 

The electrical industry is well balanced and in¬ 
tegrated machinery-wise due to the nation’s huge 
demand for household and automobile electrical 
equipment. Machine tools and equipment vary ac¬ 
cording to the type of electrical plant under the five 
classifications named in paragraph 3. 

Electrical machinery shops are equipped with 
foundries and casting rooms, sheet metal shops and 
machine shops. Machinery used is standard with a 
prevalence of wire winding machines, commulator 
turning machines, balancing machines, prony brakes 
and test stands. Stator and rotor disc punch presses 
are special and peculiar only to the electrical industry. 

Electrical accessory plants are characterized by 
their small light machinery—small lathes, presses, 
punches. Large plants usually possess a battery of 
molding machines for turning out plastic knobs, junc¬ 
tion boxes, etc. 

Wire and cable factories have extruding machinery, 
wire-drawing machinery, stranding machines, in¬ 
sulating machines, braiding machines, lacquer ma¬ 
chines and drying equipment. 

A battery plant’s equipment includes lead melting 
machines, lead molds for grids, paste mixing ma¬ 
chines, pasting machines, charging equipment, and 
plastic molding equipment for turning out covers and 
mono-block cases. Grid and case molds are peculiar 
only to the aircraft industry. Grids for aircraft bat¬ 


teries are 50% thinner than for automobile battery 
items and battery cases are smaller than automobile 
cases. 

Electric light plants contain special wire drawing 
machines for turning out tungsten filaments, auto¬ 
matic glass blowing machines—cutting machines and 
presses for producing the brass base. The filaments, 
glass bulb and base are assembled in automatic ma¬ 
chines. This industry calls for skilled process engi¬ 
neers and machinists to continue mass production. 
Glass blowers are needed to make special lamps. The 
industry is equipped to turn out millions of household 
lamps and consider most orders of the AAF as ex¬ 
tremely small. AAF items are specially made, part 
machine, and part hand. The General Electric Com¬ 
pany set up special machinery and equipment for 
making 600 watt sealed .beam landing lights. This 
equipment to date has no other known use. 

Tooling and the degree of precision varies again 
according to the type of electrical plant. In general, 
however, aircraft electrical equipment has to be made 
on a very exacting basis to insure safe performance 
so the degree of precision is far greater than in or¬ 
dinary electrical production. Tooling in the ma¬ 
chinery plant was increased to include about 50% 
automatic and semi-automatic machinery. Engineer¬ 
ing changes affected tooling and required a time lag 
but production was not stopped. Man-hours for 
fabrication, machine shop, and sheet metal shop ran 
40 to 50%. 

Materials 

Materials include magnetic steels, copper, tungsten, 
platinum, silver, aluminum, magnesium, carbon, 
graphite, cambric, cloth, varnish, vinyl and phenolic 
plastics as well as rubber. 

The light weight powerful electrical motors de¬ 
veloped during this war do not owe their success to 
the introduction of new metals or materials, but 
rather to design. By designing a motor to operate 
on alternating current between the 200 and 400 cycle 
frequency range, it was discovered that electrical 
motors could be reduced to the minimum weight— 
essential magnetic metal, iron or steel could be greatly 
reduced for a given horsepower. For example, a 7 
horsepower 400 cycle alternating current aircraft 
motor weighs 13 lbs. as against 200 to 300 lbs. for 
a 60 cycle alternating current motor of the same 
horsepower. Careful design of motors using direct 
current 12-30 volts can also result in good aircraft 


40 



products though, not so light for a given horsepower 
as the high frequency alternating current motors. A 
manufacturer limited to making only electrical ma¬ 
chinery that operates on only 25 to 60 cycle alternat¬ 
ing current could not make motors for aircraft use 
since the weight factor in design would be prohibitive. 
(See charts 8 to 12. Appendix A) 

Labor 

The electrical equipment industry saw few turn¬ 
over problems, very little lost time, and no strikes. 
This was due to the fact that a well established high 
paying industry with a million skilled workers merely 
changed from peace to war production. As the 
household business tapered out. electrical concerns 
anticipating the situation well in advance were all set 
with war contracts. The problem of expansion as 
far as unskilled labor was concerned was again the 
problem of manufacturing types. Accessory plants 
merely added more women. Machinery shops step¬ 
ped up bench assembly and used women for the 
delicate hand operations. Battery shops call for very 
little skilled labor, used cheapest source. Because of 
the hard, unhealthy work of the battery factories, no 
women were hired. 

Subcontracting 

Like the instrument industry, subcontracting is a 
practice peculiar to the industry. Xo difficulty was 
encountered here. Some of the old line companies 


subcontracted as much as twenty times the business 
they themselves could handle. Two of the major 
concerns subcontracted from 50 to 100 c /c, according 
to the product. On the other hand, some com¬ 
panies. used to turning out 10,000 automobile gen¬ 
erators a day, did not have to expand or subcontract 
at all. 

Management 

The American electrical industry is noted for its 
efficient management and its highly skilled engineers, 
scientists and technicians. That this management is 
adaptable is evidenced by the fact that at the start 
of the war there were, only 25 electrical engineers 
who had any aeronautical background at all, yet when 
the Army Air Forces demanded new aeronautical de¬ 
velopments on a large scale, the industry was able to 
come up with the answers. 

Manufacturing Methods 

Manufacturing methods vary according to the type 
of factory but the same general production procedure 
applies. The only variation in the electrical ma¬ 
chinery industry, for example, was a change of 
materials—aluminum alloy and steel for iron and 
steel ball bearings for bronze. (The change in metals 
was made in the interest of efficiency—light weight 
400 cycle AC motors can be made of the old materials 
with only a slight loss in durability.) 


AIRCRAFT GUN TURRET INDUSTRY 


General 

Twelve companies were producing power driven 
turrets for the Army Air Forces by the end of 1944. 
Most of these contractors shipped directly to the 
Government, which in turn supplied the turrets to air¬ 
plane manufacturers. In a few cases, however, tur¬ 
rets were shipped directly to airframe manufacturers 
or were produced in the airframe manufacturers 
plant. Total floor area in final assembly turret plants 
amounted to roughly 3,500,000 square feet, while 
plant and equipment dollar value investment was 
approximately 300.000.000. 

Peak turret production reached in July and August. 
1944. lagged behind the airframe and engine peaks 
by two or three months because turret production 


got underway much later and encountered a sub¬ 
stantially larger number of design changes and pro¬ 
duction bottlenecks than other aircraft components. 

Power driven turrets, experimental or otherwise, 
were first produced for the Army Air Forces in 1937. 
At the end of 1939, six manufacturers were actively 
engaged in turret production. It was not until 1940 
that armament engineers decided heavy bombers 
should he equipped with at least four turrets—fore, 
aft, top and bottom. Consequently, rapid expansion 
followed until June 1945. 

Product 

Power-driven turrets make gunnery operation pos¬ 
sible through a range of fire during high speeds. 


41 








Otherwise, at high altitude, great physical exertion 
causing fatigue would be required to hold a gun or 
guns against the slipstream. 

Turrets are classed as local, or inhabited, and 
remote. In the former, gun operation can be ac¬ 
complished either standing or sitting, either directly 
by pulling the trigger or indirectly by a hand-grip 
which, when depressed, electrically actuates the gun¬ 
firing mechanism—the solenoid. This same hand¬ 
grip, when turned in a horizontal plane, actuates an 
electric or hydraulic drive system which revolves the 
turret in azimuth (horizontally) and when turned in 
a vertical plane raises and lowers the guns. In the 
case of the ball turret, where the guns are fixed to 
the actual structure and the turret itself is capable 
of moving in both planes, the hand-grip also controls 
the vertical movement of the turret. 

A remote control turret contains one or more guns 
hut the gunner may he located any number of feet 
away at a sighting station. By means of an intricate 
computing device the proper prediction angle is trans¬ 
mitted to the guns by an electrical servo system. The 
merit of remote control is that smaller and lighter 
turrets can he used because they are not built to 
contain a man’s head or body, and thus produce less 
drag. 

Types of drive systems in current use are about 
evenly divided between electric and hydraulic. The 
latter is lighter hut more cumbersome, while the 
electrical drive system is easier to maintain. Frac¬ 
tional horsepower electric motors activate turrets, 
gunsights, and other equipment. 

There are nose, tail, chin, belly or ball and upper 
and lower turrets. One or all of these may he in¬ 
stalled on an airplane, depending upon the tactical 
purpose. 

Size and weight of a turret does not vary directly 
with size and weight of the plane on which it is used. 
In fact, the trend is in the other direction. Remote 
turrets, such as are used on the B-29 and other very 
heavy bombers planned for the future, are smaller 
and lighter than the inhabited turrets on today’s light 
and heavy bombers. On the other hand, remote sys¬ 
tems have been installed on such comparatively small 
types as the A-26 and the P-61. 

Turrets range in diameter from 37 to 54 inches. 
Diameter is not always indicative of weight since 
some of the larger magnesium turrets are lighter than 
other smaller aluminum types. In addition, size and 
weight depend on the position of the turret in the 
plane; whether or not it has a retracting mechanism; 


the design; and at what stage of the war it was de¬ 
signed. 

Table P shows minimum and maximum weights of 
turrets on various plane types: 

table p : 



Diameter 

range 

(inches) 

Empty 

weight 

range 

(pounds) 

Combat 
weight 
range 
(with man 
and am¬ 
munition) 
(pounds) 

Heavy and very heavy 




bombers . 

37 to 54 

285 to 1,126 

735 to 1,500 

Medium and light 




bombers . 

37 to 48 

242 to 686 

700 to 1,130 

Trainers . 

44 

375 

440 


Local turrets are constructed with a methyl 
methacrylate plastic canopy (Plexiglass or Lucite), 
which may or may not be reinforced with rib¬ 
bing of cast aluminum or magnesium. When pro¬ 
duction first started welded aluminum tubing was 
used as a framework for the plastic panels. Sheet 
aluminum and steel is used in addition as part of the 
turret structure while plate glass panels are some¬ 
times substituted for the plastic type. Remote tur¬ 
rets are magnesium or aluminum die stampings 
without transparent panels. 

There are approximately 75 production types of 
local turrets based on 18 designs, and about 10 remote 
turret production models. 

Except for required close gear tolerances, turrets 
are not a precision item and require few specialized 
machines or plant facilities for fabrication. Com¬ 
puting sights, however, which are an integral part 
of most turrets, require a great deal of precision work 
throughout production. 

An average 44 inch, 700 pound (empty) turret 
contains about 1,000 different parts, not counting 
those in the sight, the computer or the guns (fur¬ 
nished by the Army Ordnance Department). 

The primary job of the turret plant is to fabricate 
structural parts and assemble completed sub-assem¬ 
blies usually provided by subcontractors. For pro¬ 
duction purposes the remote turret is broken down 
into ten major sub-assemblies and the local turret 
into sixteen. 

It is important to perfect turrets as units apart 


42 














from specific airplanes. The trend of design in this 
field is to remote control turrets which project less 
and less into the airstream. Experiments are also 
being carried out with stabilized and pressurized local 
turrets and stabilized remote turrets. Streamlined 
teardrop designs are on the boards now and are ex¬ 
pected to give minimum drag and weight with max¬ 
imum fire power. Another new development is the 
installation of radar in the turrets to give accurate 
range data and to provide blind tracking and sighting. 

Engineers are working on remote control wing tip 
turrets for new jet bombers. The speeds attained by 
jet propulsion are such that any projection into the 
airstream presents a serious drag. The answer to 
this may be flush turrets. 

As far as their interchangeability with ground 
equipment goes, turrets can be broken down into a 
number of component parts, quite universally used 
for civilian production, such as switches, relays, 
motors, generators, pumps, hydraulic fittings, lenses, 
methyl methacrylate sheet, wire, dural sheet, bear¬ 
ings, plate glass, bolts, nuts, rivets, paint, bulbs, 
potentiometers, gears, aluminum castings, magnesium 
castings. 

Plants and Layout 

Turret plants range in size from 100.000 to 1,500,- 
000 square feet. About four companies, all having 
400.000 square feet or over, produce 75% of the 
total. Most of the expansion in turret manufacture 
took place through conversion of conventional brick 
or stone factories which had been diverted from other 
production. Examples of factories converted from 
peace-time production to turret manufacture include 
plumbing equipment factories, automobile body fac¬ 
tories, railroad signal switch manufacturers. A few 
new plants were built. These were of a modern 
permanent black-out construction and fairly large. 
The largest, for example, had a productive floor area 
of over 1,000,000 square feet. 

There are no factory characteristics peculiar to the 
turret industry. None of the machines are over 1? 
feet high, none weigh over 10 tons or are unusually 
wide or long. The jigs and movable dollies used in 
final assembly are not big enough to require enlarged 
assembly areas. Adjacent to the factory most turret 
companies have a large firing range to test the as¬ 
sembled turret. 

Factorv layout follows standard procedure for final 
assembly plants. Located either in the final assembly 


building or in a nearby structure are test bore sighting 
jigs for testing operation of assembled turrets. 

Production area amounts to about 80% of the 
total floor space. The rest of the factory area consists 
of a tool room, testing, service, engineering and ad¬ 
ministration departments, warehouses, packing rooms 
and in some cases research departments incorporating 
rather elaborate chemical analysis facilities. The 
largest plant, for example, committed 1,000.000 
square feet to production and about 200.000 square 
feet to the tool room. 

Temperature or humidity control is not essential to 
turret production. 

Xew turret plants require one year to build and 
equip. Engineers estimate that with the experience 
that has been accumulated, it also would take about 
one year to convert an existing plant, although some 
of the plants were in production nine months after 
they started retooling. 

Peak turret production saw 200 per month for the 
smallest plant and 2300 for the largest plant. Pro¬ 
duction per square foot of plant area averaged 10 
turret pounds. 

Machinery and Equipment 

On the average, turret plants have a well-balanced 
machine and sheet metal shop and are able to do most 
of the machine work on the actual turret structure 
and a variety of the other parts. Extreme exceptions 
included a plant that does 700 of its machine work, 
as well as the final assembly, and another that does 
only 10% of the machine work. The machines are 
practically 100% standard, the main specialized pieces 
being the bore sighting jigs used to test the com¬ 
pleted turret and the Gleason grinders for grinding 
ring gears. There are a very few of each of these in 
the country. The other drive gears must mesh so 
perfectly with the ring gear that there is room for 
absolutely no backlash or “play”. This requires 
special high precision gear cutting machines. 

Turret companies are equipped with production 
equipment such as heat-treating furnaces, electrolytic 
equipment for anodizing the structural parts, paint 
shops, floor level X-ray equipment for inspection pur¬ 
poses. 

Bench, sub and major assembly jigs are essential 
to every turret factory. These are in addition to the 
dies and fixtures used in the machine shops. Very 
little of the equipment, however, had to be redesigned 
for the use of semi and unskilled workers. 

Machine manhours consumed in the manufacture 


43 






of local and remote turrets vary according to the size 
and type. Ball turrets, for example, require 1,100 
hours of machining and 500 hours of assembly. 

Material 

The basic materials used in turret manufacture are 
either aluminum, or magnesium, copper, steel, bronze, 
brass, zinc, leather, canvas, rubber and plastics. 

The structural material is aluminum or magnesium 
casting and/or sheet, heat-treated to achieve high 
.strength as a resistant to the recoil of .50 caliber guns. 
The ammunition containers and feed system are of 
stainless steel or aluminum sheet, the relay contacts, 
silver, the armor plate, steel, the shock mounting, 
rubber, the gun mounts, steel forgings or hard 
aluminum sheet, the gaskets, cork, the wiring, copper, 
leather for weather sealing, the canopy or panels of 
methyl methacrylate sheet or plate glass, and the 
gearing of steel. 

Labor 

The smallest turret assembly plants employed about 
500 persons at peak and the largest about 7,500. 
Employment for the largest plant at that time 
amounted to about 50 engineers, 2,000 skilled, and 
3,000 unskilled workers. 

Two 8 to 10-hour shifts were sufficient to meet 
maximum production. 

Since most of the jobs, except the minority of the 
precision machine operations, could be taught to un¬ 
skilled workers, the turret plants took what they 
could get in the way of labor, set up training schools, 
in many instances in the shop, and spent from three 
to ten weeks teaching the new employees. An aver¬ 
age of 50 percent of the employees were women who 
did about 25 percent of the machine work and 75 
percent of the assembly work. 

Subcontracting 

Approximately 30 percent to 40 percent of the 
turret work is done by subcontractors who make the 
aluminum and magnesium castings, the oxygen equip¬ 
ment, the gunsights and computers, the rivets, nuts, 
bolts, screws, electric motors, controls, armament, 
armor plate, and transparent plastic for covers and 
blisters. The subcontracting schedule provides two 
months from the time the finished sub-assembly is 
completed and placed into the finished turret. 

Engineering changes and modifications require 
from 6 hours to 9 months to incorporate them into 
the production schedule. 


Management 

Management of a prime turret factory is similar to 
that of airframe and other aircraft parts plants. 
Engineering staffs were particularly vital during the 
early stages because development and expansion were 
simultaneous; consequently, the plants which did 
their own design work maintained huge research or¬ 
ganizations. 

Control of materials is a very important part of 
the picture and follows much the same line as that 
of airframe and engine material control. Require¬ 
ments have to be anticipated about six months in ad¬ 
vance to meet the optimum lead time of three months. 
Planning and scheduling to have turret output meet 
plane production was another important aspect. 

Manufacturing Methods 

The general flow of material through the final as¬ 
sembly plant follows tbe normal routine, i.e., subcon¬ 
tracted components and raw materials enter the plant 
through the receiving department where they are in¬ 
spected. Raw sheet is sent to the sheet metal shop 
for forming, cutting, and stamping. Bar stock, cast¬ 
ings, forgings, etc., go through the machine shop and 
thence to the sub-, major and final assembly lines. 

During the assembly of the 10 major subassemblies 
for the remote control turret, and the 16 for the local 
turret, more than fifty minor subassemblies are added 
to the major subassemblies, including such items as: 
left and right arm rests, the azimuth gear, drive shaft 
housing, slug box, rope hoists, ejection chutes, foot 
rest, ammunition feed rollers, elevation compensators, 
brushes, brush box, azimuth drive, compensator con¬ 
troller, speed reducer, rack guide and spring, spring 
and rack support, adjustable rack gear, roller and 
yoke canopy, arm and spline nut, center columns 
radial support, housing control, crank extension, ex¬ 
tension lamp, dehydrator, left and right hydraulic 
charger, azimuth resistor box, elevation resistor box, 
rheostat for heated clothing, and amplidyne motor 
cover. 

On the final assembly line the remote turret takes 
shape in a definite sequence of mating major sub- 
assemblies. First, the ring assembly is placed on a 
convevor and as it moves down the line the following 
items are added: saddle support castings, saddle as¬ 
sembly, azimuth drive unit, elevation drive unit, am¬ 
munition can and frame assembly, interrupter and 
collector assembly, compressor system assembly, 
booster assembly, and dome and gun enclosure as¬ 
sembly. The final assembly of a local turret includes 


44 


the same ten steps, with the addition of the following: 
control box. oxygen equipment, seat, power units, 
sight assembly, and protective armor plate. 

Careful inspection is carried on throughout the 
assembly process. The dimensions are constantly 
checked and the various parts are given several mag- 
naflux and X-ray inspections. After final assembly 
the electrical circuits are tested and the turret is given 
temperature, humidity and life tests. Its guns are 
fixed from the bore sighting jig to check their per¬ 
formance and that of the turret from every position. 

1 he removable jig assembly was an innovation to 
the manufacturing methods that speeded up produc¬ 
tion materially, although some plants continued to use 
the fixed jig method. 

Remote Control Systems 

The trend in defensive armament for bombardment 
aircraft is toward central fire control systems, the best 
example of which is found on the B—29 airplane. 
This is a remote control system wherein the gunner 
and gunsight are located behind a sighting blister 
while the computer and gun may be placed practically 
any place within the airplane. Since gunners do not 
inhabit these turrets, smaller and lighter construction 
is possible with placement positions where fire j>ower 
will most effectively blanket enemy attacks from any 
direction. Transfer of fire power concentrations 
from one gunner to another is also possible since any 
gunner can control turrets other than his own. 

By use of remote control systems gunners are af¬ 
forded an unobstructed view and greater protection 
by the airplane’s armor plate. Sighting accuracy is 
thus increased due to separation from gun recoil jar 
and vibration. A more desirable distribution of 


weight throughout the airplane is also made pos>ii>le 
by the separation of computer, gunner and turret. 

First experiments on remote control systems were 
begun in this country during 1939. Advanced prog- 
ress now permits operation at altitudes up to 40.000 
feet and at a Fahrenheit temperature range from 40 
degrees below to 125° above zero. 

There are five turrets on a B-29 airplane, the upper 
and lower forward, the upper and lower rear, and the 
tail turrets. Unit weights range from 285 to 385 
p unds without guns or ammunition, and from 735 
t< i 765 pounds fully equipped with ammunitii »n. Only 
the tail turret may be occupied by a gunner. 

The principal materials used in the fabrication of 
remote control turrets are aluminum and steel for 
the greater portion, and bronze, brass and copper to 
a lesser degree. 

The remote control system depends on a large 
number of electrical operating devices. These are 
included in the following list of major sub-assemblies 
which is the breakdown for manufacturing purposes: 
sight, computer, turret, amplidyne motor-generators, 
dynamotors, servo-amplifiers, control boxes, switch 
boxes, sighting station and navigator's hand-set unit. 

Manufacture of the turret, computer and sight fol¬ 
lows procedures already outlined in this report. In¬ 
stallation of remote control systems obviously 
requires more time than that of the local turret. 

Due to the diverse nature of remote control turret 
components, approximately 50 percent of the fabrica¬ 
tion is subcontracted. Eiach of the two leading 
producers were engaged in prewar electrical manu¬ 
facturing. Blisters for sighting stations formed with 
methyl methacrylate are generally fabricated at the 
airframe plant of final assembly. 


AIRCRAFT GUNSIGHT AND COMPUTER INDUSTRY 


General 

Ten factories were producing aircraft gunsights of 
all tvpes for the Army Air Forces by the end of 1944. 
At that time total floor area in prime sight and com¬ 
puter plants amounted to about 3.001*.000 square feet. 
Onlv 14 percent of this area was brought into exis¬ 
tence through new construction while the balance 
represents area secured by plant conversion. Sight 
output reached a peak in Tune 1944. with monthly 


production totaling 734.000 units for Army Air 
Forces. 

Product 

There are two basic types of gunsights: first, 
computing sights, and secondly, noncomputing sights, 
which are either simple ring and bead assemblies or 
optical sights. Xoncomputing sights are used on 
some fighter airplanes and in some bomber gun posi¬ 
tions. but are rapidly being replaced by the computing 


67S1S-4-*6—4 


45 






sight. The ring and bead sight are built into the 
computing sight for emergency use if the lighted 
reticle or computer should fail. 

The optical sight consists of spectacle quality 
optical glass mounted in a light metal casting. It is 
used on a number of fighter planes and in some 
bomber gun positions. This type also is being re¬ 
placed by the computing sight. 

Computing sights are either mechanical or elec¬ 
trical and can be stabilized or nonstabilized. They 
are used in fighter airplanes, where the guns are of 
necessity fixed, on flexible guns in bomber waist posi¬ 
tions and in bomber turrets. (Computers in the re¬ 
mote control system are discussed under the section 
on central fire control.) 

The computer takes the altitude, the outside tem¬ 
perature, the speed of the plane in which it is mounted 
and the wing span of the enemy plane, all of which 
are fed to it by the gunner through dials or knobs, 
and the range, which it received through the move¬ 
ment of the sight tracking the target, and computes 
the proper prediction angle. This is translated into 
a current which moves the sight reticle, thus indi¬ 
cating the point at which the guns should be aimed. 

In an electrical system, the computer emits a cur¬ 
rent to drive a small motor, which in turn drives the 
sight. In a mechanical system the sight is turned by 
means of cams and gears. 

The trend in this field is to use radar in place of a 
sight. 

A stabilized computer is one which contains from 
one to three gyros. When a sight is moved in track¬ 
ing an enemy airplane, the gyro moves proportion¬ 
ate!}', emitting low voltage signals which are picked 
up by an amplification system consisting of tubes and 
condensors. The signals are intensified and trans¬ 
mitted to the computer, thereby introducing relative 
speed into the computer. A computing sight is about 
S inches long, 6 inches wide, and 10 inches high. It 
weighs from 15 to 80 pounds, depending upon how 
intricate it is, while a noncomputing sight weighs 
about 3y 2 pounds. 

An average noncomputing sight contains about 50 
parts, while a computing sight contains from 800 to 
1.500 parts. Gyro equipped sights contain an addi¬ 
tional 300 to 900 parts. 

A computing sight includes an aluminum or mag¬ 
nesium structure, optics, bearings and springs, wire 
potentiometers, shafts, gears, dials, cams, differen¬ 
tials, constant speed fractional horsepower motors, 
sighting glass, screws, nuts, bolts, etc. 


The computer is an extremely complicated device 
requiring much precision work during the process of 
manufacture. 

For production purposes, computing sights are 
broken down into housing, gears, shafts, nuts, bolts, 
optics, motors, gyro, etc., some of which are made at 
the prime sight manufacturer's plant while the 
balance are received from subcontractors. 

Plants and Layout 

It is difficult to estimate the actual volume of square 
feet area devoted to fabrication and assembly of gun 
sights and computers. Most plants producing these 
items manufacture in addition, electrical equipment, 
bombsights, and many other aircraft instruments. It 
may suffice to say that production of gun sights could 
be achieved in one room except for casting, forging 
and assembly operations. Floor areas utilized by 
each manufacturer differ widely in volume. Rep¬ 
resentative of the industry, but by no means the 
largest or smallest prime contractors, is one devoting 
45,000 square feet of floor space to gun sight and 
computer production, another 110,000 to compensat¬ 
ing gun sights, another 300,000 to fire control sight 
production for B-29 airplane remote gun turrets, and 
subassemblies for the B-29 computer; a midwestern 
plant devoting 647,000 square feet to gun sight work, 
and still another 500,000 to the manufacture of B-29 
computers. 

Factories which were found to be reliable gun sight 
and subassembly sources were predominately those 
engaged in prewar precision work. These sources 
included a former cash register company, several 
camera producers and an automotive accessories man¬ 
ufacturer. 

Only a few companies in the United States manu¬ 
facture gyros due to the high degree of precision work 
required. These include clock and instrument manu¬ 
facturers and several other firms whose prewar ex¬ 
perience was that of precision work. 

The sole factory construction characteristic pecu¬ 
liar to the sight industry arises from the necessity for 
temperature and humidity control in order to insure 
against warping and rusting of delicate parts. Other¬ 
wise the plant may be of any conventional design 
since none of the machines used are exceptionally 
large and final assembly can be accomplished on a 
table top. 

Factory layout for sight production follows that of 
most instrument plants including extensive inspection 
departments and packaging facilities. Most sight 


46 


plants subcontract necessary foundry work although 
several possess foundries in connection with the plant. 
Subcontracted components are directed to the re¬ 
ceiving department where they are inspected and 
channeled to the machine or sheet metal shops or 
directly to the bench for major or final assembly. 
Small conveyor lines are used for transfer of parts 
from one stage of assembly to another. 

On the average. 12 months are required to build 
and equip sight plants while 6 months are required 
to convert a plant outside the field to sight production. 

% 

Machinery and Equipment 

Sight and computer factories possess well balanced 
and integrated machine shops and perform a large 
portion of the necessary machine work on parts prior 
to subcontracting. The machines used are generally 
standard types with especially made tool attachments. 
Some factories operate sheet metal work shops while 
others subcontract this work. In machining com¬ 
puters, jig borers, high precision grinders, and other 
specialized small precision gear cutters, are used ex¬ 
tensively. 

Materials 

The basic material used for the sight frame and 
computer box is either aluminum or magnesium. 
Steel is used for cams, springs, shafts, and bearings 
(a more complex device requires more steel), copper 
for wiring and. bronze for sleeve bearings, while 
plastics may be used for small knobs and dials. 
Aluminum is used for noncomputing sights and for 
some gears in a computing sight. The ring and bead 
can be made from any type of metal. 

Labor 

Since the gun sight and computer industry decided¬ 
ly is not in the heavy industry category, women can 


perform 72 to 80 percent of the assembly work and 
operate 50 percent of the machines. 

Subcontracting 

Prime contractors purchase wire, finished and un¬ 
finished gears, bearings, and other standard items 
from an outside producer and generally subcontract 
casting and sheet metal work. 

Six months are required to effect engineering 
changes at the subcontracting level. The sight in¬ 
dustry requires forward planning which allows from 
15 days to 3 months from the time an item is com¬ 
pleted by a subcontractor until used in the final turret 
assembly. 

At the time the leading gyro producer began its 
defense program in 1940, it had 100 subcontractors 
but this figure more than doubled at peak production. 

Management 

Management is similar to that of any instrument 
company; key personnel are the same. Emphasis is 
placed on precision work by skilled machinists 
(artisans). 

Manufacturing Methods 

Of the 500 parts in a gyro, approximately 100 are 
standard items while the remaining 400 require 
precision machining to close the tolerances. Con¬ 
sequently gyro producers generally possess well-in¬ 
tegrated machine shops. The sight and computer are 
assembled by identical methods as in other instrument 
assembly—the tray job bench method. Dimensions 
are checked and rechecked repeatedly with precision 
gages throughout the process of assembly. After 
final assembly the sight and computer is packed in 
pliofilm with silica jel packets inside the wrapping to 
absorb moisture. The package is then shock-mounted 
in a shipping box. 


AIRCRAFT OXYGEN EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY 


General 

In rarified atmosphere, oxygen equipment acts to 
a human as does a turbo-supercharger to an engine 
by providing enough oxygen for sea level perform¬ 
ance at altitudes above 10,000 feet. Production of 
this equipment divides into two categories, each one 


involving different materials and different manufac¬ 
turing methods: (A) masks, and (B) cylinders. 

A. Only two prime sources of oxygen masks were 
being used by the Army Air Forces by the 
end of 1944. These plants were occupy¬ 
ing approximately 17,000 square feet of floor 


47 







space and employing about 1,200 persons in 
the fabrication of mask bodies and the as¬ 
sembly of complete masks. 

Production hit a peak of 60,000 masks a month 
by December 1944, and continued at that 
rate through February 1945. The average 
was about 40,000 masks a month. 

B. The AAF obtained low-pressure oxygen cylin¬ 
ders from four prime sources, which were 
occupying not more than 500,000 square feet 
of floor space. 

Production began a fairly rapid expansion in 
1940 and by May 1944 bad hit a peak of 200,- 
000 cylinders a month. 

Product 

A. Masks have about 15 parts, depending upon the 

type. The A-10 demand type has the follow¬ 
ing : Ring buckle, suspension webbing strap, 
mask shield, release buckle, release buckle 
washer, release buckle rivet, mask face blank, 
microphone, lead-in-port plug, exhalation 
valve flap, double socket strap yoke, plastic 
inlet tube, inlet tube insert, tube clamp, flex¬ 
ible delivery tube, male connector fitting and 
gasket. 

Each mask, as a result of exhaustive studies of 
facial shapes, is issued in large, medium, 
small and very small contours. 

B. Breathing oxygen cylinders are of two kinds: 

High pressure and low pressure. High pres¬ 
sure oxygen cylinders, because of that pres¬ 
sure, must be made of good grades of stain¬ 
less steel. Their making is a heavy industry. 
Low pressure cylinders are subjected to no 
undue stresses, consequently, they are made 
of stainless and low carbon sheet steels. 
Their production is comparatively simple, 
calling for a minimum of heavy machinery. 

The AAF no longer uses high pressure oxygen 
systems. Forced into its use by a joint agreement 
with the British and the U. S. Navy, the AAF aban¬ 
doned high pressure oxygen by the end of 1942. 
Such systems, A Ah' engineers felt, were not only 
more expensive, more difficult to produce, heavier 
and no more efficient, but they were dangerous under 
gunfire. 

Low pressure cylinders range in capacity from 500 
to 18,000 cubic inches. 

The design trend of all AAF oxygen equipment is 
toward the pressure demand system of low pressure 


oxygen, as against the simple demand system. (A 
demand system offers oxygen in the amount the per¬ 
son breathes in, while the pressure demand system 
offers the same oxygen under pressure, so at alti¬ 
tudes above 35.000 feet the indrawn oxygen will have 
sufficient pressure to penetrate to the blood stream.) 

About 18 months elapse between inception of a 
new design and the appearance of service test models. 

Plants and Layouts 

A. Oxygen mask factories are compressed into 
comparatively small floor spaces, ranging up¬ 
ward to 4,000 square feet. Since the entire 
industry is converted from peacetime pur¬ 
suits, the buildings are of a permament con¬ 
struction. 

Mask factories have no special external char¬ 
acteristics. Internally the giant rubber 
blending vats, chemical tanks, rollers for 
kneading rubber and chemicals, overhead 
racks for individual molds provide easily 
identified features. 

(1) Plants devoted to the dip method of 

fabricating masks have slightly dif¬ 
ferent floor plans than those fac¬ 
tories using the mold method. The 
number of vats are greater, indi¬ 
vidual aluminum molds run into 
the thousands and the production 
line includes more steps than the 
latter method. 

(2) Mask factories using the mold 

method eliminate vats and substi¬ 
tute rollers which knead the rubber 
her and chemicals together. In¬ 
stead of beat-treating ovens, heated 
presses are used. 

In either case, about 80 percent of the 
plant floor space is devoted to pro¬ 
duction, with the remaining footage 
distributed among storage, inspec¬ 
tion, testing and shipping. 

B. Prime cylinder plants range from three-room 
layouts of not more than 10,000 square 
feet to factories of 300,000 square feet. Gen¬ 
erally converted or taken over from peace¬ 
time contractors, such plants are permanently 
constructed. Low pressure cylinder making 
is not a heavy industry. Such plants do 
not have special architectural features. 

Layouts are designed to let material flow 


48 


from the draw presses, which draw cylinder 
halves through the various steps of fabrica¬ 
tion to final inspection and packing. Xo 
particular difficulties are involved since fabri¬ 
cation does not demand anything unusual 
either in power or machinerv. 

Productive capacity varies with the size of 
the cylinder. \\ ith the G-l type, capacitv 
2.100 cubic inches, a factory was capable of 
turning out 20.000 or more a month. 

Machinery and Equipment 

A. 1 here is practically no integration in the 
oxygen mask industry. One plant, which 
comes closest, does no assembly work, 
although it does make its own face blanks, 
tubing and even machines its own molds. 

Principal tools of the mask-making industry 
are the rollers for mixing molded rubber 
with chemicals designed to give it the right 
color, properties and odor; testing equip¬ 
ment, electric knives or irons for buffing, 
and the jigs for fixtures. 

1 he making of masks is a precision 'ndustrv 
only insofar as masks must be leakproof. 
Before the industry went on a high pro¬ 
duction basis, most work was done by hand 
and required highly skilled labor. Auto¬ 
matic rubber presses, and new techniques, 
allowed the introduction of unskilled labor. 
Under this setup, only the actual rubber 
blenders need be skilled to any great degree. 

P>. Integration is great in the average oxygen 
cylinder plant, since these plants work with 
one type of material and with an item which 
has few parts. 

There are few special machine tools in cylinder 
making. Machines are standard varying 
from draw presses to welders of various 
kinds, including arc. seam, spot and atomic. 

They range from 125 tons, upward, depending 
upon the capacity of the cylinder involved. 

In the low-pressure field, precision is not a 
critical factor, since it could be cared for 
by machine settings. 

Machine-hours totaled 65 percent of all man¬ 
hours in cylinder production. 

Materials 

A. Rubber, basic material of oxygen masks, is 
of two general types: Dipped and molded. 


In either case, the rubber must be pliable, 
even in the lowest temperatures. Principal 
means of achieving this pliability is by keep¬ 
ing the rubber content extremely high. 
Furthermore, the rubber must be natural, 
since science has found no means of utiliz¬ 
ing synthetic rubber in oxygen masks. It 
must be odorless. It must be green, primar¬ 
ily because that color appeals to its users. 

(1) Dipped rubber is 95 percent pure 
latex, compounded with scores of 
chemicals. It must be treated 
against fungi. 

(2) Molded rubber is 85 percent pure, 
also being compounded with chemi¬ 
cals to achieve the proper cold, 
color and odor properties. Molded 
rubber is not susceptible to fungus 
growths. 

Dipped rubber does not wear as well as molded 
rubber, nor does it lend itself as readily to 
mass production. The trend of AAF masks 
is entirely to molded rubber. 

B. Low-pressure oxygen cylinders are made of 
stainless, low-carbon steel sheets. 

Labor 

The introduction of automatic machinery and the 
simplification of work procedures reduced labor 
problems to a minimum in the oxygen mask industry 
by allowing mass employment of women. Low 
pressure oxygen cylinder factories employ women 
to operate the automatic welding machines but the 
majority of the equipment was operated by men. 

Subcontracting 

A. Subcontracting in the mask industry is high. 

The makers of the A—14 demand system 
mask—principal mask of the Second World 
War—subcontract 90 percent of their work. 
Subcontracting on other types of oxygen 
masks falls lower. 

Mask making naturally lends itself to sub¬ 
contracting. for a number of industries are 
represented and the prime contractor, the 
molder or dipper of the rubber mask, is 
not ordinarily equipped to do mass assembly, 
or work with other materials. 

B. Subcontracting in the oxygen cylinder industry 

is correspondingly low, for the reverse of 
the reasons which made subcontracting in 


49 




masks high- Cylinder concerns are dealing 
with a single material and type of work. 
Subcontracting averages about 1 percent 
mainly for valve fittings. 

Management 

The flow of latex to oxygen mask factories, using 
the dip method, presents unusually close scheduling 
problems since this material is difficult to store and 
spoils rapidly. 

Manufacturing Methods 

A. The two methods of manufacturing oxygen 
masks—the dip and the mold methods— 
virtually are opposed: One begins with 
liquid latex, the second with solid rubber. 

(1) The dip method, by which the bulk 
of the nation’s oxygen masks are 
made, is peculiar to the mass pro¬ 
duction scene because it is es¬ 
sentially a hand operation. In this 
method, individual aluminum molds, 
held in large overhead racks, are 
dipped successively into vats of 
liquid latex and chemicals, building 
by layers. The chemicals serve to 
give the rubber mask certain quali¬ 
ties—fungiproof, odorless, pliable 
under extremely low temperatures. 
Two dippings are made in each 
vat. The molds then are dipped in 
a tank of water and conveyed to 
an oven, where they are heat- 
treated at 180° for 16 hours. After 
baking, the masks are stripped from 
the molds, buffed with electrically 
heated knives and inspected. About 
5 percent of the operation is de¬ 
voted to testing. Prior to the be¬ 
ginning of the dipping operation, 
the liquid latex must be blended 
and the chemicals must be mixed— 
both by experts. 

(2) In the mold method of making 
masks, the rubber is in solid form. 
It is mixed with chemicals by 
rollers, which knead the rubber and 
chemicals together like a giant 
bread-making machine. After be¬ 
ing thoroughly mixed, the rubber 
is put in sufficient amounts in indi¬ 


vidual molds or presses, which melt 
the rubber, allowing it to flow into 
a mask face. Hydraulic pressure 
in the molds or presses overcomes 
the high pressure of the molten 
rubber. The reformed rubber then 
is stripped from the mold, trimmed 
by hand and inspected. The mold¬ 
ing process takes about 15 minutes. 

B. There are two principal methods of manufac¬ 
turing steel low-pressure oxygen cylinders: 
(1) two-piece, and (2) three-piece opera¬ 
tion. 

The two-piece operation is confined to the 
production of 1,000 cubic inch (or greater) 
items, and the three-piece to items less than 
1,000 cubic inches. 

(1) In the two-piece operation, circu¬ 
lar alloy steel blanks are placed in 
a 500-ton draw press, which draws 
the flat sheet into a half cylinder 
with one stroke. Rate of produc¬ 
tion with this machine is 300 half 
cylinders an hour. 

The half cylinder is placed in a punch 
for perforation of an end hole. 
This, too, is a one-stroke operation. 
This operation sometimes is per¬ 
formed simultaneously with the 
drawing. The cylinder half is trim¬ 
med with an eccentric cutter which 
trims at right angles to the shell. 
The trimmed halves then are 
washed. 

Seam welders weld a continuous spiral 
band on each cylinder half. This 
operation is fully automatic. Hori¬ 
zontal straps are put on by a 
similar operation, or tacked on by 
spot welding. The halves are 
marked and buffed. 

The spud is welded into the end perfora¬ 
tion by an atomic-hydrogen welder, 
and two halves joined in an atomic 
weld machine. The welded cylinder 
is pickled by gravity immersion in 
nitric acid, after which the cross 
straps are arc welded. 

The cylinders then are ready for hydro¬ 
static testing, after which they re¬ 
ceive their first coat of paint. They 


50 


are inspected and finished painted 
by a spray application of zinc 
chromate primer and two coats of 
lacquer. Moving on an over-head 
carrier, the painted cylinders pass 
through a drying room, and are 
stenciled and packed. 

(2) The three-piece operation is accom¬ 
plished by atomic-hydrogen weld¬ 
ing two caps and a center section 
together. This method was adopted 
because it eliminated strap welding 
which added to the possibilities of 
leakage; it was less costly, elimi¬ 
nated seam welding for the spiral 
bands, and allowed use of less 
critical material in the center 
section. 

The processing begins with the drawing 
of the caps, which may be done on 
much less heavy presses. The 
center section is formed, and spuds 
welded into the caps, which were 
perforated at the same time they 
were drawn. The center section is 
placed in an arbor and seam welded, 


and the caps are welded on the 
two ends, forming the cylinder. 

The cylinder then is heat treated and 
pickled. Since the center section 
is made from a low carbon steel, 
the cylinder is Parkerized outside 
and inside. A phosphoric acid bath 
makes the cylinder corrosion re¬ 
sistant. 

Next the cylinders are hydrostatic tested 
and painted. Even in the painting, 
something is saved by the new 
method. The Parkerizing allows 
elimination of the zinc chromate 
primer and both coats of lacquer, 
with one coat of enamel substituting 
for all. 

Painted cylinders are dried by infra-red 
ray paint dryers, consisting of op¬ 
posed batteries of infra-red lights 
hitting the cylinders as they pass 
by on conveyors. 

The air testing given cylinders is done 
at 400 pounds a square inch pres¬ 
sure, while the hydrostatic test ap¬ 
plies 800 PSI while the cylinders 
are locked in a jacket cylinder. 


AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION CENTERS 


General 

Freezing airplane production to one design is a 
fatal practice in modern global warfare. To keep 
design fluid, during this war. the Army Air Forces 
established modification centers where the production 
plane could be tailored for a specific tactical mission 
or for operation in a particular climate. 

At the peak of plant expansion for modification 
there were 19 centers performing further work on 
airplanes which were factory complete but requiring 
additional change prior to use in combat service. 
Four of these were connected directly with prime 
contractors, facilities while the others were separated 
geographically from airplane assembly sources. 

Since February, 1942. the entire modification 
system has been expanded by about a.000,000 square 
feet of floor space and nearly 12.000,000 square feet 
of yard area including hangar aprons, at a cost 
of $75,000,000, of which 91 percent were government 


funds. During the peak month. April, 1944, slightly 
over 3.500 airplanes were modified. Total employ¬ 
ment reached a peak of 30.000 workers during Sep¬ 
tember 1943 but it was not until seven months later 
that peak unit out-put was reached. At this time 
hourly in-put requirements per airplane were reduced 
while more efficient labor utilization was achieved. 
Decline in modification work at the end of first 
quarter 1944 was due to inception of factory responsi¬ 
bility for all changes. 

Product 

Airplanes are in livable condition upon arrival at 
modification centers. Significant modifications in¬ 
volve installations of changes on armament, radio, 
radar, photographic, range extension, winterization 
and preparations for desert warfare. Conversion of 
bombers to gasoline carriers, and both fighter and 
bomber airplanes to reconnaisance airplanes illustrates 


51 









types of over-all changes which are made less fre¬ 
quently. Modifications are made on virtually every 
bomber produced and 25 percent of fighter and 
transport airplanes. 

Plant and Layout 

A large portion of modifications are performed on 
concrete hangar aprons and in open fields or yards. 
Night lighting systems are used extensively. Only 
during inclement weather and for jobs requiring ex¬ 
tensive stripping does housing area become necessary. 
Consequently, hangar capacity problems are mini¬ 
mized and there is practically no limit on area for 
productive capacity. The first temporary centers 
expanded rapidly with makeshift nose hangars large 
enough to accommodate perhaps half the fuselage. 
As in airframe plants, modification buildings must 
be sufficiently wide and high to accommodate the 
wingspread and tail height of the airplane types 
which are being modified. Outdoor parking area 
is necessary together with a landing field in order 
to obviate excessive towing. 

Hangars, especially in new government constructed 
centers, may include warehouses, a garage, locker 
rooms, a cafeteria, offices, toolroom, machine and 
sheet metal shops. Heating and interior lighting re¬ 
quirements are similar to those found in airframe 
plants. 

The modification cycle is difficult to express in 
terms of an average since requirements change sub¬ 
stantially even before one job is complete. Most 
bombers are completed within 30 days or less. Direct 
worker learning is rapid as in the airframe industry, 
but it must be calculated on a series of successive 
jobs rather than on one long job. 

Machinery and Equipment 

Modification machine and sheet metal shops are 
fairly complete on a small scale, non-production basis. 
The machines are the standard drills, lathes, presses 
and sheet metal types found in any aircraft factory. 
Each center is well equipped with standard hand 
tools and welding and riveting equipment. Most 
jobs can be accomplished without jigs or other fix¬ 
tures, hut some centers are equipped to construct 
them, while others subcontract the work. Similarly, 
new tooling is produced by some centers while other 


centers secure tools through subcontracting the work. 
There is a wide variety of materials used in modifi¬ 
cation work. Standard components and accessories 
are provided by the government while basic materials, 
such as aluminum, are furnished by the modification 
contractor and formed either at the center or sent 
to subcontractors for fabrications. 

Labor 

At the inception of modification operations a nu¬ 
cleus of trained airline maintenance personnel was 
available. These were supplemented by additional 
workers through methods similar to those used by 
aircraft manufacturers. The proportion of women 
engaged on direct shop operations at peak employ¬ 
ment was between 30 and 35 percent which is some¬ 
what less than that for the airplane manufacturers. 

Subcontracting 

Subcontracting methods were substantially similar 
to those used in airframe assembly. 

Management 

There is no outstanding difference in the type of 
management required for modification centers from 
that ordinarily found in aircraft assembly plants. 
Planning changes rapidly, and as a consequence, 
flexible schedules must he maintained. 

Manufacturing Methods 

The operational keynote in modification centers 
was necessarily flexibility, improvisation, substitu¬ 
tion and informality of procedures, the antithesis of 
a mass production basis. Few engineering drawings 
were submitted complete to the centers since they 
were largely responsible for both engineering and 
perfection of the installation. 

Upon the arrival of airplanes earmarked for 
major changes, a mockup is first accomplished to 
establish acceptable standards for workmanship. As 
a consequence, fabrication shops and competent per¬ 
sonnel are required to build this sample article. 

Ordinarily job-shop methods are used since only 
a limited number of airplanes are assigned for a 
particular modification, and due to the bulky nature 
of the airplane only simulations of production line 
techniques are practicable. 


52 


AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 


Airplanes and aerial equipment, under pressure 
of war. become obsolete rapidly. Hence, an effective 
and efficient program of research and development 
is essential to the formation of an air force. Such 
a program must be conducted on a nation-wide basis 
and must be coordinated by a single directing 
authority. 

The strength of the Army Air Forces during this 
war has been dependent on a coordinated research 
and development program directed by its own organ¬ 
ization. now designated the Air Technical Service 
Command, with headquarters at Wright Field. 
Dayton. Ohio. 

The majority of the work is conducted in the 
laboratories of the ATSC Engineering Division at 
Wright Field. ATSC, however, contracts for re¬ 
search on a large scale to the nation’s governmental 
and industrial laboratories, and educational institu¬ 
tions, such as. Forest Products of the Department 
of Agriculture, the National Academy of Science, 
the Bureau of Standards, the National Advisory 
Committee on Aeronautics, the Massachusetts Infi¬ 
nite of Technology. California Institute of Tech¬ 
nology. Lehigh University, Carnegie Institute of 
Technology, Bell Telephone Company laboratories 
and the engineering departments of all types of air¬ 
craft companies. 


The Engineering Division operates one of the 
largest aeronautical research centers in the world, 
with more than 50 million dollars in equipment alone. 
Thirteen laboratories have at their disposal every¬ 
thing for assisting aeronautical study: horizontal 
wind tunnels capable of blasting wind at speeds 
greater titan 400 miles an hour: vertical wind tun¬ 
nels for testing spin characteristics: aero-medical 
equipment which includes centrifuges, decompression 
chambers, altitude chambers: a 60.000 cubic foot 
cold chamber: complete facilities for simulating at¬ 
mospheric conditions the world over: whirl rigs for 
testing propellers; engine test cells: equipment for 
analyzing such items as metal, wood, cloth, fuels, 
lubricating oils and plastics; static test buildings 
where the largest airplanes can be tested to the break¬ 
ing point in determining stress analysis: photometric 
tunnels for testing lights: gun ranges: rocket pro¬ 
pulsion facilities: and shops capable of fabricating 
any item from a bomb shackle to a complete airplane. 

In addition, there are available numerous testing 
grounds at scattered points throughout the country. 
The AAF Proving Ground Command at Eglin Field. 
Fla., tests equipment under field conditions, with cold 
weather tests at Ladd Field, Alaska, and the Ice 
Research base at Minneapolis. Minn. Special aerial 
weapons are put to test at Wendover. Utah and at 
Muroc Flight Test base at Muroc, California. 


53 







AftCJtATT PtOOUCnON BOAID 

RESOURCES CONTROL OFFICE 


CHART 1 



54 



















































































































































































































































AJKAAfl PVOOUOION •CABO 

RESOURCES CONTROL OFFICE 


CHART 2 


O uj 





*• QUARTER. V AVERAGES SHOWN FOR 1940 t 1941 



































































































































































































































































RESOURCES CONTROL OFFICE 

PROPELLER PRODUCTION PROGRAM 

Monthly Shipments and Production Schedule 


CHART 3 



56 

































































































































































































APPENDIX A : 


TABLE 1 : 


200 MAJOR AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS 


Airframe Structural Parts 
Ailerons 
Bo< mis 

Controls. Column 
Controls. Engine 
Controls. Mixture 
Controls. Surface 
Controls. Throttle 
Cowling. Engine 
Doors, Cabin 
Doors. Bomb Bav 
Elevati >rs 
Fins 

Flaps. W ing 

Fuselage 

Xacelle 

Panels. Center Section 
Panels, Cowl 
Panels, Stabilizer 
Panels, Wing 
Rudder 

Section, Center Wing 
Section. Outer Wing 
Slats. Wing 
Stabilizers 

Tail Assy, or Empennage 
lips. Wing 
Wing Assy. 

Enclitic Structural Parts 
Barrels. Cylinder 
Connecting Rods 
Crank Case 
Crank Shaft 
Cylinder Blocks 
Cylinder Heads 
Drive Shaft 
Gears. Engine 
Pistons 
Piston Rings 

Power Plant Group 
Carburetor 
Magnetos 
Spark Plugs 
Superchargers 
Pump, Booster 
Pump. Feathering 
Pump, Fuel 
Pump. Fuel Hand 
Pump. Hydraulic 
Pump, Metering 
Pump, Primer 
Pump. Transfer 
Pump. Vacuum 


Pump, Bilge 
Engine Mounts ( Shock ) 
Coolers, Oil 
Valve, Oil Cooler 
Aftercooler Cabin 
Intercooler 
Ignition Harness 
Regulators. Supercharger 
Radiators, Coolant 
Propel lor Hub 
Propellor Blade 
Propel lor Governor 
Propellor Synchronizer 

Landing Gear Group 
Struts. MEG 
Brakes, MLG 
Wheels, MLG 
Skid Tail 
Struts, Xose 
Struts, Tail 
Wheels, Xose 
Casings. Aircraft 
Tubes, Aircraft 
Skis, L. G. 

Pontoons, L. G. 

Instrument Group 

Gage. Air Pressure 
Gage. Fuel Pressure 
Gage. Hydraulic Pressure 
Gage. Oil Pressure 
Gage, Unit Pressure 
Gage. Liquid Level 
Gage, Manifold Pressure 
Gage. Suction 
Compass 
Altimeter 

Indicator, Airspeed 
Indicator, Rate of Climb 
Compass, Gyro Fluxgate 
Indicator. Compass 
Transmitter, Compass 
Indicator, Liquid Level 
Transmitter, Liquid Level 
Indicator. Fuel Pressure 
Transmitter. Fuel Pressure 
Indicator, Fuel Flow- 
Transmitter, Fuel Flow- 
Indicator. Fuel Mixture 
Indicator. Manifold Pressure 
Indicator, Position 
Indicator. Oil Pressure 
Transmitter. Manifold Pressure 
Transmitter, Position 


57 











Synchroscope 
Automatic Pilot 
Indicator, Directional Gyro 
Indicator, Bank and Turn 
Indicator, Gyro Horizon 
Driftmeter 
Accelerometer 
Inclinometer 
Tachometer 
Generator, Tachometer 
Indicator, Tachometer 
Tube, Airspeed 
Indicator, Thermometer 
Bulb, Thermometer 
Thermometer 

Electrical 

Rheostats 

Ammeter 

Battery Acft. Storage 
Coil Booster 
Coil, Induction 
Generator 

Motor (146 Types) 

Heater, Gun 
Panel, General Control 
Box, Generator Control 
Power Plant, Aux. 

Regulator, Generator Voltage 

Starter 

Voltmeter 

Inverters, Electrical 
Circuit Breakers 
Relays 
Switches 

Photographic 

Camera, GSAP 
Camera, Aircraft 
Intervalometer 

Camera, Motion Picture (Bombing) 
Oxygen 

Cylinder, Oxygen 
Cylinder, Regulator 
Gage, Oxygen Pressure 
Regulator, Oxygen 
Signal, Oxygen 

Miscellaneous 
Accumulator 
Boots. Deicer 
Cylinder, C02 
Exchanger, Heat 


Extinguisher, Fire 
Heater, Cabin 
Tanks, Self Sealing- 
Seats, Pilot and Copilot 

Armament 

Chute, F'lex. Amm. 

Fire Control System 
Hoist, Bomb 
Radio, Bomb 
Shackles, Bomb 
Sights, Bomb 
Sights, Gun 
Turret, Lower 
Turret, Xose 
Turret, Tail 
Turret, Upper 

Radio Equipment 
Amplifiers 
Control Units 
Rectifiers 
Dynamotors 
Inverters, Radio 
Recorders, Reproducers 
Indicators, Radio 
Antenna 
Modulators 
RF Units 
Range Emits 
Receivers, Radio 
Transmitters, Radio 
Transmitters, Receivers 
Comparators 
Synchronizers 
Tracking Units 
Phasing Units 
Compensators 
Computers 
Relay Units 
Loops 

Tuning Units 

Oscillators 

Conversion Lhiits 

Microphones 

Headsets 

Viewer 

Filters 

Injectors 

Distribution Units 
Switching Emits 
Adapter Kits 
Frequency Meters 


58 


TABLE 2 : 


MAJOR CATEGORIES OF MACHINE TOOLS AND THE PROPORTION OF 
EACH USED IN A COMPLETE AIRFRAME ASSEMBLY PLANT 


Machine Tools Quantity 


A. Turning— 

1. Lathes: 

Engine . 78 

Screw mach. (auto.) . 44 

Turret lathes. 62 

Bench . 1 

2. Boring: 

Vert, turret lathes under 52" .... 3 

Vert, turret lathes under 72" to 

120 " . 1 

Precision . 11 

Jig borers. 5 

Horiz. Boring Mills. 5 


Subtotal . 210 


B. Milling 

Horiz. (knee, bed) . 41 

Vert. (knee, bed) (auto.) . 31 

Mfg. (hydromatic) (duplex) .... 31 

Die sinking . 3 

Hydrotels^ ^ 

Profilers \ 

Thread . 6 

Planer type . 1 

Hand . 26 


Subtotal . 145 


C. Straight cutting 

Shapers . 7 


Subtotal . 7 


Machine Tools Quantity 

E. Grinding: 

Tool and cutter. 48 

Cyl. int. and ext. 14 

Pedestal . 53 

Surface . 7 

Rotary . 8 

Disc . 5 

Thread . 3 

Gear . 1 


Subtotal . 139 


F. Gear Cutting: 

Hobbers . 1 


Subtotal . 1 


G. Forming: 

1. Power presses: 

Mech. blank and form. 66 

Hyd. blank and form. 26 

Forging air and hyd. 14 

2. Hammers. 2 


Subtotal . 108 


H. Sheet Metal: 

Shears . 26 

Rollers . 4 

Beaders . 2 

Brakes . 42 

Crimping . 1 

Xibblers . 2 


I). Drilling 

Sensitive . 72 

Power . 164 

Radial . 11 

Production . 1 


Subtotal . 77 


I. Heat Treating: 

Melt furnaces . 8 

Heat treat furnace . 23 


Subtotal 


248 


Subtotal 


31 


59 


















































































table 2 — Continued: 


Quantity 


Machine Tools 

J. Saws—Cutting: 

1. Hack . U 

Contour . 10 

Circular . 6 

2. Abrasive . 13 

Subtotal . 43 


K. Surface finishing: 

Polishers and buffers. 8 

Cappers and honers. 6 

Subtotal . 14 


L. Welders: 

Arc . 53 

Spot . 36 

Flash . 1 

Seam . 5 

Butt . 11 

Subtotal . 106 


M. Swagers . 3 

Subtotal . 3 


N. Tube Benders. 18 

Subtotal . 18 


Machine Tools Quantity 

O. Tube Flaring . 7 

Subtotal . 7 

P. Broaches . 1 

Subtotal . 1 

Q. Shrinkers . 8 

Subtotal . 8 

R. Threaders . 3 

Tappers . 4 

Subtotal . 7 

S. Slotters. 3 

Subtotal . 3 

T. Drill and rivet. 29 

Subtotal . 29 

C. Punch and rivet. 24 

Subtotal . 24 

V. Toolroom comparators. 1 

Subtotal . 1 

Grand total . 1,230 


60 












































































TABLE 3 : 


TABLE 4 : 


Material Break-down of a P-47 by Pounds 

p o u x n s 

Aluminum Bar/Rod. 370 

Aluminum Extrusion . 1.728 

Aluminum Castings—Sand . 52 

Aluminum Castings—Die . 23 

Aluminum Castings—Perm. Mold. 2 

Aluminum Forgings. 525 

Aluminum Wire . 181 

Aluminum Sheet. 5.507 

Aluminum Tubing . 116 

Brass Bar . 3 

Brass Casting . 5 

Brass Rod . 3 

Brass Sheet . 1 

Bronze Casting . 79 

Bronze Rod . 12 

Bronze Sheet. 1 

Carbon Steel Bar. 591 

Carbon Steel Flex. Cable . 18 

Carbon Steel Music Wire. 6 

Carbon Steel—Rod. 1 

Carbon Steel Rod—(Welding) . 31 

Carbon Steel Sheet . 217 

Carbon Steel Tube . 23 

Copper Sheet. 1 

Copper Wire. 53 

Lead Alloy. 165 

Magnesium Bar/Rod . 3 

Magnesium Casting . 80 

Magnesium Forging. 48 

Magnesium Tubing . 2 

Alloy Steel—Armor Plate ( Homogeneous i. . 188 

Alloy Steel Cable . 6 

Allov Steel Forging. 958 

Alloy Steel—Sheet . 1.359 

Alloy Steel—Spring Wire. 2 

Alloy Steel—Tube Round. 178 

Allov Steel—Tube—Square. 59 

Stainless Steel—Lock wire . 1 

Stainless Steel—Tube . 19 

Stainless Steel—Rod ( Welding) . 1 


678184—»6—5 


Material Break-down of a B-29 by Pounds 

POUNDS 


Aluminum Casting Plaster Mold. 8 

Aluminum Castings Perm. Mold. 80 

Aluminum Casting Semi-Permold. 10 

Aluminum Die Castings . 159 

Aluminum Sand Castings. 250 

Aluminum Extrusions .11.308 

Aluminum Forgings. 1.418 

Aluminum Impact Extrusions . 2 

Aluminum Rivet and Rivet Wire. 179 

Aluminum Rod and Bar. 200 

Aluminum Strip. 1,955 

Aluminum Sheet. 23.662 

Aluminum Tubing . 817 

Bronze Cast Bar. 12 

Carbon Steel Cable . 126 

Carbon Steel Plate. 51 

Carbon Steel Rod and Bar. 266 

Carbon Steel Sheet and Strip . 464 

Carbon Steel Tube. 69 

Carbon Steel Wire. 53 

Copper Base Rod and Bar . 37 

Copper Base Alloy Tube and Pipe. 24 

Copper Base Allov Wire . 20 

Copper Cable (Wire and Braid) . 1.163 

Copper Sheet. 27 

Copper Tube . 56 

Magnesium Die Castings. 11 

Magnesium Sand Castings . 284 

Manganese Bronze Cast Bar. 61 

Manganese Bronze Die Castings. 12 

C )lds Bearing Bronze. 36 

Alloy Steel Rod and Bar. 5,239 

Alloy Steel Plate . 696 

Alloy Steel Sheet and Strip. 6.541 

Alloy Steel Tube . 534 

Alloy Steel Wire . 507 

Stainless Steel Bar. 22 

















































































CHART 4 



62 


c umulat ivt Pumts 


























































































































































































(Employees, Output and Efficiency) 


CHART 5 


POUNDS OF AIRFRAME PER 


EMPLOYEE PER MONTH 



63 


1941 1942 1943 1944 













































































































































































































































































CHART 6 
% COMPARISON 

KEY, INDIRECT AND DIRECT WORKERS AT TWO AIRCRAFT PLANTS 


COMPANY A 



COMPANY B 



64 








































































CHART 7-o 



65 











































































































































































































































































CHART 7-b 


o 

2 


5 



cr> 


g 



<o 


o 


L 




OC - 



1 



8: 



t 



Sr 


£ 


< 



rvi 


■; 2 


o o 

k. — 
♦> 4> 


V 4> 

“ a 


St „ 





















































































































































































































TIME CYCLE FOR PROCUREMENT 
Of AIRCRAFT MAGNESIUM ALLOY PLATE AND SHEET 


CHART 7-c 



67 





















































































































































































































TIME CYCLE FOR PROCUREMENT 
OF AIRCRAFT MAGNESIUM ALLOY EXTRUDED SECTIONS 


CHART 7-d 



68 


















































































































































































































CHART 7-e 



69 




















































































































































CHART 7-f 



70 





































































































































































































































































TIME CYCLE FOR PROCUREMENT OF 
TYPICAL AIRCRAFT ALLOY STEEL PRODUCT 

EXAM PLE • AN - BOLTS 


CHART 7-g 



71 










































T A B L E 


Horsepower, Weight and Construction of Various 
Engine Types 


Type 

Model 

Rated 

horse¬ 

power 

Engine 

weight 

pounds 

Construction 

Opposed ... 

0-170 

65 

176 

Cast head. 

Do .... 

0-200 

103 

256 

Do. 

Do .... 

0-300 

150 

333 

Do. 

Do .... 

0-405 

235 

449 

Do. 


X 0-805 

450 

781 

Do. 

Radial. 

R-500 

165 

348 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-680 

280 

547 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-985 

450 

675 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-1820-97 

1,000 

1.308 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-1830 

1,000 

1,550 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-2000 

1.100 

1,590 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-2600 

1,500 

2,000 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-2800-B 

1,650 

2,350 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-3350 

2,000 

2,725 

Do. 

Do .... 

R—1360 

2,500 

3,500 

Do. 

Do .... 

R-2800-C 

1,700 

2,350 

Forged head. 

Inline . 

L-440 

200 

394 

Cast head. 

Do .... 

L-770 

450 

768 

Do. 

Do .... 

V-1650 

1,110 

1,775 

Do. 

Do .... 

V-1710 

1,050 

1,550 

Do. 

Do .... 

V-3420 

2,100 

3,275 

Do. 

Jet . 

1-16 

’1,610 

890 

(Gas turbine for 
jet propulsion, 
centrifugal 
compressor.) 

Do .... 

1-40 

’3,750 

2,000 

(Gas turbine for 
jet propulsion, 
centrifugal.) 

Do .... 

TG-100 

C) 

2,000 

(Gas turbine for 
propeller dome, 
axial flow com¬ 
pressor.) 

Do .... 

TG-180 

‘4,000 

2,370 

(Gas turbine for 
jet propulsion, 
axial flow com¬ 
pressor. ) 


T ABLE 6 : 


Machine Tools and Production Equipment Required 
for the Major Components of Pratt and Whitney 
R-1830-75 Engine at Rate of 2,000 Per Month 


Code No. 

Type 

Standard 

Special 

machine 

Special 

perma¬ 

nent 

tooled 

Total 

11-0 

Boring . 

O 

0 

■J 

d 

3 

9 

11-3 

Boring prec. 

7 

28 

49 

84 

12-0 

Broaching . 

5 

3 

j 

11 

13-0 

Drilling . 

jGear cutting | 

| Gear finishing j 

203 

86 

137 

426 

14-0 

108 

0 

03 

171 

15-0 

Grinding . 

324 

31 

123 

478 

16-0 

Turning. 

241 

7 

103 

351 

17-0 

Milling . 

168 

43 

30 

241 

18-0 

Planers . 

0 

0 

0 

0 

19-0 

Miscellaneous . . 

178 

30 

25 

233 

42-0 

Hydraulic press . 

21 

o 

1 

22 

43-0 

Mechanical press. 

4 

0 

0 

4 

45-0 

Purging hammers 

4 

0 

0 

4 

Total . 

1,266 

231 

537 

2,034 

Mi sc. equip. 

540 

31 

0 

571 

Equip, cleaning . 

79 

3 

0 

82 

Equip, heat, tr. 

44 

? 

0 

46 

Equip, inspect. 

116 

i 

1 

118 

Equip, plating . 

32 

3 

0 

35 

Total . 

811 

40 

1 

852 

G 

rand total . 

2,077 

271 

538 

2,886 


1 Pounds static thrust. 

2 Not available. 


72 
































































TABLE / : 


Principal Material Used 
R-l 830-90C Engine 


in Production of one 


T a B L E 8 : 


G R O S S \\ EIGHT I X C L U F> I N G 
R E J E C T I O X S 


Principal Materials Used 
R-3350 Engine 


in Production of One 


.Metal 


Alloy steel 


Aluminum 


Brass 


Bronze 


Carbon steel 


Cobalt 
Copper ... 
Magnesium 


Form Pounds 


Bar . 1. livS 

Sheets . 9 

Tubing . aO 

Wire . 22 

Billets . 1,581 

Bar/rod . 158 

Sheets. 84 

Tubing . 21 

W ire . 2 

Forgings and ingots. 261 

Castings (cylinder heads) .. 363 

Sand casting. 2 

I Casting (jienn. mold) . 4U 

I )ic casting . 8 

Intrusions. 2 

| Bar . 5 

| Rod and wire. 1 

— - 

; t astings . 

i It-.,- 2 7 

Kod and wire . 5 

Bar . 158 

, Sheets . 36 

Tubing . 33 

W ire . 1 

Rod and wire. 1 

Sheet and strips. 1 

Sand casting . 108 


GROSS WEIGHT I X F L V I) I X G 
R E J E C T I O X S 


Metal Form i Pounds 


Alloy steel. Bar . 701 

Sheet . 16 

Tube . 49 

W ire . 36 

Forgings . 2,349 

Billets . 3.692 

Aluminum . Bar . 3 

Sheet . 86 

Tube . 46 

Forgings . 267 

Castings (sand, die. P.M.).. 1,005 

Rivets . 2 

Carbon steel .... I lar . 35 

Sheet . 11 

Tube . 49 

Wire . 6 

Forgings . 08 

Copper alloy .... Bar . 54 

Forgings . 37 

Castings . 8 

Ingot . 69 

Magnesium . Castings (round, die, P.M.). 394 


73 








































































100 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 


CHART 8 


EFFECT OF FREQUENCY ON WEIGHT OF 
ELECTRICAL APPARATUS 


I 

I 

I 

1 - 

I 

l 

I 

J 

I 

I 

I 

I 

\ 

\ 

\ 

I 

—I- 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

- \ — 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 


\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

-*— 

\ 

\ 



Motors 



100 


200 


300 


400 


500 


600 


700 


FREQUFNCY IN CYCLES 





















100 % 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 


CHART 9 


% COMPARISON: STEEL NEEDED IN 400 CYCLE MOTORS 
WITH STEEL NEEDED IN 60 CYCLE MOTORS 



60 CYCLE MOTOR 400 CYCLE MOTOR 


75 












200 

180 

16C 

140 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 


CHART 10 


GROWTH OF ELECTRICAL LOAD THAT FOLLOWED DEVELOPMENT OF 
LIGHTWEIGHT GENERATORS AND USE OF ELECTRICAL ACCESSORIES 















1 

l 







/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 







>> 

/ 

O 

£ / 

J / 







~i 

:i 

■o 1 

w 







o / 

SI 
£ / 

/ 







/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 






i 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

B- 29 






/ 

/ 

/ 

l 

Combrtt B-17 


r. ’ T — —i 


OtIrI 

B-17 

rvi 1 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 



1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1946 
























100 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 


CHART 11 


WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT GENERATORS 



5 


10 


15 


20 


25 


20 


35 


OUTPUT IN' KILOWATTS 


// 


























































50 

45 

40 

35 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 


CHART 12 


WEIGHT REDUCTION ACCOMPLISHED DURING FIVE YEARS OF 
DEVELOPMENT OF AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL GENERATORS 


1 

1 

1 

1 

i 







t ■ 

1 

1 

1 

1 







“1- 

1 

1 

1 

i 







1 

1 

1 

1 







”1 

i 

1 

I 







i 

1 

1 

.1 







\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

i 







\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 







N* 

h 

V. 

•v 








*•* — 

Generators (Ra 

ted by Kilowati 

) 


4 8 12 16 20 24 26 



























CHAPTER I V : 


BASIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 


A. Rased on the analysis which this committee 
has made in Projects 1 and 2. of the factors govern¬ 
ing the development and production of Arms, Am¬ 
munition, and Implements of War including all air¬ 
craft, this committee recommends the following 
fundamental policies for application to the industrial 
component of Germany's war making aggregate: 

( 1 ) Take steps to disband for all time the German 
General Staff and governmental or quasi- 
govemmental activities partaking of the 
nature of a War Economics Staff devoted 
to the integration of industry under na¬ 
tional government control. 

(2) Take steps to eliminate the direct participa¬ 

tion of the German Government in the 
capitalization and/or management of in¬ 
dustry or its control through trade or¬ 
ganizations or cartels having a legal or 
quasi-legal status. 

(3) Take steps to eliminate from Germany all 

industries or segments of industries de¬ 
voted exclusively to the design, manufac¬ 
ture, testing or operation of Arms, Am¬ 
munition, or Implements of War. including 
all aircraft. 

f4i Take steps to eliminate from Germany those 
segments of industry essential to war pro¬ 
duction which have only a marginal use 
in a civil commercial economy. 

(5) Take steps to eliminate from Germany, in 
addition to (3 ) and (4) preceding, the part 
of the general industrial capacity in excess 

c H a p r e r v : 

APPLICATION OF THE BASIC 


A. Basic Control Considerations 

7. Fundamental Essentials 

The complex organism of an Aircraft Industries 
Aggregate depends for its very existence upon the 
combination of six fundamental essentials, all of 


of that needed to support a reasonable civil 
economy. 

(6) Take steps to eliminate from Germany any 

excess production capacity for basic ma¬ 
terials over that required for the support 
of a reasonable civil commercial economy. 

(7) Take steps to eliminate from Germany or to 

control the capacity for the production of 
synthetic materials of dominant significance 
to the development of a self-sufficient war 
economy. 

(S) Take steps to control, through international 
agreements, the following activities: 

(a) Importation into Germany and ex¬ 
portation from Germany of stra¬ 
tegic raw or basic materials, 
lb) The development of industry for 
the manufacture of war materials 
in territory so situated in relation 
to Germany that it may be brought 
under German dominance through 
economic dependence or a short 
war. 

(c) Commercial or industrial activities 
of other nationals in Germany. 

(d) Commercial, industrial or experi¬ 
mental activities of German nation¬ 
als in other countries. 

(9) Take steps to build in Germany a free enter¬ 
prise economy and to create the opportu¬ 
nity for the German people to establish a 
reasonable standard of living. 


which are mutually interdependent. They are: 

First. A national War Plan and some form of 
'‘General Staff” organization to direct it. 

Second. At least a nucleus airforce in continuing 
tactical exercise with modern equipment. 

Third. Laboratories and scientific and engineering 


POLICIES 


79 









staffs working on a coordinated, comprehensive, and 
continuous program of progressive research and ex¬ 
perimentation. 

Fourth. Continuing pilot-plant production of im¬ 
proved models, with broad coordinating direction for 
the wide variety of component producers and sup¬ 
pliers. 

Fifth. Ground facilities and controlling direction 
for the assembly, proof testing, and operation of the 
end products. 

Sixth. Government finance for its development, 
and government support of, and assistance to, the 
creation of markets for its products and services. 

The committee holds strongly to the view that 
whatever detailed controls may be applied to the 
Aircraft Industry as a whole, or to any of its in¬ 
dividual elements, they should all be contributory to 
the complete elimination of the six essentials outlined 
above. 

2. Major Prohibitions 

In the more detailed sections of this chapter, 
specific actions are recommended. Emphasized here 
are three broad fundamental prohibitions aimed di¬ 
rectly at the major essentials to the existence of an 
Aircraft Industry. For reasons discussed in chapter 
II, part B of this report, civilian and military aero¬ 
nautics must be treated as one. The three prohibi¬ 
tions are: 

(a) Prohibit the manufacture, ownership, storage, 

or operation by the German government, 
or by any public or private agency under 
German government control or jurisdiction 
within Germany or outside of Germany, of 
any aircraft, aeronautical training devices, 
or the components thereof. 

(b) Prohibit the establishment, or the mainte¬ 

nance. of any department, organization, 
institution, establishment, or agency in Ger¬ 
many (except as provided in (d) below 
for aircraft operations), or under German 
Government control or jurisdiction either 
within Germany or elsewhere, whose pur¬ 
pose or practice is to plan, design, manu¬ 
facture, acquire, or operate any aircraft, 
aeronautical training devices, or the com¬ 
ponents thereof. 

(c) Prohibit the appropriation or disbursement 

of any funds for the purposes or practices 
in (a) and (b) above by the German Gov¬ 
ernment, or by any public or private agency 


under German Government control or ju¬ 
risdiction either within Germany or else¬ 
where under German Government control 
or jurisdiction. Included in this prohibition 
are funds for the support of laboratories, 
schools, or other institutions devoted to the 
study or development of such activities. 

(d) Exceptions to the prohibition of aircraft op¬ 
eration in Germany, and the expenditure 
of German funds therefor, mav be made to 
the extent that such operations are deter¬ 
mined by the United Nations to be neces¬ 
sary to the civilian economy of Germany, 
provided that the aircraft so operated are 
not manufactured in Germany, and that the 
aircraft, the ground facilities for their op¬ 
eration, and the conduct of all flight, are 
directly and completely controlled and oper¬ 
ated by non-German agencies established 
and regulated by international agreement. 

3. Because the production and operation of air¬ 
craft combines activities of so wide a variety of sup¬ 
pliers, producers, and technical institutions who pro¬ 
vide generally similar products and services to other 
and purely civilian needs, a corollary to the above 
listed prohibitions is the reduction of the general 
purpose industrial capacity of Germany to a level 
which will leave available no significant excess over 
that required for a reasonable civilian economy, 
which excess might be used through subterfuge to 
evade the prohibitions. 

4. Pursuant to the foregoing, the committee has 
felt it necessary to recommend the elimination from 
Germany of certain production facilities, some por¬ 
tions of which might appear to be required by a 
reasonable civilian economy. Where such recom¬ 
mendations are made, they are based on the ground 
that the facilities are of such vital necessity to the 
production of presently known aircraft that their 
elimination is required as a necessary element in the 
control of capacity to produce aircraft. 

5. The World Organization or United Nations, 
as appropriate, would presumably, from time to 
time, reconsider the effective limitations for amend¬ 
ment or modification as may be dictated by world 
developments, and the then current needs of a rea¬ 
sonable civilian economv in Germany. 

B. Specific Actions for the Initial Period of 

Occupation 

Because the defeat of Germany and its initial oc- 


80 


cupation is already history, the considerations in this 
Section are more or less academic, but the following 
general requirements (substantially a digest of ICS 
1067 ) are set down as a matter of interest bearing 
on the initial treatment of a conquered nation. They 
are applicable to all Arms. Ammunition, and Imple¬ 
ments of W ar, including all aircraft. (Note: The 
listing below is identical to the corresponding Section 
in this committee's report on Project 1.) 

1. Initial Actions. 

(a) General, confiscate the following: 

(i) All completed or partially completed 

Arms. Ammunition, or Implements 
of W ar. including all aircraft. 

(ii) All stock piles of materials of any 

kind. (Subject to later controlled 
release.) 

(iii) All funds held by or to the credit of 

the enemy government. 

(b) Treatment of German industrial establish¬ 

ments : 

(i) Stop all production. 

(ii) Require maintenance work, where 

nature of plant justifies. 

(iii) Seize and impound all records and 

funds 

(iv) Locate and take into custody all 

managerial personnel, 
i v) Place guards on the plant to prevent 
dismantling by “souvenir hunters.” 
or sabotage by Germans. 

(vi) Survey the plant for possible useful¬ 

ness to occupation forces. 

(vii) Gather sufficient force to operate as 

necessary to meet the needs of oc¬ 
cupation forces. 

(c) Treatment of German technical industrial re¬ 

search facilities: 

(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) same as in 
(b) preceding. 

(vi) Locate and take into custody all sci¬ 
entific personnel associated with 
the facility. 

(vii) Obtain at the earliest possible time 
a survey by technical personnel to 
determine if the facility could or 
should be operated to the advan¬ 
tage of own country. 

(viii ) At earliest possible date, inform ap¬ 
propriate authority of the facility; 


its overall characteristics with 
recommendation as to its disposi¬ 
tion : 

a. Destruction of the physical in¬ 

stallation. 

b. Removal for reinstallation in 

own or another United Na¬ 
tion. 

c. Disposition of the scientific and 

managerial personnel who are 
in custody with list of those 
not yet located. 

(d) Treatment of government or quasi-govern- 
mental industrial control organization : 

(i) Seize all offices and impound all 

records. 

(ii) Locate and take into custody all per¬ 

sonnel associated with the opera¬ 
tion of the office. 

(iii) Impound all funds. 

(iv) Establish guards to prevent removal 

of records or other necessary ma¬ 
terial. 

( e) Reopen under supervision all food distribution 
and transport systems or stores. 

(f) Activate industrial establishments as neces¬ 
sary for the support of the occupation forces 
or essential to health of the inhabitants. 

C. Action During the Intermediate Occupation 
Period 

1. General Observation. The actions below recom¬ 
mended for the Aircraft Industry, have been jointly 
considered and reconciled with recommendations de¬ 
veloped by the same committee in its broader study 
of German Industry involved in the production of 
armament, munitions and implements of W ar (Proj¬ 
ect 1), to which this Project 2 study is comple¬ 
mentary. Omitted from the following tabulations are 
many items listed in Project 1 which are not ap¬ 
plicable to aircraft. Included here, but omitted from 
Project 1. are certain items peculiar to the aircraft 
industry. Repeated here are a number of items listed 
also in Project 1 which have general application to 
all implements of war, including aircraft. 

Where reduction of capacity to ‘‘a predetermined 
level” is recommended the term is intended to imply 
that the level to which the capacity should be reduced 
will be determined during the occupation period by 
whatever control agencies are established by the occu¬ 
pation forces. It is important to point out that the 


81 


“predetermined level” is intended to apply to all of 
Germany, regardless of any arbitrary divisions of Ger¬ 
many which may he set up for other purposes. 

2. Complete Humiliation Recommended 

(a) Destroy or remove for reparations, including 
all machinery and equipment, and prohibit 
the reestablishment of: 

(i) All plants designed for or exclu¬ 

sively devoted to the manufac¬ 
ture, assembly, maintenance, 
repair, storage of aircraft and 
the components thereof, ex¬ 
cepting only those facilities 
noted in subparagraph “c” be¬ 
low. 

(ii) .All plants for the production ol 

internal combustion turbines 
for any purpose. 

(iii) All airports and air traffic control 

installations including hangars, 
landing strips, taxi strips, and 
aircraft servicing facilities, ex¬ 
cepting only those noted in 
subparagraph “c” below. 

(iv) All testing facilities for aircraft, 

aircraft power plants, and 
armament, including engine 
and propeller test rigs, bring 
ranges, and flight test proving- 
stations, static test buildings, 
altitude and cold test chambers. 

(v) All laboratories and other institu¬ 

tions and installations, devoted 
exclusively or primarily to the 
research, design, development, 
or test of aircraft or equipment 
therefor, including zoitliout any 
exception all wind tunnels, and 
all aerodynamic measuring de¬ 
vices and power installations 
therefor. Included are labora¬ 
tories and equipment of uni¬ 
versities, schools, and other 
educational institutions which 
are devoted to aerodynamic or 
aeronautical engineering. 

(vi) All concealed or underground fac¬ 

tory or laboratory installations 
for any purpose other than 
those necessary to normal 


civilian requirements such as 
mining, quarrying, and the like. 

( vii) All special bombproof, blastproof 
and explosion proof protective 
structures or construction ex¬ 
cept to the extent that they are 
required to the peace time 
safety of the workers. 

*(viii) All electric furnaces and crucible 
retort installations for the pro¬ 
duction of steel together with 
the electric power feeders for 
electric furnaces. 

*(ix) All facilities for the production 
of aluminum and magnesium 
extrusions. 

*(x) All plants producing hydrogen 

peroxide. 

*(xi) All plants producing optical glass, 
except the facilities necessary 
for spectacle crown. 

*(xii) All plants producing synthetic 

rubber. 

*(xiii) All plants producing synthetic 

oils and gasoline. 

*(xiv) All plants producing alumina or 
aluminum ingot. 

*(xv) All plants producing magnesium 
ingot. 

(xvi) All standby electric power gen¬ 

erating equipment exceeding a 
total capacity in one establish¬ 
ment of twenty-live (25) kilo¬ 
watts. 

(xvii) All establishments engaged solely 
in the development of tooling 
or improvement of technical 
processes for others. 

Captain Leighton objected to the present recom¬ 
mendation for the complete elimination of facilities 
for the production of any specibc items of basic mate¬ 
rials on the grounds ; Hirst, that there will be continu¬ 
ing need for some quantities of all of these items in a 
reasonable civilian economy and that the control coun- 

* The committee found itself unable to arrive at an unani¬ 
mous opinion on the items marked. In those instances in 
which the opinion was equally divided, the deadlock has 
been decided in favor of complete elimination. In order 
that the varying opinions may he available to the user of 
this report, the reasons advanced by the members for the 
dissent tire here set down. 


82 


oil will, therefore, find it necessarv to provide an 
alternate source of supply. Second, that the con¬ 
ditions which prevail in Germany and in the availa¬ 
bility of. and need for. these materials in general 
civilian economy may. and probably will, change mate¬ 
rially during the occupation period. Third, that this 
committee should not go further than to (1) empha¬ 
size the vital importance of certain materials in the 
production of war implements. (2) recommend re¬ 
duction at least to the minimum requirements of the 
civilian economy, and (3 l recommend serious con¬ 
sideration of their complete elimination, leaving to the 
Control Council the ultimate decision < in the light of 
their on-the-ground knowledge of conditions) as to 
whether complete elimination is feasible, or advan¬ 
tageous to the broader interests of the United Nations. 

In regard to synthetic oils and gasoline. Rear Ad¬ 
miral Ruddock opposed elimination on the grounds 
that a scheduled controlled production of synthetic 
oil and gasoline, using German natural resources as a 
raw material, would have the effect of gradual con¬ 
sumption of these resources tending toward making 
them unavailable to Germany in the future in suffi¬ 
cient quantities to support a major war effort; and 
that continued production in Germany would supply 
at least a part of the European requirement, thus leav¬ 
ing in the ground that part of the world resource in 
natural oil which would otherwise be required. 

(b) Destroy or remove for reparations special 
purpose, automatic, and high precision ma¬ 
chine tools and industrial equipment which 
have no use in a peacetime economy, and 
prohibit their replacement. A partial list 
illustrative of significant items to be de¬ 
stroyed or removed appears below : 

( i ) Hydro presses or large toggle presses 
of sufficient bed area to produce 
formed airplane parts. 

(ii) Special milling machines for ma¬ 

chining wing spars or special 
stiffeners. (Similar to U. S. 
"Onsrud” or "Farnum’’ spar cap 
millers.) 

(iii) Onsrud broken arm type combina¬ 

tion router and drill press for pro¬ 
ducing skin shapes. 

(iv ) Combinations of automatic machines, 
similar to U. S. Greenlee type, 
which perform multiple machining 


operations on articles such as 
engine cylinders, radial type. 

(v) Special boring machines which simul¬ 
taneously finish-bore engine cylin¬ 
der blocks, in-line type. 

(vi) Special multi-spindle drilling ma¬ 

chines, with turn tables, which 
automatically perform drilling, fac¬ 
ing, boring and counter boring 
operations. 

(vii) Special riveters of Erco type which 

perform speed riveting on airplane 
subassemblies. 

(viii) Special milling machines capable of 
milling faces of airplane wing ends 
for attachment to fuselage. 

(ix) Rollers, Farnum type which could 

produce rolled shapes from flat 
material as a substitute for alumi¬ 
num extrusions used in fuselage or 
wing construction. 

(x) Stretch presses, of special type, 

which perform certain sheet draw¬ 
ing and forming operations that 
are not practical on hydro or toggle 
type presses. 

(xi) Special type electric seam welders, 

used in airplane subassembly and 
jettison gasoline tank production. 

(xii) Special deep throat electric spot 

welders of two stage pressure im¬ 
pact, resistance controlled, similar 
to U. S. "Sciaky" type, used exten¬ 
sively in subassembly manufac¬ 
ture. 

(xiii) Hand riveters, electric or air, used in 
assembling skin surfaces. 

(xiv) Hydrogen welding and brazing 
equipment of the type used in air¬ 
plane manufacture. 

(c) Exceptions to the eliminations mentioned in 
“a” and “b” above may be made to the extent of per¬ 
mitting the retention of airports, air traffic control and 
airport service installations and airport buildings in 
the post occupation period up to, but not exceeding, 
the essential requirements for such civil aeronautic 
activities as are determined by the occupation forces 
prior to their withdrawal to be indispensable to the 
civilian economy of Germany. 

The Committee found itself unable to agree as re¬ 
gards the extent to which German nationals should 


be permitted to participate in the conduct of ground 
services for civil aeronautic activities within German 
territory. The Army members state their positions 
as follows: ‘‘The position of Major General K. B. 
Wolfe, and Brig. General H. C. Minton, War De¬ 
partment members of the committee, on any reference, 
expressed or implied, relating to civil aeronautics to 
serve the civilian economy of Germany during or 
after the occupation period contained in Report No. 2 
devoted to Post Surrender Treatment of the German 
Aircraft Industry is as follows : Allied Control Coun¬ 
cil should formulate policies and practices to enable 
the international air transport services of the Allied 
Nations to operate into, away from, and over German 
territory. Airway facilities, including airports and 
navigation aids in German territory, required for such 
operations should not be owned nor controlled by 
German nationals nor should such facilities be con¬ 
structed, operated, or maintained by German na¬ 
tionals. German nationals may be permitted to ride 
as passengers but should not be permitted to engage 
in the conduct of flight operations of such inter¬ 
national air transport services.” 

Rear Admiral Ruddock and Captain Leighton, the 
Navy Members, while agreeing that ownership or 
control of any type of aircraft or control of airway 
facilities should be denied to German nationals, do 
not agree to a present recommendation that German 
nationals should be for all time completely excluded 
from any participation in the construction, operation 
or maintenance of “airway facilities, including air¬ 
ports and navigation aids in Germany.” They base 
their opinions on the grounds first that such sweep¬ 
ing prohibitions would necessitate the importation of 
a large number of employees of other nations into 
Germany, many of them in non-skilled jobs, second 
that such importations would certainly be a constant 
source of annoyance and resentment among the Ger¬ 
man population, third that there is insufficient evi¬ 
dence to establish that such sweeping exclusions will 
be either necessary or even advantageous to the de¬ 
velopment of a reasonable and “peace-minded” civil¬ 
ian economy in Germany or to the discovery or 
prevention of covert military developments, after the 
withdrawal of the occupation forces, fourth that 
(bearing in mind that part of the services, such as 
air mail, are of immediate and direct concern to the 
German government, and that questions of public 
safety both to travellers and to those on the ground 
will be involved) conditions in Germany as deter¬ 
mined by on-the-spot experience of the Occupation 


Forces may develop the strong desirability of in¬ 
viting a considerable degree of participation by Ger¬ 
man nationals at least in subordinate positions. For 
the foregoing reasons Rear Admiral Ruddock and 
Captain Leighton take the position that this Com¬ 
mittee should leave for later decision by the United 
Nations Control Agencies on the ground the extent 
to which German nationals may be employed in the 
construction, operation and maintenance of civilian 
airway ground service facilities and that this Com¬ 
mittee should go no further than to recommend that 
“Such service facilities should be identified and listed 
and subjected to effective surveillance and control by 
the authorized agencies of the United Nations, under 
regulations to be specifically established by the United 
Nations prior to the withdrawal of the occupation 
forces.” 

3. Complete Elimination Considered Desirable but 
Some Level of Production in Germany may be 
Necessary under Strict Limitation. 

(a) Destroy or remove for reparations, to a pre¬ 
determined level of Production, with special 
consideration being given to elimination: 

(i) Plants producing abrasives. 

(ii) Plants producing precision measuring 

devices. 

(iii) Plants producing fixed atmospheric 

nitrogen. 

Again the committee found itself unable to 
agree unanimously on the entire list of 
items. 

Rear Admiral Ruddock could not agree to the in¬ 
clusion of fixed atmospheric nitrogen in the list of 
basic materials for which some production in post 
occupation Germany would be permitted on the 
grounds that: nitrogen forms the one essential ele¬ 
ment in the manufacture of presently known explo¬ 
sives in common use. The retention of any capacity 
in Germany permits constant development of the 
process and experimentation in its industrial improve¬ 
ment ; and additionally, any capacity in Germany 
might well be a cloak for stock piling. The amount 
of nitrogen necessary in fertilizers in Germany is 
relatively small and this requirement should be pro¬ 
vided by sources outside Germany, perhaps free, as 
an assurance against a redevelopment of this produc¬ 
tion in Germany. 


84 


4. Reduction to a Predetermined Level Recom¬ 
mended. 

(a) Destroy or remove for reparations to a pre¬ 
determined level of capacity and prohibit the expan¬ 
sion of the remaining capacity of the following gen¬ 
eral purpose machine tools and industrial installa¬ 
tions : 

(i) Open hearth steel furnaces. 

(ii) Bessemer steel converters. 

(iii) Plants producing hydrogen. 

(iv) Plants for the production of forestry prod¬ 

ucts. (Especially wood pulp and by¬ 
products.) 

(v) Electric generating and distributing equip¬ 

ment. 

(vi) All plants for the production of general 

purpose machine tools. 

(vii ) Tool room installations in all plants, espe¬ 
cially facilities readily adaptable to the 
production of machine tools. 

( viii) All machine tools and industrial installations 
having a marginal application to civilian 
economy but serving importantly in an 
aircraft production program, such as (but 
not confined to) : 

(aa) All automatic or semi-automatic 
profile milling machines having 
two dimensional simultaneous 
controls. 

(bb) Hydraulic presses above 1000 
tons capacity. 

(cc) Forging presses above 1000 tons 
capacity. 

(dd) Forming or drawing presses 
above 1000 tons capacity. 

(ee) Forging hammers above 2000 lbs. 
or 11" square rating. 

< ix) All general purpose machine tools in all 
plants, especial attention being given to 
those important in aircraft manufacture, 
including but not necessarily limited to: 
(aa) Tigborers. 

(bb) Milling machines, especially those 
adaptable to die sinking, pro¬ 
filing. and to high speed alumi¬ 
num and magnesium cutting, 
(cc) Turret lathes. 

(dd) Automatic screw machines. 

(ee) Profilers. 

(ff) Routers. 


(gg) Sheet metal shears, brakes, roll¬ 
ers, stretch-pressers. 

(hh) Mechanical and hydraulic presses 
for blanking, forming and forg¬ 
ing. 

(ii) Die sinking machines. 

(jj) Drop hammers. 

(kk) Heat treat installations, especially 
those of dimensions and char¬ 
acteristics suitable for alumi¬ 
num and welded steel struc¬ 
tures. 

(11) Mechanical gang riveters, and 
automatic punch, or drill and 
rivet machines. 

i mm) Light high speed hand drills and 
air hammers (riveting). 

(nn) Welders (arc. spot, flash, seam. 

and butt ). 

(oo) Tube benders. 

(pp) Anodvzing and plating installa¬ 
tions. 


5. Plant Buildings and Sendees. 


( a) Accompanying the destruction or removal of the 
machinery and equipment listed in 2. 3 and 4 pre¬ 
ceding, take the following action regarding plant 
buildings and services therefor: 

(i) Remodel or destroy as appropriate all build¬ 

ings in such manner as will prevent rein¬ 
stallation of the equipment without easily 
detected additions to or modification of the 
buildings. 

(ii) Destroy or otherwise render unusable the ac¬ 

cess roads, and other service installations 
such as sewage, water service, etc., beyond 
the requirements of the remaining installa¬ 
tions. 

(iii) Remove all camouflage, including trees closer 

than 30 meters from industrial buildings. 


6. Conditions to he Achieved bx the End of Occu¬ 
pation. 

(a) At the end of the occupation period and prior 
to the withdrawal of the occupation forces, it is essen¬ 
tial that all of the foregoing actions be completed and 
that certain other conditions prevail: 

(i) Conditions to be effective in Germany: 

(aa) The existence of a friendly and non- 


85 


military German Government quali¬ 
fied (to the satisfaction of the occu¬ 
pation forces) to assume full re¬ 
sponsible authority. 

(bb) The industrial capacity is actually re¬ 
duced to the required level, i. e. that 
no significant excess capacity re¬ 
mains over civilian needs or avail¬ 
able for military production. 

(cc) The disbanding of the German Gen¬ 
eral Staff and all organizations for 
the redevelopment of aircraft manu¬ 
facture or operation is an actuality, 
and all previous members and all 
individuals known to be qualified to 
reform such organizations are under 
the complete control of the United 
Nations. 

(dd) The disbanding of all internal cartels 
and trusts of a similar nature is an 
actuality, and all leading members 
of the cartel organizations are under 
the complete control of the United 
Nations. 

(ee) The existence of a satisfactorily stable 
internal economy at whatever level 
is established as satisfactory to the 
occupation forces. 

(ff) The existence and established func¬ 
tioning of a non-German organiza¬ 
tion under international control for 
the operation of such civilian aero¬ 
nautics activities as are determined 
by the United Nations to be neces¬ 
sary to the German civilian econ¬ 
omy, and the existence of such reg¬ 
ulations and controls as are neces¬ 
sary to assure that control does not 
revert to the German government 
or to German nationals. 

(gg) The reorientation of the German edu¬ 
cational system to remove present 
emphasis on scientific and techno¬ 
logical subjects especially applicable 
to the development of instruments 
of war, including aircraft. 

(ii) International agreements completed. 

(aa) International agreements concerning 
the treatment to be accorded Ger¬ 
many in event of violation by the 


latter of imposed conditions of in¬ 
dustrial or military activity. 

(bb) International agreements concerning 
the control of imports into Germany 
of strategic and critical materials 
and exports from Germany. 

(cc) International agreements concerning 
the acceptable characteristics of the 
proposed German Government. 

(dd) International agreements concerning 
the treatment to be accorded na¬ 
tionals of the United Nations en¬ 
gaging in industrial activity in Ger¬ 
many. 

(ee) International agreements concerning 
the treatment of German industrial 
or experimental activity in other 
countries to include agreements as 
to international cooperation to de¬ 
termine undercover German activity 
and elimination thereof. 

(ff) International agreements concerning 
patent rights and the treatment of 
German patents. 

(gg) International agreements concerning 
the treatment of cartel agreements 
of all kinds and character and the 
agency for discovering them. 

(hh) International agreements concerning 
the movements of German indus¬ 
trial and scientific personnel. 

(ii) International agreements concerning 
the freedom of travel of other na¬ 
tionals in German)-. 

(jj) International agreements concerning 
data to be submitted by the Ger¬ 
man Government and the means to 
be provided for checking its reli¬ 
ability. 

(kk) International agreements concerning 
the conduct of air operations by 
L nited Nations in and over German 
territory. 

D. The Post-Occupation Period 

The prohibitions, limitation, and international 
agreements outlined in the preceding parts of this 
chapter are recommended as conditions precedent to 
the withdrawal of the occupation forces and the re¬ 
turn of control of German affairs to the German 


86 


Government. It is assumed that the elected German 
Government will he a party to the international agree¬ 
ments suggested, and that niton the withdrawal of 
the occupation forces the elected German Government 
will be held fully responsible for adherence to inter¬ 
national agreements and for the administration and 
execution of appropriate controls to effect whatever 
prohibitions, limitations, and regulations relating to 
her military and industrial activities are established 
as conditions precedent to the withdrawal of the occu¬ 
pation forces. Thereafter direct control of German 
industry by other than German government agencies 
will be inconsistent with the concept of a “friendly” 
Germany restored to the familv of nations. 

CHAPTER V I : 

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICES FOR 


A. The Period of Occupation in General 

1. Exact administrative devices cannot be tabulated 
in advance. The comments and recommendations are 
being confined to the necessary organizations for 
carrying out the actions proposed in this report. 

The organizations tabulated herein are not repre¬ 
sented to be complete government organization but 
are only those necessary to the accomplishment of 
industrial reduction and control. 

2. The Agencies Xccessary for Enforcing the Actions 

Specified. 

i a) An agenev for surveying the German aircraft 
industry and determining in detail its organization 
and the administrative channels and services of sup¬ 
ply for the accomplishment of: 

(i) Research and experimental development. 

(ii) Production of its end products. 

(iii) Coordinated production of its wide variety of 

components and equipment. 

(iv) Education and Training of its personnel. 

(v) Ground facilities for operation and traffic 

control. 

This agency to determine during the occupation 
period the action required to eliminate facilities for 
the foregoing in the occupation period and to inhibit 
their post occupation resurgence. 


The only practicable course consistent with such 
a concept is to establish avenues of information of a 
nature commonly accepted and used by all nations in 
their normal peace time intercourse, and to use the 
information thus gained to determine the adherence 
or otherwise of the German Government to its under¬ 
takings. The nature of such avenues of information 
is discussed in Chapter Y of this report. It is beyond 
the scope of the present report to recommend action 
to be taken in the event of violations, other than to 
Miggest that whatever action is taken must be taken 
promptly and must be directed at the highest level o!" 
German Government if recurrence of the cycle of 
1918-1945 and the necessity for eventual armed re¬ 
occupation, is to be avoided. 


APPLYING THE POLICIES 


( b) An agency for control of air transport, deter¬ 
mination of nature and volume of air traffic required 
for the civilian needs in the post occupation period, 
and organization required to operate it under inter¬ 
national control. 

(c) An agency for assembling an inventory of 
machine tools and for designating those to be re¬ 
moved or destroyed. 

id) An agency for obtaining a complete survey 
of basic materials and production facilities and for 
designating those units or parts of units to be de¬ 
stroyed or removed. 

( e) An agency for handling basic materials alloca¬ 
tions and thus to determine the requirements of the 
(lerman civilian economy. This agency to be entirely 
devoid of German infiltration at any level. 

( t") An agency for handling government finance 
at all levels down to city government. 

(g) An agency for inspecting the industrial in- 
stallations to determine: 

ii) Has reduction to the required level been ac¬ 
complished ? 

(ii) Have service facilities been correspondingly 
reduced ? 

i iii) Have plant buildings been properly modified ? 

(iv ) Where destruction in place has been decided 
upon, has destruction been such as to pre- 


87 




elude reconstruction short of complete re¬ 
placement ? 

(h) An agency to maintain surveillance over in¬ 
dustrial and managerial personnel, and to regulate 
and control their activities. 

(i) An agency for obtaining a complete survey of 
electric power generating and distribution facilities, 
determining the normal requirements of the civil 
economy, and to designate plants and auxiliary in¬ 
stallations for removal or destruction. 

(j) An agency for surveying and taking under 
control all German industrial organizations, such as 
government activities, trade organizations, cartels, 
etc., and to destroy these organizations and to initiate 
and execute such measures as will assure the com¬ 
plete decentralization of the control of German in¬ 
dustry. 

B. The Post-Occupation Period 

1. General. 

Upon withdrawal of the occupation forces, the 
direct control and operation of German industry will 
lapse unless a large number of individuals are main¬ 
tained in Germany to police the operation thereof and 
to gather statistics. 

The maintenance of such a supervisory agency 
(other than for control of air traffic) is undesirable 
once the decision has been made to withdraw the oc¬ 
cupation forces, as continuing direct control will still 
savor of occupation and be a constant source of an¬ 
noyance and grievance to the German people. At 
this time, therefore, it is desirable to establish less 
obvious means of obtaining information as to the 
activities currently being carried on in Germany and 
as to whether or not there are indications that the 
limitations or prohibitions are being violated. 

2. German Government Reports. 

Although the statistics and reports made by the 
German Government or any agency in Germany, 
would be susceptible of falsification, by implication if 
not in fact, any such data used as the basis of control 
procedures might lead to erroneous conclusions and 
actions. The German Government should, however, 
be required to submit reports at periodic intervals, not 
exceeding one year, on the following and other simi¬ 
lar subjects: 

(a) Government budget allocations and actual ex¬ 
penditures. 


(b) Production of basic materials. 

(c) Employment in industry by industrial classi¬ 

fication. 

(d) Type list of items produced. 

(e) Imports and exports. 

The figures submitted as outlined above, and any 
others considered necessary, should be reviewed by 
the United Nations or World Organization for any 
indication of deception or other suspicious circum¬ 
stance. The United Nations or World Organization 
should have the right to spot check on any item in¬ 
cluded in the report, and the German Government 
should be required to make all records available. 

3. Indication of Violations. 

On the basis of the recommendations contained in 
this report and in the simultaneous report by the same 
committee on Project I (to which this report is com¬ 
plementary), the industrial capacity remaining to 
Germany will he so limited that covert action by 
the German Government to violate the imposed pro¬ 
hibitions and limitations would require widespread 
and obvious construction and industrial activity to 
attain any significant level of production of Arms, 
Ammunition, or Implements of War. This is espe¬ 
cially true in the aircraft field because of (1) the 
distinctive characteristics of the laboratory and proof 
test facilities (especially wind tunnels, assembly build¬ 
ing and landing fields) (2) The unusually wide 
variety of subsidiary products and engineering spe¬ 
cialties entering into the development of components 
and (3) the very nature of end product and its sphere 
of operations. These are all factors which defy at¬ 
tempts to keep secret the existence of development 
activities of any significant magnitude. 

The continuation of a limited amount of “civil” 
aircraft operations in Germany into the post occupa¬ 
tion period will be a powerful asset to the early dis¬ 
covery of covert attempts to evade general industrial 
limitations, provided (1) the operations are com¬ 
pletely controlled by an internationally controlled 
agency (2) are widespread enough to provide for 
occasional passage over all of German territory (3) 
aircraft are manned by crews who number among 
them individuals who are trained observers in vari¬ 
ous industrial fields (4) all flights are required to 
clear from and end at regularly established control 
stations and are made subject of permanent record 
and periodic analysis by qualified experts, and (5) the 
“civil” air control agency is under the direct control 
and regulation of whatever major control body is 


88 


established by international agreement to take cog¬ 
nizance of Germany's general industrial and economic 
activities, and is used as a complementary agency to 
other agencies of that major control body. 

4. Agencies jor Collecting Data in Germany. 

Repeated here for emphasis is the comment con¬ 
tained in this committee’s report on Project I, that 
the gathering of data on industrial activities involved 
in the production of Arms, Ammunition and Imple¬ 
ments of War. including all aircraft, should be the 
function of an international agency, either of the 
United Nations or a World Organization. 

The normal agencies used by governments in inter¬ 
national relations could he used for this purpose. 
They include the following: 

(a) Embassy staffs. 

(b) Commercial, military and naval attaches. 

(c) Consular officers. 

(d) Industrial visitors. 

(e) Tourists. 

In order that the reports and comments received 
from the agencies mentioned above may be entirely 
usable and have bearing on the broad problem in¬ 
volved. there should he prepared a set of instruc¬ 
tions describing the matters on which reports are 
desired and a form to he followed in making the re¬ 
ports. These instructions and forms should be in 
some detail for such permanent agencies as (a) to 

(c) inclusive, but in less detail for ( d) and (e). The 
instructions herein referred to should he prepared by 
the international agency, and the overall estimate of 
conditions and of activities in Germany should be 
made by the same agency. 

Some of the activities to which the observations of 
the agencies ((a) to (e) preceding) should be di¬ 
rected include: 


(a) Radio broadcasts and motion pictures. 

(b) Car loadings. 

(c) Traffic on highways, waterways, and railways. 

(d) Construction or modification of plant struc¬ 

tures. 

(e) Movement of labor groups and changes in em¬ 

ployment practices. 

(f) Installation of new roads, canals, railways. 

electric power lines, water mains, sewers. 

etc. 

(g) Rumors and gossip. 

(h) Formation of organizations or associations. 

(i) Merging of industrial activities. 

(j) Training of youth. 

(k) Formation of any military or militia organi¬ 

zation. 

5. Action Xecessary in the Event of Isolation. 

It is appropriate in conclusion to strongly empha¬ 
size that through reports of such agencies as listed 
above Germany’s aggressive intentions and at least 
the general form and substance of her war making 
preparations were clearly indicated to the world at 
least as early as 1933. During the ensuing six years, 
as a consequence of a policy of individual appease¬ 
ment rather than concerted forceful prophylaxis by 
the World Powers in a position or condition to take 
curative action, Germany was permitted to proceed 
unimpeded on her way to total war. There is every 
reason to believe that after the withdrawal of the 
occupation forces the same agencies can and will in 
the normal course of their activities, again note, and 
again report, developments in Germany in sufficient 
detail and in sufficient time to permit adequate and 
timely prophylactic or curative action to he taken by 
any World Organization which has the concerted will 
and the resources to enforce peace, and the political 
foresight and courage to use it. 


APPENDIX B 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 


1. Confidential —Pamphlet No. 118 
Title: Pictorial Report V-l Launching System 
Source: Armv Service Forces 


2. Confidential —Pamphlet No. 116 
Title: Report on German Aircraft ME-110 G—l/R-3 
Source: Army Service Forces 


89 








3. Secret —Pamphlet No. 109 

Title: Aircraft Works of Koninkijkc Maatschappij 
“De Schelde" 

Source: Army Service Forces 

4. Confidential —Pamphlet No. 110 

Title: Visit To Underground Y—1 Manufacturing 
Plant 

Source: Army Service Forces 

5. Confidential —Pamphlet No. 77 
Title: The Peugeot Organization 
Source: Army Service Forces 

6. Secret —Pamphlet No. 118 
Title: The “Coanda Effect" 

Source : Army Service Forces 

7. Secret —Pamphlet No. 71 

Title: Aircraft Production Activity of The Peugeot 
Organization 

Source: Army Service Forces 

8. Secret —Pamphlet No. 108 

Title : German Manufacture of Airscrews 
Source: Army Service Forces 

9. Secret —Pamphlet No. 199—Part 2 
Title: War Plants Disposal: Aircraft Plants 
Source: Mr. O’Mahoney, from the Committee on 

Military Affairs 

10. Secret —Pamphlet No.-— 

Title: The Bombers Baedeker 
Source : British War Ministry 

Guide to the Economic Importance of German 
Towns and Cities. (Part I—Aachen, Kwstrin) 
(Part II—Lahr, Zwickan) 

11. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.B54 
Title: Notes on the German Aircraft Industry 
Source : Foreign Economic Administration 

A thorough discussion of the German aircraft in¬ 
dustry by an Italian aircraft engineer. 

12. Restricted —Pamphlet No. DSS 133808 

Title: Aircraft Industry—Electrical Equipment Sup¬ 
plies 

Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

A list of German firms, their addresses and 
products. 

13. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.612B 
Title: Focke-Wulf Factories, Germany 
Source: American Embassy, London 

14. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.602 
Title: Focke-Wulf Organization, Germanv 
Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

A PW report on the management of the Focke- 
Wulf organization. 


15. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.B451 

Title: Manufacture of Aircraft Components and Ac¬ 
cessories, Germany and Austria 
Source : American Embassy, London 

A PW rejrort on several aircraft factories. 

16. Confidential —Pamphlet No. DSS 411 

Title: Report on Argus Motoren Works of Berlin, 
Remeckendorf Ost-Germany 
Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

Report on this factory which generally made air¬ 
craft motors. 

17. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 100.2554 
Title: ME—262 Jet-Propelled Fighter 
Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

A PW report on the assembly of this plane. 

18. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.B522 

T itle : The (ierman Aircraft Industry Goes to Ground 
Source: British Whir Ministry 

A PW report on the installation of underground 
aircraft factories in Germany. 

19. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 137259 

Title: Germany, Manufacturers of Aircraft Instru¬ 
ments 

Source: American Embassy in England 

20. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.615 
Title: Aircraft Industry, Germany 
Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

21. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.5S7B 
Title: German Aircraft Production 
Source: British War Ministry 

A report on German aircraft production of com¬ 
pleted planes and accessories. 

22. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 137259 

Title: Germany. Manufacturers of Aircraft Instru¬ 
ments 

Source: American Embassy in England 

23. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 143038 
'Title: German Aviation Fuels 

Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

24. Confidential —-Pamphlet No. DSS 63487 

Title: Estimate of Steel Ingot and Castings Con¬ 
sumption of Germany by End Product 
Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

Memorandum giving an estimate of the required 
steel for German aircraft, aircraft bombs and airdrome 
runways. 

25. Secret —Pamphlet No. DSS 6189.B617 

Title: Aircraft Factories—Austria, Germany and 
Poland 


90 


Source: British War Ministry 

A comprehensive report by a PW on the Amine 
Luther-Seck, W’ien-Artzgersdorf. 

26. Secret —Pamphlet Xo. DSS 115116 

Title: Report on German Armoured Vehicle Produc¬ 
tion 

Source: British W ar Ministry 

27. Secret —Pamphlet Xo. DSS 6189.B618 
Title: Armament Industry, Germany 
Source: British War Ministry 

A report on various shops in the August Engel? 
Complex. 

28. Restricted —Pamphlet Xo. DSS 133808 
Title: Electrical Equipment Supplies 


Source: Foreign Economic Administration 

A list of companies in Austria and Germany with 
the supplies furnished. 

29. Confidential —Pamphlet Xo. DSS 62391 
Title: Expansion and Dispersal in the German Air¬ 
craft Industry 

Source : American Embassy. London 

An interim report on German aircraft industry. 

30. Confidential —Pamphlet Xo. DSS 100.790 
Title: Germany: Use of Paper for Auxiliary Petrel 

Tanks: Fighter Craft 

Source: British Embassy, W ashington. D. C. 


'V U. S. Government Printing Office : 1946—67S1S4 




91 









































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